The burnt-out car of Brigadier
Mallaby where he was killed on 30 October 1945. (Imperial War Museums/File)
The death of British Army officer Brig. Gen. AWS
Mallaby on the evening of Oct. 30, 1945, heightened the tension in Surabaya and
led to the Battle of Surabaya on Nov. 10 that year. The incident even today
excites worldwide interest. Some investigative analyses cannot come to a single
conclusion.
There are four scenarios about
who was responsible for the general’s death, blaming the Indonesians, Dutch,
Japanese and British, respectively.
What conditions led to the
killing of Mallaby? I have examined Mallaby’s last five days in Surabaya from
various sources and have reached at least two preliminary conclusions.
First, Mallaby was killed as a
result of the ignorance of his superiors: Vice Adm. Lord Louis Mountbatten
(Supreme Allied Commander Southeast Asia), Lt. Gen. Philip Christison
(Commander-in-Chief for the Netherlands East Indies) and Maj. Gen. Douglas
Hawthron (23rd Indian Division commander).
They lacked advance
intelligence briefings on conditions in Surabaya, could not see the real facts
on the ground, were influenced by Dutch propaganda that said Indonesian
nationalists were very weak and therefore failed to draft a strong and
clear-cut policy.
Second, Mallaby was killed as
a result of his own character. He was not a general who relied only on force,
but a more “relaxed” general who relied more on dialogue with Indonesian
leaders in Surabaya.
Such an approach suited his
basic task but because of that, he was perceived by his superiors in Jakarta as
weak and was compelled to use force instead.
His more relaxed attitude left
him unaware of the potential danger of crowds, so he walked out unarmed and was
accompanied only by two officers.
The British policy was not
clear in dealing with Surabaya. McMillan ( 2005 ) writes that the “overall
picture that emerges is one of confusion rather than the execution of a
clear-cut plan”.
Mountbatten’s plan was that
British forces should not be involved in the Netherlands East Indies’ internal
politics. It was only to secure key areas such as Batavia and Surabaya, control
local Japanese headquarters, undertake the disarming of the Japanese and
recover POWs. On Sept. 28, Mountbatten urged the Dutch to confer with
Indonesian leaders.
The plan shared by Christison
and Hawthorn was different from Mountbatten’s. Christison and Hawthorn’s plan
was to “show the flag” and get involved in the internal politics by restoring
law and order before the return of the Dutch.
Mallaby was sure that it was
not of his mission to hold Surabaya for the Dutch.
Leaving for Surabaya, he
explained his priorities: First, enter Surabaya and negotiate with the locals
on the evacuation of all Dutch civilians and get them on board ship to take
them back to Holland, second, evacuate all Allied POWs held by the Japanese and
finally take the Japanese army prisoner and wait for ships to repatriate them.
His arrival in Surabaya was
welcomed by agitating graffiti in Indonesian “Merdeka atau Mati,” in Urdu
“Ayadi ya Kunrezi,” and in English “Freedom or Death.”
Realizing that one brigade was
not enough to face the strong Indonesians in Surabaya, Mallaby took a peaceful
approach: parley with Indonesian leaders.
Thus, in his first three days
in Surabaya, Mallaby held many discussions with Indonesian leaders, outlining
his tasks and making agreements on burden sharing to execute his basic tasks.
His approach was successful
because the mood of the Indonesian leaders was cooperative although suspicious
and very insistent that no Dutch came in as they, not British, were their
enemy.
But Mallaby’s approach was
over-ridden by Christison and Hawthron, because it did not match with their
plan. In the afternoon of Oct. 26, Hawthorn sent a telegram: “Do not parley
occupy town.” Then Hawthorn dropped leaflets over West and Central Java,
demanding that all Indonesians surrender their arms within 48 hours or be shot.
Ignoring a signal asking for the leaflets not to be dropped over Surabaya, on
Oct. 27 the leaflets were dropped over the city.
Mallaby was speechless for
about three minutes after reading the leaflet. When asked “What are you going
to do, sir?” Mallaby replied: “Obey orders.” Mallaby was in a dilemma. He was
certain that he was not assigned to disarm Indonesian people, but Hawthorn was
his superior and should be obeyed.
The leaflets angered Surabaya
people who then canceled the talks. Indonesians fought for three days (Oct.
27-29) and encircled the 49th Brigade in many places.
The brigade was saved by
Indonesian president Sukarno, vice president Mohammad Hatta and prime minister
Amir Sjarifuddin who came to Surabaya on Oct. 29 asking for a cease-fire.
Hawthorn had also to go to
Surabaya to negotiate with Indonesian leaders, unashamedly disavowing his own
words and orders.
Basis
Susilo
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