Wednesday, February 28, 2018

Kerry B. Collison Asia News: Indonesia’s Ideological Convergence: Emerging Tren...

Kerry B. Collison Asia News: Indonesia’s Ideological Convergence: Emerging Tren...: There is an emerging ideological convergence among activists from different Indonesian Islamic groups toward a more Shariah-oriented ...

Indonesia’s Ideological Convergence: Emerging Trend in Islamic Regulations? – Analysis

There is an emerging ideological convergence among activists from different Indonesian Islamic groups toward a more Shariah-oriented outlook. Such a convergence can be seen from the joint efforts of these activists to enact local Islamic regulations in various Indonesian regions.

Since the Defending Islam rallies in late 2016 and early 2017, there is a perception of a growing ideological convergence between clerics and activists affiliated with different Indonesian Islamic groups, ranging from mainstream ones such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah – the two largest Indonesian Islamic groups, to the more conservative groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and Islamic Defenders Front (FPI).

Beyond the headlines, this apparent convergence can be found in numerous localities throughout Indonesia. Since Indonesia’s political decentralisation began in 2001, activists from these groups have worked together in numerous localities throughout Indonesia to successfully enact and implement local shari’ah regulations known as perda shari’ah in these localities. As of today, nearly 450 local regulations have been implemented by more than 100 Indonesian cities and municipalities.

The Pamekasan Case

Previous research on Islamic regulations in Indonesia concluded that these regulations were developed to bolster the Islamic credentials of local mayors or regents (bupati) so that they could easily win re-election to their positions. They also found the regulations tend to be enacted in the regions with a strong history of Islamism in their politics, for instance, in West Java and South Sulawesi provinces, which were former sites of the Darul Islam rebellion during the 1950s and early 1960s.

However, research by the RSIS’ Indonesia Programme found these regulations are enacted by local councils (DPRD) and executives after extensive lobbying by prominent clerics representing a wide variety of Islamic organisations, which lends support to the ideological convergence thesis outlined above. Also these regulations are now being introduced in areas that historically do not have a strong tradition of regional Islamism, such as in East and Central Java provinces.

An example can be found in the Pamekasan District in Madura Island, East Java province. The regulation here was enacted after an extensive lobbying campaign by a group of local religious scholars (ulama). They were united under the banner of the local branch of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI), with support from the local branches of NU, Muhammadiyah, Al Irsyad, and Sarekat Islam (SI).

The perda was enacted unanimously by Pamekasan’s legislative council owing to the united support from these Islamic organisations, which argued the regulation should be enacted because of the strong Islamic tradition present both within the regency and Madura Island in general.

Uztaz Dwiyanto, the deputy chairman of MUI branch in Pamekasan, said no DPRD councillors were willing to oppose it, as the ulama would have “campaigned to vote them out of office” if they expressed any opposition to the regulation. Kyai Haji Kholil-ur-Rahman, a notable cleric who led the movement to enact the regulation, was then elected as the Bupati of Pamekasan from 2008 to 2013.

After Pamekasan enacted the first perda in 2003, at least five additional regulations were also enacted by the regency — including those which require women to wear headscarves (hijab) while appearing in public places, require all primary school graduates to be tested on their Qur’anic reading proficiency, prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages, and prohibit the establishment of nightclubs and other forms of entertainment within the regency.

The Bojonegoro Regulation

A second example can be found in Bojonegoro District, in the border between East and Central Java provinces. While it is historically known as an area where non-observant Muslims (abangan) predominated as late as the 1980s, it is now transformed as a region where deep expressions of Islamic piety now can be seen clearly in the public sphere. This motivates a group of local clerics to promote a perda mandating primary school graduates to recite the Qur’an properly.

Introduced in 2017, the proposed regulation receives strong support from local branches of Islamic organisations, ranging from NU and Muhammadiyah to more conservative groups like HTI. The latter organisation is having an increased following within this rural region. It has established its own Islamic cooperative, which has attracted many small farmers and tradesmen to become its members, because it does not charge any interests on its loans.

With the Islamist Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) as its primary sponsor, the regulation receives wide support from Bojonegoro’s legislative council. The only party which publicly opposes its enactment is the Indonesian Democratic Party Struggle (PDIP), which expresses concerns that the regulation intervenes in the private lives of Bojonegoro residents.

It also believes the perda can be perceived as a regulation that favours Muslims over other religious faiths, something that violates Indonesia’s national ideology Pancasila, which promotes the equality of all recognised religious groups in Indonesia.

However, other parties represented in the legislative council have expressed their support for the perda, because they do not want to be seen as intimidating the local ulama who are unanimously supporting it, especially as the regency is due to hold its local election in June this year. It is expected to win an easy passage in the council.

Underlying Implications

The effective lobbying for local shari’ah regulations in Pamekasan and Bojonegoro districts illustrates the emerging ideological convergence among activists of mainstream and more conservative Islamic groups in Indonesia to support the enactment of these regulations. This is notwithstanding the fact they are contradictory to the national ideology of Pancasila and the 1945 Indonesian constitution, which bars the creation of laws that favours one religious group above others.

The proliferation of these regulations in multiple localities throughout Indonesia is a ‘bottom-up’ strategy by Islamic groups to change Indonesia’s legal foundation to become more religiously-based instead of Pancasila-based. This is something Indonesian policymakers should be paying more attention to in order to better appreciate the implications for nation building.

*Alexander R Arifianto PhD is a Research Fellow with the Indonesia Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.


Kerry B. Collison Asia News: WEST PAPUA - An Indonesian District Isolated From ...

Kerry B. Collison Asia News: WEST PAPUA - An Indonesian District Isolated From ...:   In a country comprised of thousands of islands, some of which have never been explored by outsiders, one of the most isolated regio...

WEST PAPUA - An Indonesian District Isolated From Development


In a country comprised of thousands of islands, some of which have never been explored by outsiders, one of the most isolated regions in Indonesia is Asmat District, six and a half hours by plane from Jakarta to the Papua capital of Jayapura, then another hour’s ride in a 10-passenger Twin Otter or Caravan, followed by a nine-hour fast ferry ride across the Arafuru Sea.

It is a journey that can only be regarded as risky and not for the faint-hearted, given the possibility of extreme weather that can and does capsize vessels and that causes some passengers to stay on uninhabited islets to await the next boat rather than dare forbidding looking clouds.

