A song for the morning star and a people living on belief

WHEN West Papuan Ronny Kareni came to Australia nine years ago, he could speak pidgin English but not English. Now he has a degree in international relations and can quote, in Italian - from an opera by Verdi - a line that he translates as ''My country is beautiful but lost …''

Today at noon, outside the State Library of Victoria, Ronny Kareni will raise the flag of the Morning Star in recognition of its first raising 51 years ago with the agreement of the Netherlands, then the colonial power in West Papua.

Kareni was one year old when, in 1984, his mother smuggled him and his sister across the border from West Papua into Papua New Guinea. His father stayed to be part of the armed struggle against the Indonesian forces securing the province for Indonesia, as they have since 1962.

The family built a shelter on a beach with logs cut from the jungle and a roof thatched with palm leaves. His mother made doughnuts and bread on her open fire and tried to sell them at local markets. There were days with no food. Then Ronny started school and found he was the only child speaking Bahasa Indonesian.

He was 19 when he came to Australia to study at Damascus College in Ballarat under a program organised by the Sisters of Mercy and West Papuan leader-in-exile Jacob Rumbiak. Kareni says he was welcomed into the Damascus College community. Money was raised to cover his fees, his uniform, his books. He found Australians friendly, open-minded and, on the subject of West Papua, disappointingly ignorant. Some people thought West Papua was in Africa when it is Australia's closest neighbour, as far away as Warrnambool from Melbourne.

Kareni, who has had several jobs with bodies such as Multicultural Arts Victoria, now works full-time for the West Papuan cause. I ask him why he does it. ''Because if I don't,'' he says, ''who will?'' Kareni says West Papuans formed 96 per cent of the population of their country when the Indonesians arrived. They now number less than half and the Indonesian authorities exercise, in his words, a ''culture of impunity'' in their dealings with them.

Kareni is a political man with a political message. He argues that, as a result of the Third Papuan People's Congress in Jayapura last year, West Papuans now have an elected leadership to begin round-table negotiations with Indonesia and a third party such as the United States. He doesn't rule out West Papua remaining part of Indonesia but says: ''There must be recognition of our rights as indigenous people to live freely, without repression and intimidation.'' The Indonesian authorities arrested 300 delegates to the Third Papuan People's Conference. The bodies of two others were found shot. Kareni's father had his skull fractured.

Saying armed struggle ''is not effective'', Kareni advocates non-violent activism and believes his people will win their freedom. His belief comes from his faith in the Christian God, from the Bible being the story of a dispossessed people, and from the strength of West Papuan culture. ''Our message is in our songs. Our songs are our message.'' He is part of a West Papuan band called Tabura, named after the shell blown like a horn to bring people together.

But I say, ''You're relying on the rest of the world to act on your behalf. What if they don't?'' 

''Then I would have to question God,'' he replies after a pause. ''I would say, why have you created us and placed us in West Papua and allowed this to happen to us?'' Then he adds, ''If there is one West Papuan left, the cause of West Papuan freedom will continue.''

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Indonesia complacent about emerging extremists, says rights group

Terrorism in Indonesia is less of a threat than in the past but the rise of Islamist advocacy groups working for policy change poses another challenge to the government.

In its latest assessment, the International Crisis Group says many of the young men turning to extremist violence are harboured by a growing number of Islamist NGOs campaigning against vice, apostasy and minorities.

The Senior Advisor to the International Crisis Group in Jakarta, Sidney Jones, says while the number of extremist groups has actually grown, they are smaller and less well organised.

Correspondent: Karon Snowdon

Speaker: Sidney Jones, senior advisor, International Crisis Group's Asia program

JONES: And I think that the concern is that we're seeing a number of very small groups arise in a way that raises the possibility we could get more attempts at violent acts even if a much more amateurish initiative.

SNOWDON: And their focus you say is less on foreign targets. Does that mean they're looking at domestic issues, domestic targets potentially?

