This week’s supermoon marked the end of the kathin
season — kathin being an ancient Buddhist ritual that takes place
between the full moons of October and November. During the ceremony, Buddhist
laity, emulating the example of the devout Buddhist king, offer robes and other
gifts to monks at temples across the land. The ritual marks the end of the
rainy season, of monks’ three-month Lenten retreat, and the beginning of the
rice harvest. It is also the means by which monks count seniority in the
Sangha, the organisation of Buddhist monks.
A
well-hidden priority of the Crown Prince in the weeks following the 13
October death of his father, King Bhumibol, performance of kathin
rituals at the kingdom’s first-class royal temples likewise creates and
re-creates rank within the royal family.
No one
performs kathin at a royal temple without His Majesty’s express
permission. See notices here and here.
The
kingdom’s most splendid royal temples (wat luang) encapsulate the
kingdom’s history, or the Chakri Dynasty’s version of that history. Thus kathin
performances by top royals are living history, teeming with information about
the interregnum and succession. Taking place as they do in a religious format,
they have the added advantage of being virtually invisible to farang
(foreigners) and the foreign press.
From 1978
to 1980 I was fortunate to gain access to royal kathin as part of
doctoral research on kathin rituals and national integration.
Over two
ritual seasons, I trailed members of the royal family to kathin luang
and kathin phraratchathan, those offered “in the name of the king” (nai
nam nai luang), at the foremost royal temples in the land.
The study
of kathin in both its royal and non-royal forms took me deep into Isan, the
impoverished, rebellious northeast, a main focus of my study.
Celestial
association enabled me to interview up and down the ritual and social
hierarchy: from the fearsome Lord Chamberlain, a former member of the US’ World
War II intelligence agency, the OSS, and head of the Crown Property
Bureau (about which it was taboo to speak); to longtime Palace retainers, who
knew the history of everything; to former Prime Minister MR Seni Pramoj and
members of the Democrat Party; to bureaucrats and bankers, senior and junior;
to leaders of the socialist movement in the northeast, a major political base
of Pridi Phanomyong in the 1930s and 1940s; to a former education minister of
the fervent anti-royalist Prime Minister Field Marshal Phibun Songkram
(1938-1944, 1948-1957). I also interviewed monks of all ranks and political
camps, including the controversial abbot of Wat Bowonniwet.
In the
course of my research, I discovered that Bangkok Bank, Ltd was “latching on to
the royal virtue” (pheung phraratchaparami), sponsoring kathin at
royal temples “in the name of the king” to penetrate rural markets,
particularly in the Northeast.
Both the
bank, which received the royal garuda, the symbol of royal patronage, in
1967, and its Sino-Thai founder, Chin Sophonpanich, were heavily involved in
the narcotics trade as well. His top lieutenants carried the king’s kathin
gift to Khon Kaen, not Chin.
Many
people, including young bank workers, were concerned about the morality of
using religion so blatantly for financial gain.
Furthermore,
even if some scholars chose not to, the supposedly unsophisticated people of
Isan understood quite well how land changed hands under the dictatorial regimes
that distinguished the Ninth Reign of the Chakri Dynasty, just as they
understood first-hand the humiliations of the sex trade.
It amazes
me still that journalists and scholars refuse to question how the Crown
Properties achieved such enormous proportions over the course of the 20th
century. How is it that Thailand, such a tiny country, has produced so many
billionaires who operate on a global scale, many of whom are
designated as “self-made”? How, indeed, did the gentle, modest King Bhumibol,
dedicated to the development of his country, become the world’s richest
monarch?
When the
dissertation was completed many years later, the bank’s connection with royalty
and mention of the Crown Property Bureau were not received well by senior
scholars. Or any scholars.
“You
can’t always believe what they would tell a young girl like you,” huffed a
senior anthropologist.
Scholars
slightly older than myself dismissed the work as irrelevant, insisting (as per
Palace propaganda) that the monarchy was not a major factor in the study of
economics or modern politics, that it should be decentered in scholarly
analyses in order to allow Isan and other people to “have their voices” and the
like. Or they deliberately (mis)associated study of the monarchy with support
of the same, ignoring the quite subversive content of my work.