This is the southern coast of Papua, nearly 30,000 square kilometers of forest, rivers and swamp with only 90,316 people in a district about the size of Belgium. Surrounded by mangrove forests and rivers, Asmat City is built on wood and boards over a swamp. The ethnic Asmat coastal tribes live as fishermen. Motorcycles can only be found in Agats, the capital of Asmat district 30 minutes down the river by boat. In more remote villages, the majority walk or use boats.

Prone to Illness

In January, Asmat faced an extraordinary crisis when 646 children were affected by a measles outbreak, a disease eradicated in the Americas and much of Europe. With 144 children recorded as suffering from malnutrition, the two diseases killed 70 people. With a global mortality rate of 19 victims per million people, measles is not a deadly disease and its treatment is not difficult. But 70 lives are an expensive price for a preventable tragedy.

It isn’t the first time famine and disease have taken the lives of under-five children in Papua. Asmat’s children look at incoming visitors expectantly with bloated bellies and breastbones that stand out, a common indication of malnutrition, apparently hoping the arrivals mean food. A total of 55 residents of Yakuhimo District died of starvation in 2005. Twice in the same area, as many as 100 residents have died. Another 95 residents of Tambraw District died because of the same issues in 2012.

Malnutrition is inevitable because there is no real food security. The marshy soil is not suitable for agricultural use. Consequently, nutritional intake for children is far from ideal, a problem made worse by the limited availability of clean water. With the soil unsuitable for wells, clean water is obtained from rainwater catchment, a problem in the dry season.

Although water is available from nearby rivers, it is unhealthy because villagers, unaware of sanitation and clean water provision, defecate on the banks where they obtain drinking and cooking water. The rivers and swamps are murky at best and the water is unfit for consumption.

Rare Health Facilities

There are only 16 health care centers, known as Puskesmas, serving 23 districts and 224 villages. However, Asmat is not the only region in Papua with minimal health care facilities. In an area of 319,000 sq km – an area the size of Poland or Norway, with a population of just 3.5 million people, Papua has only 589 health service units. Compare that with Jakarta, with 2,763 health units covering 664 sq km.

The low number of health care facilities in Papua is proportional to the lack of health personnel. In such a vast territory, Papua has only 17,000 medical personnel. In comparison, in West Java with an area of 35,000 sq km, there are 119,000, approximately seven times as many as Papua.

The Agats district has only one surgeon and seven general practitioners. It has no pediatrician although the hundreds of cases of malnutrition in infants and toddlers require handling by specialists in childhood diseases and afflictions.

What Needs to Be Done

Asmat’s isolation is a fundamental issue affecting the availability of public services such as health, education, and others. However, the central government is not turning a blind eye to the existing development gap. Between 2002 and 2017, Papua has received a special allocation of almost Rp58 trillion (U$2.4 billion). Another Rp8 trillion has been budgeted for 2018.

With Asmat District having been allocated not less than Rp173 billion for health care, it is almost incomprehensible how famine has always repeated itself there. However, funds go unused because the sick don’t or can’t seek hospital care. A trip from one village to another requires long hours of boat travel, and few even own boats. Take Atat village, located on the banks of the Mamat River and surrounded by swamp. To reach the closest district hospital in Agats, residents must rent a boat costing Rp3-4 million (US$210-292) for three hours’ travel time. Just finding money to pay for food is difficult. Renting a boat is out of the question.

If the trillions of rupiahs allocated to the local government aren’t utilized on fundamental issues, the situation isn’t going to change. The hungry continue to be hungry, the sick will get sicker. What is really needed in Asmat is the opening of road access. Where they exist, 43 percent or Asmat’s roads are unpaved and 56 percent are made of wooden planks. Only slightly less than 1 percent of the district’s roads are made of concrete.

The construction of roads and transport facilities is vital to contribute to the eradication of various issues of low quality of life in Asmat. The opening of access would facilitate the transfer of goods and services to contribute to the mobility of the public to use public facilities such as access to health care. The availability of proper transportation of access would also allow the construction of other crucial facilities such as hospitals, schools and water treatment. But given the district’s isolation, it is a daunting task. Just getting there is hard enough.

Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat is a doctoral candidate at the University of Manchester. Dikanaya Tarahita is an Indonesian freelance writer. They are regular contributors to Asia Sentinel


Tuesday, February 27, 2018

Kerry B. Collison Asia News: One Belt, One Road, And Now One Circle – Analysis ...

Kerry B. Collison Asia News: One Belt, One Road, And Now One Circle – Analysis ...: Drift ice camp in the middle of the Arctic Ocean as seen from the deck of icebreaker Xue Long. Photo by Timo Palo, Wikimedia Commons. ...

One Belt, One Road, And Now One Circle – Analysis - The last frontier for exploration is being breached

Drift ice camp in the middle of the Arctic Ocean as seen from the deck of icebreaker Xue Long. Photo by Timo Palo, Wikimedia Commons.

The anticipated economic and strategic windfall from environmental change in the Arctic has spurred China to officially enunciate an Arctic policy. Key to note are: 1) the starring role the Belt and Road Initiative plays in China’s engagement in the Arctic, and 2) the approach of using international law to justify Chinese entry and activity in the Arctic. The question that emerges is whether these two approaches — China’s BRI on the one hand and international law and norms on the other — will eventually be at cross-purpose.

The last frontier for exploration is being breached.

Last August, a Russian-owned LNG tanker with a unique reinforced steel hull became the first vessel to travel from Norway to South Korea, through the Northern Sea Route (NSR) along the Russian Arctic coast, without the aid of an ice-breaking vessel, and that too in merely 19 days. US president Trump, within his first 100 days, signed an executive order calling for a review of the former president’s plan that blocked offshore drilling in the polar regions. Finland and Norway are studying the viability and profitability of an Arctic Railway project that would connect the Nordic region to the Arctic coast, offering pathways into Europe all the way to the Mediterranean Sea, and along the Russian NSR to Asian markets.