JONES: It means the police are enemy number one. So everybody who's been killed in a terrorist action in the last two years has been a policeman.

SNOWDON: And is it just the effectiveness of improved policing? Have there been significant changes within the Indonesian society at all that you can point to which has led to some of this change in the modus operandi of groups and their fragmentation?

JONES: As Indonesian democracy has matured, it has given rise to a whole range of groups, including some very hard-line, one could say anti-democratic Islamist forces, which engage in low-level violence in the name of anti-vice campaigns. For example bashing up bars or brothels, and in some cases going after minorities that they regard as deviants, such as the Ahmadiyah sect where we've seen Ahmadiyah property, and in some cases people, being attacked by these groups. One of the things we're seeing is that increasingly some of these groups are becoming almost a training ground for people who then go on to use more serious forms of violence, no longer sticks and clubs and iron pipes, but bombs and guns.

SNOWDON: Which could become a bigger problem in future? What's your assessment?

JONES: Well I think we're going to see an ongoing problem of small groups emerging out of some of these anti-vice campaigns and it becomes increasingly important for the Indonesian government to take these anti-vice groups seriously and to treat with absolute zero tolerance any use of violence and any infringement of the Indonesian criminal code. Instead of saying well these people are a nuisance but not that much of a problem, they are a problem and need to be dealt with.

SNOWDON: And you're saying the Indonesian government is not dealing with them enough?

JONES: I think we're seeing far too much complacency, and in some cases active involvement of officials at a local level because they see these groups as undertaking actions that resonate with deeply conservative populations at the local level. So this is a case where a very democratic society in Indonesia has given rise to some very anti-democratic forces.

SNOWDON: And as you say the number of these groups are increasing and perhaps their potency?

JONES: I think in terms of the Islamist civil society groups, I think they are increasing in influence because they are able to actually influence public policy at a local level. And that's fine and democratic societies should have room for groups across the political spectrum, where there shouldn't be tolerance for such groups is if they use violence and if they actively promote hatred toward minorities in a democratic society.

SNOWDON: And imposes on the emerging democracy itself?

JONES: Yes, I think that it's gotten to the point now where Indonesians have to make some pretty important decisions. For example where do you draw the line between freedom of expression and criminal incitement? That's an issue that all societies; Australia, the United States, Turkey, Egypt, all of those are facing, and the threshold may not be the same in each of those countries, but where freedom of expression leads to direct violence against minorities that should be protected by the state, then we've got a problem.

SNOWDON: Well other societies have dealt with that of course. Do any neighbours, Australia included, offer models or partial solutions?

JONES: I think that there are models, especially in terms of working with communities, and I think one of the needs in Indonesia now is to move away from just focussing on curbing terrorism and that cooperation has been very effective. The need now is to see how you deal with extremist teachings in a democratic society through working with communities, and I do think Australia has a lot to offer. Radio Australia interview

