Wednesday, June 13, 2012

In Asian Waters, an Arms Race With China That America Cannot Win

'The more successful US diplomacy is at building up a large network in the region, the stronger the deterrent effect and the less risk assumed by each member.'

In a speech delivered on June 2 to the Shangri-La Security Dialogue conference in Singapore, US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta attempted to convince his audience that America’s “rebalancing” strategy to the Asia-Pacific region — previous called a “pivot” — is serious and will be backed by expanded military power.

Panetta likely hoped his remarks would bolster the credibility of the administration’s strategy. On closer examination, there is less to Panetta’s Pacific naval buildup than meets the eye. The United States should not expect to win an arms race in the Western Pacific. Instead, it will have to find other more enduring advantages if it hopes to craft a sustainable strategy for the region.

The US Office of Naval Intelligence forecasts that China’s navy will own 106 major warships in 2020, up from 86 in 2009. Seventy-two of these are expected to be attack submarines, compared to 29 for the United States in the Pacific in 2020, under the 60 percent allocation assumption.

Of course, counting ships does not tell the whole story. Even more critical are the missions assigned to these ships and the conditions under which they will fight. In a hypothetical conflict between the United States and China for control of the South and East China Seas, the continental power would enjoy substantial structural advantages over US forces. China, for instance, would be able to use its land-based air power, located at many dispersed and hardened bases, against naval targets.

The Air-Sea Battle concept began as an effort to improve staff coordination and planning between the Navy and the Air Force in an effort to address the structural disadvantages these forces would have when going up against a well-armed continental power like China. The concept is about creating operational synergies between the services. An example of this synergy occurred in last year’s campaign against Libya, when US Navy cruise missiles destroyed Libya’s air defense system, clearing the way for the US Air Force to operate freely over the country.

But Air-Sea Battle still faces enormous challenges in overcoming the “home court” advantage a continental power enjoys deploying its missile forces from hidden, dispersed, and hardened sites. China can acquire hundreds or even thousands of missiles for the cost of one major US warship.

Given these structural weaknesses, Air-Sea Battle’s success will rely not on endlessly parrying the enemy’s missiles, but striking deeply at the adversary’s command posts, communications networks, reconnaissance systems, and basing hubs in order to prevent missiles from being launched in the first place.

The United States won’t be able to win an arms race against China and has no plans to do so. Nor can the Pentagon count on superior military technology; China already has impressive scientific and engineering capabilities, which are only getting better. Instead, US policymakers need to discover enduring strategic advantages that don’t require keeping a qualitative or quantitative lead in weapons.

Geography may be one such benefit. In a conflict, the so-called First Island Chain that runs from Japan to Taiwan and then to the Philippines could become a barrier to the Chinese navy and provide outposts for US and allied sensors and missiles. China would likely view such preparations as a provocation, but from the allied perspective, they will complicate Chinese military planning.

Second, the United States and its allies are far more experienced at planning and conducting complicated military operations that require coordination across countries and military services. With a long-established network of alliances and partnerships in the region, US commanders and their counterparts have accumulated decades of experience operating together. One aspect of Air-Sea Battle is to further extend this advantage.

The most powerful US advantage is the alliance network itself. Washington’s long list of treaty allies and partners provides options for US and allied policymakers and planners. The alliance network could also help convert the threat of escalation to a US advantage. The more US military forces are able to disperse across the region, at temporary or rotational basing arrangements, the more difficult it will be for China to gain an advantage with military power. To achieve such an advantage, China will have to attack a wider number of countries, bringing them into a war on the US side. This prospect should deter conflict from beginning.

The more successful US diplomacy is at building up a large network in the region, the stronger the deterrent effect and the less risk assumed by each member. With its outreach to Asean countries and others over the past decade, the United States seems to be on this path. New rotational basing deals with Australia, Singapore and the Philippines are more evidence of this approach. But more diplomatic success will be required as the challenge from China increases.

US military planners face unfavorable trends in the Western Pacific. Panetta and his lieutenants have sent reinforcements to the region and are rewriting their military doctrines. Although these measures are necessary, US policymakers will need another way. Good strategy requires finding enduring advantages. The alliance network in the region provides US commanders with partner military forces, basing options, operational experience and deterrence against escalation, advantages China won’t match any time soon. In this sense, the solution to the challenging military problem US forces face in the Western Pacific will be found as much with more diplomacy as with more firepower.

Foreign Policy

Robert Haddick is managing editor of Small Wars Journal.

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