Imagine
my surprise when key words and concepts from my work popped up in leaked
diplomatic cables from Wikileaks.
The
American ambassador requested a copy of my dissertation, but dismissed the
research findings as being of no real import.
A
Buddhist activist dismissed Bangkok Bank’s connections with royal temples out
of hand: “We know this already,” they said, joining the ranks of the
hyper-blasé.
I was
thus shocked many years later to find out that the dissertation had almost
become a cult object. Among the first to really use it was journalist Paul
Handley, who elaborated on the ritual mechanisms by which the King vastly
expanded his wealth in a circle of ever multiplying merit (see Paul Handley’s The
King never smiles, p 130). This was followed by a handful of scholars
who addressed Thailand’s fiercely arbitrary lese-majeste law. Last came
a younger generation of scholars (who studied under old masters) who ask, “Why
haven’t I heard of this before?”
Ironically,
even as the dissertation became a cult classic, often in pirated form (I can
buy it online if I have the money), with a few notable exceptions (Pierre
Bourdieu and a few imitators), the far-more-accessible articles sank like a
stone.
I
hesitated to go back into the water, and still do, for good reason.
Why do I
care?
Khit
theung.
Because I
studied religion and ritual, I believe I saw much of the best of the country,
or people at their best and most honest.
This
included Palace officials, some of whom are now quite prominent; offspring of
princes who knew history and the arts; frustrated female teachers and
professors, highly trained and similarly trivialized; even Thanom and Praphat,
whose reflections on past kathin rituals — Thanom took the north, Praphat the
northeast, with both recoiling at the idea that they would offer kathin
phraratchathan — were by definition reflections on their kamma, their fate, in
the ugly aftermath of the demonstrations at Thammasat.
I spent many peaceful hours in the company of monks who were not charlatans or rascals, who took care of their communities. The same with socialist leaders from Isan.
I
interviewed former ministers in the cabinet of Field Marshal Sarit,
cosmopolitan bankers and economists who were quick to recognize the potential
of linking kathin to their national development projects.
Since
much of the work entails waiting, I passed many pleasurable hours in the
company of Palace officials, photographers, astrologers and the like, each of
whom had a role to play in the royal pageant.
I was
shocked to encounter Kittivudho Bhikkhu, casually chatting with
members of the Privy Council at a kathin rehearsal at Wat Mahathat run by
ex-abbot Phra Phimonlatham: the talented, uppity Isan monk who lost his
considerable seniority in the Sangha when Marshal Sarit, an ardent supporter of
King Bhumibol, had him forcibly defrocked and jailed.
Kittivudho,
friend of the royalist right, had trumpeted that “Killing communists was not
demerit” because they were “like animals,” not real people. Many such kommunit
were from Isan.
Devout
Palace officials were genuinely perplexed that anyone would not love their
king, although the Lord Chamberlain seemed a tad more cynical.
Most if
not all were bursting with information that they could not divulge, a situation
that would seem to persist in the present.
Exhausting.
Demoralising.
In
contrast, officials at the Department of Religious Affairs were often tired but
never demoralized. Unlike their director — husband of a woman who owned a major
bus company — most were actual religious specialists. For hours on end, they
told lineage stories linking Isan meditation monks to their teachers and their
teachers’ teachers, leading back to the time of King Mongkut, circling back to
the present via royal kathin.
Thus it
breaks my heart to see the junta tighten its grip under the guise of mourning
the late king, piously declaring “No politics!” while the Crown Prince, on the
merest of whims – or a series of seeming whims – sends his various audiences
into a spin. The latter would include high-ranking members of the Royal Family,
the military, the police, the government, the diplomatic corps, the
international press, even, perhaps, his German real estate agents, to say
nothing of Thailand’s so-called political parties.
Everyone
has a good side and a bad side.
What we
are seeing now is the bad side with perhaps worse to come as a lethal cocktail
of intimidation and princely disruption builds on genuine (not manufactured)
historical memory.
Thailand
is a land of contradiction. We all want to be royalty, and we all want to escape
it.
Everyone
is afraid, for good reason.
Christine Gray, PhD, is a cultural
anthropologist who writes about monarchy, ritual, gender and power.
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