India: the warped history and geography of NonAlignment 2.0 In the aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Narasimha Rao government reworked India’s dysfunctional economic and foreign policies to improve India’s abysmal terms of trade with the rest of the world. The latest global financial crisis seems to have shaken the United States’ global dominance and is forcing India to revisit its post-Soviet foreign policy. Choices Asian countries like India make in the near future will affect the chances of the emergence of an ‘Asian Concert’ that, in turn, will influence the United States’ ability to sustain its dominance by ‘rebalancing’ toward Asia. A second term for President Obama means that Asian countries may be compelled to respond to ‘rebalancing’ sooner rather than later. Obama’s first foreign tour since his re-election is a case in point. But as usual India is struggling to discover the right balance between strategic independence and alignment, and soft and hard powers. NonAlignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty First Century, a document released in February 2012, is of interest in this context, as it is one of the most comprehensive contributions to the ongoing debate within India. It discusses India’s strategic opportunities and attempts to outline India’s foreign and strategic policy over the next decade. While the authors, including well-known academics, retired government officials, journalists and industry representatives, ‘were administratively supported by the National Defence College and Centre for Policy Research’, the usual disclaimers apply. Written over a year, the document’s release coincided with the Chinese foreign minister’s visit to India and was attended by the current and past National Security Advisors, who mostly disagreed with the document. The document indeed does not throw much light on India’s foreign policy conundrum — ‘to enhance India’s strategic space and capacity for independent agency’. It largely restricts itself to presenting a bulleted list of what ought to be done. The authors were ‘driven by a sense of urgency… that we have a limited window of opportunity in which to seize our chances’ and the belief that ‘internal development will depend decisively on how effectively we manage our global opportunities’. But they seem to be torn between nostalgia for India’s earlier non-alignment policy and the belief in India as a quintessentially non-aggressive country, and the reality of an emerging multipolar world, where hard choices are unavoidable and hard power counts. NonAlignment 2.0 then appears to be a convenient, if not ad hoc, solution to India’s foreign policy conundrum in the midst of the growing chances of confrontation between the US and China, as well as between Israel and Iran. Three aspects of this document — which limit its usefulness — are striking. First, the document is devoid of idealism, which, irrespective of its impracticality, could have helped build overarching structures to reconcile the otherwise irreconcilable claims upon foreign policy. Second, the discussion is not built upon any theoretical and strategic framework, given the ad hoc nature of the solutions presented in the document. Third, the document does not empirically substantiate the assumptions that inform the solutions. The discussion essentially happens in a vacuum without engaging in parallel or preceding debates. The document does not even refer to the Non-Alignment Movement. Unsurprisingly, the authors neither explain why and in what ways the earlier non-alignment policy needs to be changed, nor do they explain in what respects NonAlignment 2.0 is different. Moreover, the authors think in largely non-institutional terms, which is surprising given their commitment to non-alignment that ideally entails multilateralism. This is evident from the absence of references to key organisations and blocs such as ASEAN, the EU and SAARC. With the exception of the IMF, UN and the G20, other international organisations are rarely, if ever, mentioned. And there is hardly any discussion on potential alternatives to the existing international organisations. A narrow geographical focus compounds the historical and institutional vacuum at the heart of NonAlignment 2.0. Global pretensions notwithstanding, the document largely focuses on China and Pakistan — the only countries that have sub-chapters devoted to them. Most references to the US are related to Pakistan, Afghanistan and China. Even Pakistan is thought of ‘as a subset of the larger strategic challenges posed by China’. SAARC members, excluding Pakistan and Afghanistan, are referred to merely seven times, of which five references are to Bangladesh. And Indonesia, another important neighbour, and Japan, an important partner, attract less attention than Iran. In fact, Iran completely overshadows the Middle East in the document. Viewed alongside the lack of engagement with international institutions and India’s history, the skewed geographical focus of NonAlignment 2.0 suggests two things that should disturb those who, for some reasons, hope that India will step up and play a larger role in the emerging international order in Asia. Firstly, a significant section of the Indian strategic community continues to be obsessed with Pakistan and, increasingly, China and, hence, is oriented toward India’s northern land borders. Such an orientation is obsolete given India’s ever increasing marine footprint and growing economic and strategic engagement with countries across the world. Secondly, they also continue to be unable to imagine international institutional solutions to perennial regional military and diplomatic concerns. For instance, NonAlignment 2.0 informs us that in future, Chinese attempts to escalate the China–India border conflict ought to be countered through ‘effective insurgency in the areas occupied by Chinese forces’. This is a solution from another age. But as veteran journalist BG Verghese pointed out, this document is important insofar as it challenges others to think aloud. By Vikas Kumar Assistant Professor of Economics at Azim Premji University, Bangalore. East Asia Forum

India: the warped history and geography of NonAlignment 2.0

In the aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Narasimha Rao government reworked India’s dysfunctional economic and foreign policies to improve India’s abysmal terms of trade with the rest of the world.