China, too, has staked claim. A non-Arctic littoral — or, as it calls itself, a “Near-Arctic state” — China released its official Arctic policy at the end of last month, coming on the heels of increasing activity and visibility in the region in question that is raising eyebrows and anxieties. The white paper declares China as “an important stakeholder in Arctic affairs” and reveals an expanding playground in which China sees itself as a legitimate actor. Retreating ice in the Arctic and its repercussions — effect on local climate and environment and domestic agriculture and marine industries, waterway and resource development in the Arctic — are matters “vital to the existence and development of all countries and humanity, and directly affect the interests of non-Arctic States including China.”


These interests are both economic and strategic. Reduced shipping costs given shorter routes between Asia and Europe, as compared to the traditional Malacca Strait and Suez Canal route, benefit foreign trade and strengthen energy security for China. Indeed, as the policy document states: “The utilization of sea routes and exploration and development of the resources in the Arctic may have a huge impact on the energy strategy and economic development of China, which is a major trading nation and energy consumer in the world.” 90% of China’s trade is seaborne, so even small differences in time taken could mean big savings and greater profits. For instance, it normally takes 48 days for container ships to reach Rotterdam from China. Passage through the Arctic would reduce Europe to Asia distances by anywhere between 20% to 40%. There are even time and cost savings if ships set course from southern Chinese ports — the distance between Hong Kong and Northwestern Europe is still shorter by as much as 14%.


An important, inter-related factor is China’s ever-enhancing shipping power and increasing role in shipping finance. China’s state-owned shipping company, Cosco, is the largest shipping company outside of Europe, and China today lays claim to the third-largest merchant ship fleet in the world. This is reflective of not only the shipping industry’s importance to China’s economy, but also the key role China’s growing merchant fleet and shipping finance industry are set to play in the rolling out of China’s maritime trade and infrastructure vision — including in the Arctic — in a bid to better control its maritime trade.

The Arctic also allows transportation through a more politically peaceable environment and is thus a more secure alternative to bottlenecked waters prone to piracy and which are dominated by a strategic competitor. Close to 70% of China’s energy needs are met by seaborne imports. The lure of undiscovered oil and natural gas resources — anywhere between one-fifth and a quarter of untapped fossil fuel resources, potentially altogether worth as much as $35 trillion — throw up alternative energy sources that China can tap and thus bolster its energy security. The US Geological Survey pegs 30% of the world’s undiscovered natural gas and 13% of undiscovered oil reserves in the Arctic. Not to forget what are thought to be considerable deposits of mineable minerals — gold, silver, diamond, copper, nickel, titanium, graphite, uranium — and, crucial for the manufacturing of high-tech products like electric cars and smartphones, rare earth elements, such as lithium and cobalt. Clearly at play is a longer-term vision to secure future trade routes to markets and resources.

The other strategic motivation implied is of course the desire to play a bigger role in trans-regional and global issues — and not just as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a fact that is included in the policy document as a rationale for China jointly shouldering the cause of peace and security in the Arctic, or under a vision of “shared future for mankind,” also liberally invoked throughout the document. The Arctic is a new sphere — previously inaccessible — where China wants to play a leading role, “since the traditional areas are already taken by the old powers,” as notes Jin Canrong at Renmin University.

Critically, given the continued reality of climate change in the Arctic, the development of this region will see new technologies and ‘economic biomes’ come to the fore. This will not only catapult the Arctic as a major theatre of activity — economic and geopolitical — in the coming future, but will also define science and sustainability in the 21st century.


Given this context, it is hardly surprising that the Chinese white paper on the Arctic advances a “Polar Silk Road” under the ambit of its broader Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), considering the starring role the BRI is already playing in advancing “Xiplomacy” (think the Two Centenaries and the “Chinese Dream”). At first glance, the Chinese mandate primarily encourages its enterprises to develop shipping routes, including infrastructure construction, conduct commercial trial voyages, and operation of these shipping routes. Other areas, such as energy cooperation, blue economy, and tourism, are not directly linked to the Polar Silk Road. But these are already existing fields of Chinese engagement under the BRI. Digital connectivity is also specifically mentioned. China is likely to use the BRI as a key vehicle to fulfill its stated policy goals (“to understand, protect, develop and participate in the governance of the Arctic”).

While Beijing has been active in the Arctic since it bought its first icebreaker from Ukraine in 1994, recent years have seen an uptick in Chinese engagement. Not only has China’s only icebreaker now navigated the three major shipping routes through the Arctic, a Chinese ship carrying 19,000 tonnes of cargo became the first container vessel ever in 2013 to transit the NSR to reach Rotterdam from Dalian — and that too in a month’s time compared to the 45 days it normally takes through the Suez Canal. China also became an observer in the Arctic Council, the highest-level body governing the Polar North, in 2013. In fact, Chinese president Xi Jinping even referred to China as an “upcoming ‘polar-region power” during a state visit to Australia in 2014.

Research of navigational routes, as well as that of climate and environmental changes in the Arctic, and exploration of the region’s potential resources are part of the ambit of this blue economic corridor. (An earlier paper by the State Oceanic Administration referred to the Northwest Passage as a “northern link” in BRI.)

On the ground, Russia’s NSR is already a strategic area of cooperation between China and the largest Arctic state as part of the BRI — Xi and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin signed a joint declaration in July last year that invoked an “Ice Silk Road,” under which the NSR Route will be developed. (But note that the Chinese Arctic white paper does not highlight the NSR or any particular Arctic route as the preferred shipping route Chinese companies will pursue.) The Yamal LNG project is the primary and largest Sino-Russian venture in this regard, which is expected to supply China with four million tonnes of LNG per year, transported through the NSR and reaching China in just 15 days, less than half the time it would take using the traditional shipping route around Europe and through the Suez Canal.[1] The Silk Road Fund holds a 9.9% stake, and the China National Petroleum Corporation, 20%; Chinese banks have partly funded the project; and 60% of the equipment has been contributed by Chinese companies. Cosco is all set to send six ships to transport equipment, steel, pulp, and other items along the NSR. Engagement in Russia’s Far East, including in oil and gas fields; construction of ice-class cargo vessels; and a deepwater port on the northwestern Russian coast are Sino-Russian projects on the cards.

