Sell the farm to buy a future as China's food bowl

PLANS to seek billions of dollars in Chinese investment to transform vast tracts of undeveloped land in northern Australia for farming would come at the expense of giving Australians access to affordable, good quality food, opponents say.

The Trade and Competitiveness Minister, Craig Emerson, has confirmed that the government is undertaking a joint study with China to examine the policy changes needed to facilitate a massive investment by Chinese agricultural interests.

Dr Emerson denied this meant plans to ''buy up the farm'' and use imported labour to produce food for the voracious Chinese market with its 1.3 billion citizens. "It is designed to lift Australian food production for world markets," Mr Emerson said.

The Nationals Senator, Barnaby Joyce, who has pushed for tougher restrictions on foreign ownership of land - a move seen as breaking ranks with the Liberals - said it was a worry for urban as well as regional Australians. While the move by the Chinese was "astute", Senator Joyce said it exposed the lack of planning for our own food security since Australia was now a net importer of food - and the resulting inflation had an impact on food prices. "It's not that you'll run out of food; it's the form of food that you'll be able to buy, and that is happening right now. How often do you see people now who in the past bought the roast, now by mince? Why? Because they can't afford the roast, but that was once a staple."

Selling Australian land to a foreign state-owned enterprise has troubling implications, according to Joyce. "Therefore it is held by an organ of the government, and governments , especially strong ones like the Chinese, don't go broke. Therefore they can hold it in perpetuity".

Joyce denied his views were xenophobic. "Look at any other country and see what their controls of [foreign] investment are like and then compare it to ours and you'll see you can't buy [land] in China, you can't buy it in Japan, you can't buy it in South Korea, you're struggling to buy in the United States and there are vastly greater controls with buying it in New Zealand."

The Liberal senator Bill Heffernan said Australians were either "too bloody tired or too bloody lazy" to develop the land to ensure our own future. "I think it's time that all Australians sat up and took notice … we're not just going to lose control of our sovereignty but of our own destiny. If you let other nations take control of your sovereign assets it's no different to what would have happened 100 years ago when they [invaded] with an army."

Senator Heffernan, who chairs a Senate inquiry into Australia's foreign investment rules, fears it will push up the price of land and distorts the market. 

While northern Australia has millions of hectares of under-utilised land - and abundant water and good proximity to Asia - obstacles to development have included poor transport links and a very difficult climate. Until now China has focused on opening up farmland in South America and Africa to meet the demands of its burgeoning middle class.

More than a quarter of meat produced worldwide is now eaten in China. In 1978, China's annual consumption of meat was 7.25 million tonnes. It is now 64.5 million tonnes and more than twice that of the US.

Julia Gillard told a conference on "Australia in the Asian century" this month that we should be ready to act as Asia's food bowl by building our food-processing industry and developing irrigation and higher-yield crops.

Read more: http://www.smh.com.au/national/sell-the-farm-to-buy-a-future-as-chinas-food-bowl-20120531-1zkv0.html#ixzz1wUDDLK00

Is this the beginning of the end for Indonesians' civil liberties?

Indonesia may have lost a lot more than the opportunity to see Lady Gaga when, last weekend, she announced the cancellation of her June 3 concert in Jakarta. The episode could mark the beginning of the end for Indonesia's civil liberties as radical groups continue unabated in their assault on the nation's freedoms.

Those who care about their freedom should speak up and fight to defend it rather than busily trying to distance themselves from Lady Gaga and whatever it is they believe she represents through her songs and stage appearances.

The news that the American pop diva had cancelled her Indonesian gig must have come as a huge relief to many people, most particularly the police. The prospect of a violent disruption by the Islam Defenders Front (FPI) as 52,000 "Little Monster" fans watched Lady Gaga at Bung Karno Stadium has now been averted.

Thanks to her, police now do not even have to deal with the dilemma of whether or not to issue a permit. They would have been very unpopular with conservative Muslims if they decided one way, and would have earned the wrath of her young fans if they went the other way.