The latest global financial crisis seems to have shaken the United States’ global dominance and is forcing India to revisit its post-Soviet foreign policy. Choices Asian countries like India make in the near future will affect the chances of the emergence of an ‘Asian Concert’ that, in turn, will influence the United States’ ability to sustain its dominance by ‘rebalancing’ toward Asia. A second term for President Obama means that Asian countries may be compelled to respond to ‘rebalancing’ sooner rather than later. Obama’s first foreign tour since his re-election is a case in point.
But as usual India is struggling to discover the right balance between strategic independence and alignment, and soft and hard powers. NonAlignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty First Century, a document released in February 2012, is of interest in this context, as it is one of the most comprehensive contributions to the ongoing debate within India. It discusses India’s strategic opportunities and attempts to outline India’s foreign and strategic policy over the next decade. While the authors, including well-known academics, retired government officials, journalists and industry representatives, ‘were administratively supported by the National Defence College and Centre for Policy Research’, the usual disclaimers apply. Written over a year, the document’s release coincided with the Chinese foreign minister’s visit to India and was attended by the current and past National Security Advisors, who mostly disagreed with the document. The document indeed does not throw much light on India’s foreign policy conundrum — ‘to enhance India’s strategic space and capacity for independent agency’. It largely restricts itself to presenting a bulleted list of what ought to be done.
The authors were ‘driven by a sense of urgency… that we have a limited window of opportunity in which to seize our chances’ and the belief that ‘internal development will depend decisively on how effectively we manage our global opportunities’. But they seem to be torn between nostalgia for India’s earlier non-alignment policy and the belief in India as a quintessentially non-aggressive country, and the reality of an emerging multipolar world, where hard choices are unavoidable and hard power counts. NonAlignment 2.0 then appears to be a convenient, if not ad hoc, solution to India’s foreign policy conundrum in the midst of the growing chances of confrontation between the US and China, as well as between Israel and Iran.
Three aspects of this document — which limit its usefulness — are striking. First, the document is devoid of idealism, which, irrespective of its impracticality, could have helped build overarching structures to reconcile the otherwise irreconcilable claims upon  foreign policy. Second, the discussion is not built upon any theoretical and strategic framework, given the ad hoc nature of the solutions presented in the document. Third, the document does not empirically substantiate the assumptions that inform the solutions. The discussion essentially happens in a vacuum without engaging in parallel or preceding debates. The document does not even refer to the Non-Alignment Movement. Unsurprisingly, the authors neither explain why and in what ways the earlier non-alignment policy needs to be changed, nor do they explain in what respects NonAlignment 2.0 is different.
Moreover, the authors think in largely non-institutional terms, which is surprising given their commitment to non-alignment that ideally entails multilateralism. This is evident from the absence of references to key organisations and blocs such as ASEAN, the EU and SAARC. With the exception of the IMF, UN and the G20, other international organisations are rarely, if ever, mentioned. And there is hardly any discussion on potential alternatives to the existing international organisations.
A narrow geographical focus compounds the historical and institutional vacuum at the heart of NonAlignment 2.0. Global pretensions notwithstanding, the document largely focuses on China and Pakistan — the only countries that have sub-chapters devoted to them. Most references to the US are related to Pakistan, Afghanistan and China. Even Pakistan is thought of ‘as a subset of the larger strategic challenges posed by China’. SAARC members, excluding Pakistan and Afghanistan, are referred to merely seven times, of which five references are to Bangladesh. And Indonesia, another important neighbour, and Japan, an important partner, attract less attention than Iran. In fact, Iran completely overshadows the Middle East in the document.
Viewed alongside the lack of engagement with international institutions and India’s history, the skewed geographical focus of NonAlignment 2.0 suggests two things that should disturb those who, for some reasons, hope that India will step up and play a larger role in the emerging international order in Asia. Firstly, a significant section of the Indian strategic community continues to be obsessed with Pakistan and, increasingly, China and, hence, is oriented toward India’s northern land borders. Such an orientation is obsolete given India’s ever increasing marine footprint and growing economic and strategic engagement with countries across the world. Secondly, they also continue to be unable to imagine international institutional solutions to perennial regional military and diplomatic concerns. For instance, NonAlignment 2.0 informs us that in future, Chinese attempts to escalate the China–India border conflict ought to be countered through ‘effective insurgency in the areas occupied by Chinese forces’. This is a solution from another age. But as veteran journalist BG Verghese pointed out, this document is important insofar as it challenges others to think aloud. By Vikas Kumar Assistant Professor of Economics at Azim Premji University, Bangalore. East Asia Forum