At the same time, China has also approached other Arctic littorals. While none of the other Arctic states are officially part of the BRI, they are members of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (thus firmly within the scope of the BRI) and are actively engaged in Arctic projects that are likely to be subsumed under the BRI umbrella. For instance, Chinese mining companies are active in the Canadian Arctic and Greenland. Last year saw China particularly amplify its interaction with Finland, which is currently chair of the Arctic Council until 2019. Xi became the first Chinese president to visit the Nordic state in 22 years. The first China-Finland iron silk road began operating last November, the first railway to link China with the Nordic region. Both are jointly building a second Chinese icebreaker, to be completed in 2019. And recently, China began discussing a 10,500-km fibre optic across the Arctic to create the fastest digital highway between Europe and China as early as 2020. The proposal involves Finland, Norway, Russia, and Japan. Xi has even reached out to Alaska, making an unexpected stop on his way back home post the China-US bilateral summit in April last year. There, he was apparently offered “a generation’s worth” of LNG supply by the governor.

BRI and international law: Convergence or clash?

China’s Arctic policy — insofar as the ambition and the policy goals are concerned — is not a surprise. The inclusion of the BRI as a means of fulfilling China’s stated aims in the Arctic necessarily means the appearance of similar parameters and principles — and indeed, “respect,” “cooperation,” and “win-win result” undergird Chinese activity in this specific geography as well. “Sustainability” is understandably given greater weight in this policy document.

In practice, what does pursuing an Arctic policy through BRI as a primary vehicle mean? The Chinese trade and infrastructure initiative has already gained nomenclature as the “hardware” of Chinese — pick one — hegemony/power projection/Sino-centric Asian and world order. As such, the Arctic, too, is being hardwired into a hub-and-spokes architecture, with China at the centre, that can then be supplemented with policies, norms, and practices. Indeed, as political scientist Michael Byers has said, “They (Chinese companies) are starting to do in Arctic what they are doing elsewhere: they are investing in infrastructure, they are buying foreign companies, they are competing for leases in oil and mineral extraction.”

Against this context, the repeated stress on abiding by international law is noteworthy in the policy document. Given that China is a non-Arctic state, it has clearly used the principles of international law to justify an uncontested and unbarred entrance into the Arctic region: “States from outside the region do not have territorial sovereignty in the Arctic, but they do have rights in respect of scientific research, navigation, overflight, fishing, laying of submarine cables and pipelines in the high seas and other relevant sea areas in the Arctic Ocean, and rights to resource exploration and exploitation in the Area, pursuant to treaties such as UNCLOS and general international law.” The reiteration that Arctic shipping must be conducted in accordance to international law further seems logical when taking into account existing territorial disputes among the Arctic littorals — such as the Northwest Route, which Canada sees as its internal waters, but the US claims as an international waterway. Clearly, for China to pursue its interests in this region, an understanding of Arctic waters as international commons — and thus freely navigable — is critical. Such an interpretation is possible through the UNCLOS framework.

China’s implementation of the BRI on the ground and the intended use of the BRI to carve a different world order (“all roads lead to Beijing”) stands as a counterpoint to the understanding of the Arctic as an international commons where, as indicated by the policy document, China will abide by all international legal instruments, treaties, and mechanisms of pertinent institutions, like the International Maritime Organization. Indeed, as Chinese and polar politics specialist Anne-Marie Brady states, “China’s focus on becoming a polar great power represents a fundamental reorientation — a completely new way of imagining the world” — and the polar region is one new strategic playground where China will build and prove its burgeoning power. Will this alternative world vision give appropriate right of way to international law and treaties? The short shrift given to UNCLOS closer home in the South China Sea could very well bely any true commitment on the part of China to accepted norms beyond, perhaps, an opportunity to allay concerns of revisionist designs.

Responses to China’s official Arctic policy run to both extremes. Some are crying wolf and calling it a cover for a more subversive strategy; others believe China is only stepping up as a responsible nation, and any irresponsible activity will undermine its credibility – and that the policy itself is a clear statement against which to measure its behaviour. While China’s capital is in high demand among the Arctic states as well — infrastructure investment needs are to the tune of $1 trillion over the next 15 years — commercial shipping through the Arctic is unlikely until at least 2040 given existing environmental, technological, and financial challenges. Matters of environment and sustainability, navigation security, and dual-use infrastructure will become salient in the meantime. Chinese behaviour and actions will ultimately determine whether BRI implementation practices converge with the upholding of international law that China promises in its official Arctic policy.

About the author:
*Ritika Passi
is Project Editor and Associate Fellow at ORF. Her research focuses on issues of connectivity, security and development. She is currently working on the Belt and Road Initiative and the International North-South Transport Corridor. In an editorial capacity, she is in charge of ideating, coordinating and producing special projects. She oversees the Global Policy Journal-ORF series. She is the editor of the ORF Primer, which ran for two years, and co-editor of ORF Raisina Files 2017. 

This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.

[1] The first shipment occurred in December last year, marking the start of commercial operations


Thursday, February 22, 2018

Kerry B. Collison Asia News: The Emergence of Indonesia’s Ocean Policy – Analys...

Kerry B. Collison Asia News: The Emergence of Indonesia’s Ocean Policy – Analys...:   Indonesia finally has a comprehensive Ocean Policy to steer all government agencies towards a single, unified direction: to realise...

The Emergence of Indonesia’s Ocean Policy – Analysis


Indonesia finally has a comprehensive Ocean Policy to steer all government agencies towards a single, unified direction: to realise the Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) vision of President Joko Widodo to be a strong maritime nation.

The Indonesian equivalent for the word “Motherland” is “Tanah Air” or literally “Land-Water”. This signifies that the islands and waters comprising the Nusantara – the Indonesian archipelago — make up one unified and inseparable entity. Starting from the Djuanda Declaration of 1957 which enunciated Indonesia’s “Wawasan Nusantara” or Archipelagic Outlook, Indonesia took a leading role in the international acceptance of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982 which recognises Indonesia’s status as an archipelagic state.

Nevertheless, throughout most of the New Order period (1966-1998) the Indonesian government paid scant attention to the country’s maritime development. The priorities of the Suharto government were predominantly land-based and focused on the densely populated islands in the western part of Indonesia. While the limited financial resources to develop a strong navy and other maritime capacity was a major constraint, the real impediment to the realisation of Wawasan Nusantara was the army’s then stranglehold on politics.

Streamlining Indonesian Ocean Law

The call for greater attention to Indonesia’s maritime domain had started during the New Order period, but it only found traction after the fall of President Suharto in 1998. Successive Indonesian governments since the onset of reformasi have begun to give more attention to Indonesia’s archipelagic nature with its specific weaknesses and potentials.