Lady Gaga has settled the dilemma for the police. She has rightly refused to comply with the strict requirements regarding her stage appearance in order to gain a permit, such as submitting in writing the songs she would sing and the costumes she would wear. And she must have had her fans as well herself in mind when she spiked her Jakarta date after police clearly stated that they could not guarantee her or her fans' safety in view of the protests against her concert.

The real losers in this episode, however, are not Lady Gaga and the 52,000 fans who bought tickets (many of them will be heading to Singapore, where she has apparently added another date to perform, free from FPI harassment). It is actually the nation that has been made so much poorer in terms of its freedoms.

Contrary to what many people believe, even among those who have spoken for our freedoms in the past, the battle being waged by the FPI and Muslim conservatives was never really about Lady Gaga. The stakes were much higher. This was an assault on our freedom of expression.

It certainly marks the return of censorship on artistic expression, not by the state as in the past, but by the use of raw mob power. Don't be so shocked if all Indonesian and non-Indonesian performing artists from now on are required to submit their song lists as conditions for their permits. Before long, all types of gatherings will be equally subject to censorship.

Coming so close on the heels of the FPI attacks on the promotional tour by Canadian liberal Muslim writer Irshad Manji, the assault on freedom of expression is now almost complete. The discussions of her book Allah, Liberty and Love in Jakarta and Yogyakarta, even those held on university campuses, were forcibly shut down by the FPI with the help of the police.

Sadly, many Indonesians have been quick to dismiss these events as problems confined to Lady Gaga and Manji. Performing artists and scholars who should have been defending their freedom were instead busy distancing themselves.

It did not escape their Indonesian critics that both Lady Gaga and Manji are defenders of homosexuality. This could be one reason why many people in Indonesia, where homophobia runs deep, would have nothing to do with them.

But as Lady Gaga moves on with her performances elsewhere and sells more records, and as Manji continues to recruit followers for her moral courage movement, it is Indonesians who have to brace themselves for more assaults on their freedoms and civil liberties.

Those who think that the assaults on freedom will stop with Lady Gaga and Manji, and who thus remain silent, are sorely mistaken. They are the ultimate targets, and victims.

These two victories have only emboldened the FPI and similar radical Islamic groups to flex their muscles and torment those who don't follow their strict moral beliefs. On a winning streak, they must already be planning their next move and targets.

Just look at the current state of the freedom of religion. The silence of the "silent majority" has allowed the FPI to harass, torment and even kill followers of religious minorities. The attacks became increasingly violent and the targets widened because no one, or only very few, spoke up in defence of the religious freedom of minorities.

Now freedom of expression and freedom of assembly are about to go the same way. Don't bank on the police - the people sustained by taxpayers' money - to come and protect our freedoms. In the attacks on religious minorities and in the episodes with Lady Gaga and Manji, police were part of the repression.

A pattern is clearly emerging where religious conservatives are pushing their strict Islamist agenda at the expense of our civil liberties. Not only do they have representatives in government, in the House of Representatives and among religious scholars, they also have thugs working on the streets to impose their agenda by force.

This raises a serious question about where Indonesia is now heading, 14 years after it got rid of the Suharto dictatorship and launched the reform movement.

Are we seeing the emergence of a new form of tyranny, one that is defined more by the strength of the majority? Where are those on the other side of the fence in this Indonesian version of cultural war? Will they rise up and speak out to defend Indonesia with all its plurality and the civil liberties needed to hold this nation together and keep it moving forward? Or, will they just take these assaults lying down, as they have been doing?  

Endy Bayuni
The Jakarta Post
PubAsia News Network May 31, 2012 1:00 am

Five Things the Pentagon Isn’t Telling Us About China’s Military

There is no shortage of speculation that China will eventually deploy military forces to port facilities it has constructed in places like Burma, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

Think of it like an iceberg: The top lies in plain sight, but much more hides beneath the surface.