Strengthening the Indonesian navy, ensuring better control over Indonesia’s outermost islands, finalising maritime boundaries, improving law enforcement at sea to ensure the security and safety of navigation, husbanding the country’s rich marine resources and improving sea transportation to reduce the isolation of the eastern islands have all become national priorities


One of the problems faced by Indonesia over its maritime domain was that for a long time there was no single comprehensive ocean regulation. There were over a dozen laws which gave different ministries and agencies particular responsibilities at sea. Development activities were scattered over various central government ministries and agencies to the different levels of regional administrations without a clear roadmap, leading to disappointing results and inefficiency.

Institutional competitions were particular hazards to law enforcement at sea. The seriousness of the situation led to increasing calls for a more integrated policy on managing Indonesia’s seas.

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono established a consultative body, the “Dewan Kelautan Indonesia” (Indonesian Maritime Council), in 2007 to help formulate a general policy on ocean affairs. President Yudhoyono signed the seminal Law Number 32 of 2014 on Ocean Affairs on 17 October 2014, just a few days before he stepped down. The move brought together salient elements scattered in different legislations pertaining to the management and development of Indonesia’s maritime domain under one law.

Law Number 32/2014 became the legal basis for the establishment of the “Badan Keamanan Laut” (Maritime Security Board), a full-fledged agency responsible for ensuring security, safety and law enforcement at sea with a stronger mandate than the coordinating agency for security at sea “BAKORKAMLA” that it replaced.

Indonesia as a “Global Maritime Fulcrum”

While all the post-1998 presidents had given greater attention towards Indonesia’s maritime domain, it is President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) who has elevated maritime-related affairs to a national priority. Strengthening Indonesia’s maritime identity was one of the campaign pledges put forward by President Jokowi, which he followed up with the plan to make Indonesia a “Global Maritime Fulcrum” (GMF) soon after being sworn in as president on 20 October 2014.

Jokowi created the new Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs, which coordinates the Ministry for Maritime Affairs and Fishery, the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources as well as the Ministry of Tourism, reflecting its economic thrust.

On 20 February 2017 Jokowi signed Presidential Decree Number 16 of 2017 concerning Indonesian Ocean Policy (IOP) which will be the primary reference point for all programmes and activities related to Indonesia’s maritime domain. The goal of the IOP is to realise the GMF Vision of “Indonesia as a sovereign, advanced, independent, strong maritime nation that is able to provide positive contribution for peace and security in the region as well as to the world”.

The roadmap of the IOP highlights seven policy pillars: Marine and Human Resources Development; Maritime Security, Law Enforcement and Safety at Sea; Ocean Governance and Institutions; Development of Maritime Economy; Ocean Space Management and Marine Protection; Maritime Culture; and Maritime Diplomacy. Each of the policy pillars is further broken down into policies/strategies, altogether totalling 76 policies/strategies.

The first Plan of Action is for the period 2016-2019 which highlights five priority clusters: Maritime Boundary, Ocean Space and Maritime Diplomacy; Maritime Industry and Sea Connectivity; Services and Industry of Marine Natural Resources and Marine Environment Management; Maritime Defence and Security; and Maritime Culture.

The implementation of the IOP is carried out by the ministries and non-ministerial government agencies according to their respective roles and functions under the supervision of the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs.

Indonesia as Promoter of World Peace

It can be seen that the IOP is primarily domestically-oriented as most of the policy pillars and strategies are aimed at strengthening the protection and management of the Indonesian archipelago, and maximising the economic potentials that its maritime domain has to offer as part of Indonesia’s overall economic development. The external dimensions of the IOP are limited to maritime diplomacy and to defence and security.

Nevertheless, the GMF vision also underlines Indonesia’s view of itself as an international promoter of peace. One of the IOP programmes on defence and security is to enhance Indonesia’s participation in regional and international cooperation on maritime defence and security. On maritime diplomacy the IOP explicitly states that Indonesia must play a leadership role in various maritime cooperation and initiatives at the regional and multilateral levels.

The IOP, moreover, also states that the GMF vision should take into account of, and be synergised with, the various regional initiatives as long as they are in line with Indonesia’s national interests and can make positive contributions to peace.

*Dewi Fortuna Anwar is Distinguished Visiting Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. A Research Professor at the Centre for Political Studies-Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), she straddles the world of academia, political activism and government, having also served previously in the State Secretariat during the Habibie Presidency and subsequently in senior advisory positions to two Indonesian vice-presidents


Monday, February 19, 2018

Kerry B. Collison Asia News: Indonesia’s military craves more power

Kerry B. Collison Asia News: Indonesia’s military craves more power: Indonesia’s military craves more power To the consternation of pro-democracy activists and those with grim memories of ex-president S...

Indonesia’s military craves more power

Indonesia’s military craves more power

To the consternation of pro-democracy activists and those with grim memories of ex-president Suharto’s authoritarian rule, Joko Widodo’s government continues to mull over legislation that would give the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) a wider counterterrorism role.

It is not clear yet what changes will be made to the 2003 Anti-Terrorism Law, but in a letter to Parliament last month new armed forces chief Air Chief Marshal Hadi Tjahjanto rang alarm bells by proposing that terrorism should be changed from a law enforcement to an officially defined state security issue.

That, and the contention that terrorism is also a threat to territorial integrity, would place it squarely within the domain of the military, which lost its internal security role when democratic reforms made it solely responsible for external defense in 1999.

 “The question is whether it is desirable to give the military the authority to take the initiative without reference to the police,” says Sidney Jones, director of the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, a think tank. “It opens a wedge where the dangers will outweigh the benefits that would come from specifying its roles in the law.”

Previous versions of the draft legislation have allowed Indonesia’s capable special forces units to spearhead the response in cases of ship or aircraft hijacks, mass hostage-taking and multiple simultaneous terrorist threats.

“The law only provides for prohibited acts carrying criminal liability for the perpetrators (and) is only applicable after terrorism acts have been carried out,” said in his letter to the parliamentary committee working on the draft.

To deal effectively and efficiently with terrorism, Tjahjanto wrote, the strategy of “proactive law enforcement” should be applied where terrorists are lawfully apprehended in the planning stages of an operation before they can inflict death and destruction.