In its annual appraisal of the Chinese military published on May 18, the US Department of Defense seems to be describing an object it finds both familiar and mysterious.

Here are the five most important questions about Beijing’s defense strategy that remain stubbornly unanswered.

What are China’s long-term defense spending plans?

Although China’s official 2012 defense budget is $106 billion, an 11 percent increase over last year and a fourfold increase from a decade ago, the Pentagon places China’s total military spending at somewhere between $120 and $180 billion. “Estimating actual PLA military expenditures is difficult because of poor accounting transparency and China’s still incomplete transition from a command economy,” the report notes, referring to the People’s Liberation Army.

There have been no credible estimates of Beijing’s long-term defense spending plans. On its current trajectory, China could overtake the United States as the world’s biggest military spender in the 2020s or 2030s, but there are too many unknown variables to accurately predict if this will happen.

What is China’s nuclear strategy?

The Pentagon concludes that “China’s nuclear arsenal currently consists of about 50 to 75 silo-based, liquid-fueled and road-mobile, solid-fueled ICBMs.” The Pentagon doesn’t attempt to estimate the total number of nuclear weapons that China possesses, although it’s generally assumed to have a smaller nuclear arsenal than the US cache of more than 5,000 nuclear warheads.

Nonetheless, theories that Beijing possesses or plans to develop a much bigger nuclear weapons stockpile just won’t die down. Speculation last year that China may have as many as 3,500 nuclear warheads — predicated on rumors of a sprawling network of underground tunnels — has been reliably trashed, but some still argue that Beijing sees a strategic opportunity in building a nuclear arsenal that could match or even exceed that of the United States in the coming decades.

China currently has only two Jin-class Type 094 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in service, the Pentagon tells us, and the missiles designed to arm the subs are not yet operational (though when they are, they will be nuclear-capable). Two submarines aren’t much of a strategic deterrent for an aspiring superpower, but the true scope of the SSBN fleet that China plans to build remains unknown.

What is the Chinese Navy up to?

American analysts often use the term “string of pearls” to describe Beijing’s supposed strategy of establishing a network of foreign naval bases, especially in the Indian Ocean, but the Chinese don’t. The latest Pentagon report does not discuss whether China plans to create a US-style network of permanent forward bases for the PLA Navy.

Nonetheless, there is no shortage of speculation that China will eventually deploy military forces to port facilities it has constructed in places like Burma, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The Seychelles has invited China to use its ports as resupply points for Chinese ships, but Beijing has insisted that this is not the establishment of a first foreign base, unconvincingly calling it a “resupply port.” The “places or bases” debate has already been running for some years and it will continue to rumble on while Beijing remains tight-lipped about its long-range ambitions.

The Pentagon report also struggles to shed light on China’s future aircraft carrier program, beyond the existence of the single ex-Soviet carrier that is currently undergoing sea trials. “Some components of China’s first indigenously produced carrier may already be under construction,” it suggests, adding that “China likely will build multiple aircraft carriers and associated support ships over the next decade.” That’s guesswork.

What kind of space capabilities is China developing?

China is becoming increasingly proficient in space. The report mentions that China is assembling its own GPS-style satellite network, blasted the Tiangong-1 spacelab into orbit in 2011 and has developed a ground-launched anti-satellite missile to improve its counter-space capabilities. But the Pentagon neglects to mention one of China’s most ambitious space programs: the development of the Shenlong spaceplane and the possible associated development of advanced propulsion systems, whose existence increases the risk of a military space race with the United States.

Paper tiger or fire-breathing dragon?

There are many other imponderables in China’s military. Chinese cyber-espionage has been effective in obtaining foreign military secrets, but it’s unclear how much of this know-how has been successfully and usefully absorbed into China’s own military programs and doctrines. The overhaul of the Chinese defense industry has revolutionized the country’s indigenous capabilities, but how close has China really got to ironing out the kinks in its military-industrial structures and processes?