Maritime Coordinating Minister Luhut Panjaitan, a former commander of the army special forces’ (Kopassus) elite Detachment 81 counterterrorism unit, told Asia Times that Indonesia is merely seeking to model itself along the lines of many Western countries.

He points in particular to the involvement of the British Special Air Service in the dramatic 1980 Iranian Embassy operation as an example of the army being called in when the police were not thought to be up to the task.

Panjaitan says the government wants to create a crisis center at the presidential palace, separate from the existing National Anti-Terrorism Agency (BNPT), which would make decisions on threat levels and whether to involve the military in any given situation.

“All we want to do is create the right balance,” says the retired four-star general, who also acts as Widodo’s chief political adviser. “We want to establish an equilibrium for the roles of the police and the military.”

Panjaitan rules out formalizing a specific anti-terrorism role for the military’s nationwide territorial structure. But he says the retired non-commissioned officers who form the village-level layer, known as babinsa, could still act as “eyes and ears” of the counterterrorism apparatus.

Former president Susilo Bambang Yiudhoyono was furious when he learned that the militants responsible for the 2009 bombing of Jakarta’s J.W. Marriott Hotel had been living in a village in Java for four years without anyone reporting their presence.

Security experts estimate 80% of anti-terrorism efforts focus on intelligence, 15% on investigation and only 5% on what they call “door-kicking,” though the tactical capabilities involved in that task are crucial.

On that score, there is a significant difference in capabilities between Detachment 81 and its police counterpart, Detachment 88, which was created in the wake of the devastating 2002 Bali bombing and has still performed remarkably well with limited training.

Those limitations became obvious during a joint exercise at a supposed terrorist-held hotel in central Jakarta, where two police commandoes found themselves stuck upside down as they rappelled down the front of the building – in stark contrast to the fast-roping ability of the Kopassus operators.

US instructors and other well-placed sources say that like other specialized units, Detachment 88 has perishable skills which require constant training – something that hasn’t been achieved up to now because of a continual turnover of manpower.

This lack of continuity, they say, means the unit has yet to learn the teamwork and expertise needed to take down a building occupied by terrorists, one of the main reasons why the paramilitary force has often been accused of shooting first and asking questions later.

Kopassus appears to have maintained its skill level, despite the 17-year embargo the US imposed on military contacts between the two countries over the bloody events in East Timor in 1991 and later during the then Indonesian territory’s vote for independence in 1999.

While Kopassus has vastly improved its human rights record, it will take more time to relax the so-called Leahy Law, named after Democrat Senator Patrick Leahy, which still forbids the Indonesians from engaging in combat training with US special forces.

US Defence Secretary James Mattis promised to re-explore the issue during a visit to Jakarta in late January, where he was treated to a bizarre display of Kopassus soldiers breaking concrete blocks with their heads and drinking the blood of snakes they had killed.

Ironically, when then US President Barrack Obama visited Indonesia for the 2011 East Asia Summit, Kopassus and army regulars occupied the two inner rings of the security cordon at Bali airport, leaving the police outside on the perimeter.

The amended anti-terrorism law aims at bolstering the policy and coordination powers of the BNPT, a 100-strong counterterrorism agency staffed by police and military officers which has proved largely ineffectual since it was established by the Yudhoyono administration in 2010.

Critics say there is no guarantee that giving it more staff and a larger budget will make it any more effective, particularly in the disengagement and de-radicalization of terrorist convicts.

Recidivism within five years of an arrest is surprisingly low, certainly below 10%, but researchers say that has little to do with government programs and more to do with pressure from wives, the birth of a new child or other family circumstances.

On the other hand, the Correction Department’s failure to keep convicted militants in isolation and away from the general prison population has led to further terrorist recruitment from among common criminals.

To rectify that shortcoming, the government is building a new maximum security facility on the prison island of Nusakambangan, off Java’s southern coast, which will eventually hold 240 of the country’s convicted terrorists and other high-risk prisoners.

It is modeled after Louisiana’s Pollock federal penitentiary in the US, with one notable exception: it will be surrounded by a moat, which presents potential water-soaked escapees with an additional hazard when negotiating an electrified perimeter fence.

Much will depend, however, on whether the supposedly specially trained guards will make a difference, particularly in preventing the prisoners from using mobile phones, as they have been able to do by paying off wardens in other jails.

The 210-square-kilometer Nusakambangan is already home to seven prisons, including Pasir Putih, which along with Cirebon and Garut in other parts of mainland West Java is one of three facilities currently designated for terrorist convicts.

The island houses up to 1,500 prisoners, including about 60 criminals who face death by firing squad at one of two sites set aside for executions; it was where Bali bombers Imam Samudra, 38, Amrozi bin Nurhasyim, 47, and Al Ghufron, 48, were put to death in 2008.

Now on trial in Jakarta, radical cleric Aman Abdurrahman, 46, could suffer the same fate if he is found guilty of masterminding from behind bars the January 14, 2016, bomb and gun attack in the center of Jakarta which left four militants and four civilians dead.

It was that incident, inspired by the now-faltering Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), that prompted calls for strengthening BNPT’s ability to coordinate the 36 different ministries and agencies involved in trying to rein in violent jihadism

By John McBeth Jakarta, February 19, 2018 2:18 PM (UTC+8)

Sunday, February 18, 2018


Kerry B. Collison Asia News: TRIBALISM IS KILLING MULTICULTURALISM:   The word “Multiculturalism” may be a recent innovation in the English language. The concept however goes back a long way. Multicult...



The word “Multiculturalism” may be a recent innovation in the English language. The concept however goes back a long way. Multiculturalism is in fact just a rebranded form of tribalism. For most of human existence, tribalism has been the default human condition. We are tribal by nature. If you have any doubts about that fact, then go to an English soccer match, that’s a lesson in anthropology you won’t forget in a hurry.

Despite its enduring persistence, tribalism is an extremely poor way to organise a society. Tribal societies rarely rise above the most meagre level of existence. 

Tribalism is inherently destructive and inefficient. An inordinate amount of effort is expended on offence and defence. This leaves few resources available for productive enterprise like producing food and shelter. Unfortunately, in a tribal system, every tribe must play the tribal game or suffer the consequences.

The tribal game consists of looking out solely for the interests of the tribe. In the tribal game, there are only two rules.