All of the unknowns feed into one larger question: Is the PLA worth the hype? China’s military is untested; it hasn’t fought a major campaign since a disastrous war with Vietnam in 1979. In the event of conflict, would its performance live up to the nation’s expectations, or would disadvantages like corruption and inexperience critically undermine its war-fighting capability? Is the 21st-century PLA even designed to be used, or does it exist to prop up and counterbalance the Communist Party domestically in a world where Beijing calculates that large-scale warfare is increasingly unlikely?

Maybe the answers to these questions are buried in some secure vault at the Pentagon, but they’re not in its latest report.

Foreign Policy

Trefor Moss is a Hong Kong-based journalist and a former Asia-Pacific editor of Jane’s Defence Weekly.

Transforming South Korea’s defence capabilities

For nearly six decades, South Korea’s approach to security has focused on sustaining the status quo: maintaining deterrence and a robust defence posture in order to prevent another major conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

Three mutually reinforcing strategic pillars — defensive deterrence, alliance with the US and forward active defence — have long defined South Korea’s conception of national security, its force structure and the operational conduct of its armed forces.



But since the late 1990s, South Korea’s security dilemmas have become more ‘fluid’ and multi-faceted. Five key factors have redefined South Korea’s security equation over the last decade: a widening of the North Korean threat spectrum; the US’s defence transformation; China’s military modernisation and increased power projection; South Korea’s aim for greater autonomy, resulting from its improved economic and military capabilities; and subsequent changes in the US-ROK alliance.

In light of these changes, South Korea’s defence planners have been searching for a new strategic paradigm, which would allow greater flexibility, adaptability and autonomy under conditions of strategic uncertainty. Simultaneously, South Korea is modernising its armed forces in order to respond to the widening spectrum of threats, mitigate technological and interoperability gaps with US forces and eventually attain a self-reliant defence posture.
Indeed, for over a decade now, South Korea has planned to transform its military into a smaller, but increasingly networked, balanced and digitised standing force with independent surveillance and reconnaissance platforms, real-time integrated C4I (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence) systems, and long-range precision strike capabilities. At the core of South Korea’s defence transformation has been the ‘Defense Reform Plan 2020’ (DRP 2020), first introduced in 2005, and subsequently revised in 2008, 2009 and 2010.

Under the DRP 2020, South Korea’s armed forces would significantly enhance their military capabilities. About one-third to one-half of existing, but largely outdated, major weapon systems would be replaced with next-generation technology. In order to accelerate force development, South Korea’s defence budget was projected to increase by 11.1 per cent annually through 2015, and 7.1 per cent through 2020, totalling about 621 trillion won (US$431 billion at 2008 rates) between 2006 and 2020.

With its ambitious scope and proposed timeline — and escalating costs — it has become increasingly clear that the military budget will not reach the targets prescribed in the DRP 2020. The follow-on debates have also led to more adjustments, revisions and delays in its implementation. In 2010, however, two crises further reshaped the direction of the DRP 2020 and much of South Korea’s defence planning: the sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan in the Yellow Sea and North Korea’s artillery attack on South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island. Shortfalls in responding to these attacks eventually prompted South Korea to ask the US to postpone the planned transfer of war-time operational control to Seoul until 2015.

South Korea’s Ministry of Defense announced another force modernisation plan in 2011 — ‘Defense Reform 307’ — which addresses medium- to long-term defence requirements to counter potential North Korean asymmetric provocations. It includes provisions to enhance early-warning systems, missile defences, reservists training, inter-service jointness, and command and control. But, as with previous plans, its implementation will be constrained by South Korea’s traditional security paradigm, which has inhibited military innovation in Korea.

First, inter-Korean relations over the past decade have polarised South Korea’s political arena, with persisting debates on the magnitude and character of North Korean threats, the terms and conditions of potential Korean unification, changes in US strategy and security commitment to South Korea, and concomitant long-term strategic requirements and defence-resource allocation. This political fragmentation has led to an erosion of strategic consensus, which has resulted in disagreement over South Korea’s defence requirements.