Rule 1) There are no rules

Rule 2) See rule one

In effect, tribalism is the law of the jungle. Kill or be killed is the order of the day. The tribe must jealously guard its territory and seek if possible to extend it. That can only be done through physical conflict because neighbouring tribes are unlikely to give up territory without a fight.

In recent times, academics have imagined that tribal, and especially pre-civilised, people lived a peaceful, idyllic existence until white people showed up.


There is no evidence for this viewpoint. In fact, if we look more closely, a very different picture emerges. Many skeletons excavated from times before civilisation show unmistakable signs of human inflicted fatal injuries. 

Skulls with axe wounds, arrow heads lodged in skeletons and similar damage allows us to estimate the levels of fatal conflict. These are probably underestimated as they ignore other injuries which are not visible on skeletal remains.

Even so, the numbers are shocking and paint a bleak picture of tribal existence. Tribal warfare rarely involves large scale battles of the kind nation states engage in. However, the lower level skirmishes carried out over a much longer time frame had devastating results on tribal populations, including women and children.


The chances of being involved in a kill or be killed situation is vanishingly small for a citizen of a modern Western nation state. Even WW1, which was one of our bloodiest conflicts had a relatively low body count. The flu pandemic which followed wiped out more people than the war itself.

In contrast, tribal conflicts can easily wipe out 30% or more of an entire tribal population.

That is not to say that tribes are in a constant state of conflict. They can in fact enjoy long periods of relative peace. Unfortunately, tribalism demands that such periods are used to increase populations in readiness for inevitable conflict. The inevitability of the conflict is caused by the exploding populations and the demands these put on scarce resources. Unfortunately, tribes which don’t play this game will be wiped out. Darwin’s theories apply to societies even more than they do to individuals.


This isn’t to say that tribal people are inferior in any sense. For most of human history, our ancestors were tribal. It is simply a destructive system. Witness the Ethiopian famine of the early ‘80s which was met with Western aid, spearheaded by Sir Bob “send the F@#king money” Geldof and his Live Aid concerts.

At the time of that famine, there were 40 million hungry people in Ethiopia. By 2010 that number had doubled. Today, there is famine once more and yet the population is projected to double again within 20 or 30 years. How is that possible? Only through Western Aid is the obvious answer. Unfortunately, Western aid will eventually be either overwhelmed or withdrawn. When that happens, Ethiopian tribes will fight and kill each other for whatever food remains just as you or I would in that situation. The largest tribe will likely win that fight. That is how tribalism has worked for most of human history.


The amazing thing is not the perpetuation of tribalism. It is the fact that we managed to break out of that cycle and create the Nation State.

A nation state is like a “supersized tribe.” It holds a fixed territory with agreed borders. Violence is monopolised by the state whose job it is to coordinate protection of both the borders and the citizens within.

This system is not without disadvantages. The large distances between the rulers and their citizens can lead to episodes of extreme indifference or worse, by ruling classes.

This dynamic creates a constant struggle between rulers and ruled. In the Western world, and especially in the Anglosphere however, we have a strong foundation of institutions such as English Common Law, the Rule of Law and Democracy. These philosophical and legal foundations give citizens protection from rogue governments and have underpinned a society which previous humans could only dream about.

The size of a Nation State means that localised droughts or catastrophes can be dealt with through shared resources. The savage drought in Eastern Australia in the 2000s never caused the starvation we commonly see in African droughts.


The Rule of Law allows for large scale enterprises which produce an abundance of foods and other consumer goods. The lack of tribal competition removes the need for rapid population increases and our technology gives us a means to effortlessly control our numbers.

Steadily declining populations reduce environmental strains and provide ever increasing abundance for future generations. We live in societies which provide a standard of living which earlier humans could only dream about.

That is not to say that tribal life is without redeeming features. Many of our recreational activities revolve around things which tribal people take for granted. However, the disadvantages are monumental. 


Imagine an awkward childbirth in a tent, when the medical establishment consists of a bloke with a stick with some feathers on it. Or how about neighbours who will set fire to your hut in the middle of the night and then butcher you and your family when you come running out. Sorry, but I’ll take apartment living every time.

Unfortunately, the Western Nation State is now under serious threat from tribalism. The decision to import vast numbers of tribal people into Western Nations is undermining our very foundations.

What is often conveniently ignored, and now virtually illegal to mention in many Western Nations, is that the European Nation States were founded as Supersized tribes with a shared ethnic, cultural and religious foundation. Patriotism is Tribalism writ large. “Ask not what your country can do for you,” demanded Kennedy, “ask what you can do for your country.”


Yet the word “country,” was the wrong word. The word he should have used was “countrymen.” As with “King and Country,” it was not land which people made sacrifices for, it was for their countrymen.

Like it or not, people identify with their own ethnic kind. We view them as extended family. Whenever they have the chance, people have a tendency to self-segregate. That doesn’t mean that we are all closet Nazis. It is simply human nature to feel more comfortable among people of “your own kind.”

Neither is that an exclusively “white” phenomenon.

In fact, from personal experience, I would suggest that white people are among the most inclusive and tolerant of others. This could be in part a cultural issue since the Nation State encourages “universalism” and shuns the kind of tribal affiliations found elsewhere.


It is natural therefore, for Westerners to try to assimilate people into their society and accommodate them as part of the nation. Our Government is mandated to treat all people as individuals and bestow on them the same rights and responsibilities as everyone else. We assume that all people will react as we do and embrace the nation in its entirety.

What people never considered (or were too polite to mention), was that the people we were bringing in, may not have the same outlook as we do. Unfortunately, when people with a tribal culture are inserted into a universalist society, the tribalists have a huge advantage. 

By working together to advance shared benefits, tribalists gain inordinate power and influence.

It is like collaborating in a card game. As Warren Buffet pointed out, “if you are playing cards and you can’t figure out who the Patsy is, then it is you.”

Nowhere is this as obvious as in politics. Westerners tend to vote in part for their own benefit and in part for their perception of who will best serve the interests of the nation as a whole.

Tribalists on the other hand will vote exclusively for members of the tribe. Since votes are often split quite evenly, the solidarity of the ethnic vote means that political parties have to pander to ethnic interests whenever the ethnic vote becomes significant.


Muslims in London are far short of a majority. Indigenous white Britons still outnumber them by more than two to one. Yet tribally voting Muslims have ensured that London now has a Muslim Lord Mayor.

The entrenched involvement of indigenous peoples in the political process has slowed this trend down to some extent, however, things will change soon, and politicians know it.

That is why they pander incessantly to minority tribal interests. They assume that the universalist majority can be taken for granted. The Left knows that many whites will vote for more spending on schools and hospitals. The Right knows that many whites will vote for lower taxes and a business-friendly environment.

Only the tribal vote needs to be bought and paid for. This largesse can take many forms. Sometimes it may be direct financial benefits in the form of “community aid” or grants for community organisations.

Tribalists are not silly. They understand graft and corruption intimately. When the government scratches ethnic backs, you can bet that a portion of this aid will be recycled into the politician’s campaign funds.


As costly as this may be, it is not the most destructive part of the relationship. Tribalists think tribally. Their main concern is power and numbers. All tribalists see the majority as the biggest threat, and the one to be taken down.

The White majority have the numbers, the power and the resources that the tribalists covet. No matter how much they hate each other, tribalists are happy to work together to achieve their aims.

Each tribal group sees the majority as the main obstacle to achieving their goal. Thus, we have a coalition of tribal groups whose long term goal is to cripple the power of the White majority at all costs. They seek to do this primarily through government. While whites historically have been concerned with restricting government power, most ethnic groups are more concerned with monopolising that power to their own ends.

Thus, we have issues such as the removal of Freedom of Speech. This right was won through great bloodshed by Westerners. It has been taken from us by a coalition of ethnic groups. These groups argued that White Australians might inflict a Holocaust on ethnic minorities if we were allowed to express our opinions without government permission.


This argument is so ridiculous on so many levels that it should never have been even considered. Yet thanks to the power of the various ethnic and religious lobbies, our hard-won Freedom of Speech was taken from us with barely a whimper.

The campaign of the white majority to get it back, which was led by then Prime Minister, Tony Abbott was steamrolled by the ethnic coalition. Abbott was subsequently removed from power and replaced by a candidate rather more sympathetic to ethnic minority interests.

Immigration of course, is the ultimate “sacred cow” of the tribalists. They play a numbers game, so any politician attempting to reduce immigration is hounded down as “literally Hitler.” Witness the hatred and vitriol directed at Trump. Yet all he has proposed is to remove illegal migrants and restrict the immigration of people from countries which are hotbeds of terror and anti-American hatred.

Every imaginable attack has been launched at Trump and his “deplorable” supporters and for what? For trying to keep out known murderers and terrorists?


Trump may not be perfect, and to call him unconventional would be an understatement. Yet his opponents were a crook and a communist who sailed along on a sea of media adoration. Even his own party hated him. I think that most of the Republican establishment would prefer Che Guevara as President.

There lies our immediate problem. Our politicians, with a few notable exceptions, have been captured by ethnic interests and are now working in lucrative and high prestige jobs with the primary purpose of hamstringing the power of indigenous white majorities. In my opinion, that would make them the most treasonous, treacherous leaders of any human society in the history of ever.

In England, the Labour party is now brazenly excluding white men from decision making conferences and charging them extra for events based solely on their race (while simultaneously arguing that “race doesn’t exist).

“Human Rights” bodies are formed that actively discriminate against whites as they did in the Queensland university case. When regular Pickering Post contributor, Paul Zanetti brought a real complaint of hate speech against white males however, the HRC treated him like something they had just stepped in.



In a recent trip to a UK hospital, I took a photo of a noticeboard having a poster encouraging “black” workers to join the union which has a “Black Members Organisation.”

Can you imagine the uproar if a union had a “White Members Organisation?” There are too many instances of anti-white racism to mention and I’m sure you are aware of many of them. If you aren’t, then you really need to get out more.

Australia is still behind the UK by around 20 years but we are rapidly playing catch up. We are reaching a tipping point where we risk turning our cohesive, homogenous nation into a divisive, beggar thy neighbour tribal slime hole.

If that happens, whites will not be the only losers. While ethnic leaders have their snouts deep in the multicultural trough, their constituents are often the ones to suffer. Refugees, who fled conflicts in their homelands are seeing their children return to die in Jihad.

Muslim girls can face FGM, honour killings and forced marriages. Jewish leaders fight for Third World immigration while ordinary Jews face serious threats in communities which were once safe and welcoming. Many ethnic minorities live in ghettos plagued by crime and corruption thanks to ethnic lobby groups and the corrupt politicians who pander to them.

So, the question is, what can we do about it? Well, we could take the Swedish option and do nothing. This is the easy option for us, but our kids and grandkids will pay a terrible price. Already, young white males in the UK are finding themselves on the bottom of the heap and locked out of an increasing number of opportunities.

This situation will deteriorate rapidly as every other ethnic group fights for its own benefit while white people refuse to fight for theirs.

The alternative is to really push back as if your future and your family depend on it. We have to accept that our political class does not have our interests at heart. We need to stop voting as if we live in a homogenous nation state. We no longer have that luxury. 


Like many of you, I have to express disappointment, though not surprise, that One Nation are a bunch of incompetent, arrogant and ineffective fools.

Unfortunately, while Pauline may not be Donald Trump, PHON is the only political party which has any claim to represent the interests of traditional Australians.

If we were to vote for One Nation en-masse, the other parties would soon get the message. Whilst we could be subjected to (hopefully just) one term of poor leadership, others would soon come forward with stronger credentials and capabilities.

Secondly, we need to recognise and understand that what we are facing is ethnic warfare, even though it is mostly playing out in a non-violent form at present.

We need to fight against this ferociously. We have to watch like hawks and pay attention to what is being said. We need to force our enemies to define their terms.


Don’t allow racism against white people to be called “reverse racism.” It is just racism. Demand a definition. Don’t allow discrimination against white people to be called “positive discrimination.” It is plain old discrimination.

Challenge people whenever possible. Share articles like this one on Facebook and with friends and family. Most of all, share them with politicians and make your views clear in no uncertain terms.

We can turn things around. We’ve been in worse pickles and lived to tell the tale. All it will take is drive and courage. In my experience Australians have these quantities in spades,

…don’t let me down.


Harry Richardson

Harry Richardson is a long-time student of Islam and author of best seller, "the Story Of Mohammed - Islam Unveiled',