In this context, the political will to allocate the required resources has been constrained by economic pressures and the imperative to sustain South Korea’s socio-economic stability and growth. South Korea has struggled to find sufficient finances to fund its military modernisation plans, which has resulted in delays in procuring various technologies.

Second, the ROK military has been constrained by its own institutional rigidity, intellectual conservatism and path dependence. This has resulted in inter-service rivalries for influence and resources. Indeed, the composition, force structure and deployment of the ROK military have each remained relatively unchanged, dominated as they are by conventional ground forces.

Third, ROK forces continue to face a range of technical and inter-operability problems in conducting full-spectrum joint military operations with their US counterparts. These challenges can be attributed to inter-service divides, technological and operational deficiencies, and, arguably, a lack of combat experience.

In order to implement its defence reforms, South Korea must show greater adaptability in its defence planning. But this is unlikely until a political consensus is forged to move away from the traditional security doctrine. East Asia Forum

Michael Raska is Associate Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

Anxiety in China About Facing Up To Old Ghosts on the Road Ahead

The worrying news from China is that the country appears headed toward an economic and political crash sometime in the next five years, if current trends continue. The somewhat better news is that a large part of the elite grasps that danger and is talking fairly openly about the far-reaching change that will be needed to prevent it.

In eight days of meetings with Chinese academics, economists, journalists, businessmen and government officials this month, I encountered little of the rising-superpower hubris that might be expected from a country perceived in most of the West as an unstoppable juggernaut.

Instead, I heard considerable anxiety about a slowing economy and an uncertain political transition this year, and even greater worry about the problems the incoming leadership team under Xi Jinping will likely face over time.

Most people I met during a tour of Beijing, Shanghai and the interior city of Changsha thought China would avoid an economic “hard landing” this year, despite a sharp slowdown in growth during the last few months. But many were concerned about whether the new leadership could manage the restructuring needed to keep growth going beyond the next couple of years.

Similarly, few people seemed to think that Xi’s ascension this fall would be derailed by the power struggle reflected in the recent purge of populist Chongqing governor Bo Xilai possibly because, like most of the world, they don’t know what is happening behind the leadership’s closed doors.

“China is at a crossroads,” said Zhu Yinghuang, the former editor of the China Daily. “After 30 years of economic reform, we have to get to political reform.”

So what would that change look like? Not surprisingly, no one expects China to become a liberal democracy anytime soon. But I heard a lot of ideas for how the new leadership group could begin to open up the political system.

Chief among them was local reform: Several people said that the case of Chen Guangcheng, the blind dissident held captive until he escaped to the US embassy in Beijing, demonstrated the need for top leaders to pressure town and village authorities to abide by the law.

Victor Yuan, who established China’s first private polling firm, said average Chinese cite “enforcement of the rule of law” as a first priority for reform. Another first step, he said, would be “greater social mobilization,” in the form of more independent social service groups and NGOs at the local level.

Inevitably a process of political change will have to tackle China’s most taboo subject: the suppression of the Tiananmen Square reform movement in June 1989. After requesting that he not be quoted, one academic argued that the best way for the regime to revitalize its political legitimacy would be to apologize to the families of those killed. “This is our burden, our baggage, that has to be dealt with,” he said.

So far there is scant evidence that China’s leaders are considering such steps. But outgoing premier Wen Jiabao said in March the country “has come to a critical stage” in which “without successful political structural reform ... new problems that have cropped up in China’s society will not be fundamentally resolved.”

“This is the time to do something, and to do it incrementally,” said Shen Dingli, the dean of the Institute for International Studies at Fudan University. “If you reform, you have immediate challenges. But if you don’t reform, you will have even bigger challenges. The top leaders all know this.”

The Washington Post

Jackson Diehl is the deputy editorial page editor of The Washington Post.