East Timor's lessons for our abuse Royal Commission

The support group for victims of sexual abuse, Broken Rites, has proposed that victims be given the opportunity to tell their stories as part of the proceedings to be undertaken by the upcoming Royal Commission. 

According to the Fairfax press on Monday, the group's spokesman, Dr Wayne Chamely, is advocating that a 'truth commissioner' be appointed specifically for the purpose of listening to victims. The commissioner 'would move around and meet people in their own communities' and carry out this function concurrently with the Commission's other terms of reference. 

At the heart of this proposal is a conviction that the Royal Commission must be as victim-friendly as possible if it is to get at the whole truth, contribute to the healing of victims, educate the public about this entrenched issue and its origins, and generate effective recommendations.

Broken Rites is clearly concerned that the Royal Commission may not be able to adequately accommodate victims because some may not feel comfortable testifying in such a setting or will not be heard because the Commission, due to its anticipated huge work load, will have to be selective.

Faced with similar challenges, East Timor's groundbreaking truth commission opted to take a system-wide victim-friendly approach to its work.

The Comissao de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliacao (CAVR) (or Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation) functioned 2001–2005 and was set up to address the huge number of human rights violations committed 1974–1999, particularly during the Indonesian occupation, including widespread sexual violence.

Its core mandate focused on establishing the truth about these violations, facilitating community reconciliation, and reporting on its work, inquiry, findings and recommendations. 

Sensitivity to victims informed every aspect of the CAVR's design, structure, operation and reporting. Its enabling legislation required the commission 'to assist in restoring the dignity of victims' and it employed a number of strategies to achieve this.

Some were procedural, such as consulting victims about the commission's terms of reference and the selection of commissioners, bringing victims together to share their experiences with other victims, recording and preserving victim testimony, and administering an urgent reparations scheme for the most vulnerable victims.

Others were organisational, such as allocating a victim portfolio to one of CAVR's seven commissioners and establishing a victims unit charged with ensuring that the needs and rights of victims were addressed across the commission's activities. 

The centrepiece of this victim-friendly approach was listening to victims. For this to work, significant planning, resources and time were invested in preparing communities and victims, particularly women who'd suffered sexual violence, to participate and share terrifying experiences that would have led to recrimination under the previous regime. CAVR teams spent three months in each sub-district for this purpose.

Victims were invited to give statements about their experiences and to testify at local hearings. and some were invited on a representative basis to speak at national hearings. In response and in addition to their input at community reconciliations, victims provided some 8000 statements and testified freely and openly at 350 local hearings and eight national public hearings.

These hearings, particularly the national hearings held in the capital, broadcast live and attended by high-level Timorese, were expressions of solemn respect and solidarity for victims. In addition to providing evidence, the hearings assisted the healing of victims by honouring their contribution both to East Timor's liberation and, through their stories, to the building of a culture of human rights, non-violence and rule of law in the new nation.

The material gathered has been archived and disseminated in multiple languages in video, print and other formats to help East Timor's booming youth population appreciate the sacrifices made on their behalf and to benefit from the lessons learned from this deeply traumatic period. 

 

Indonesia, home of the principal perpetrators, did not interfere with the process.

The CAVR methodology was not perfect and, in retrospect, could have been even more victim-friendly. Some of its core recommendations, including a call for a reparations program, have not yet been implemented seven years after being tabled in the East Timor parliament, a source of considerable disappointment to aging victims. 

Two principal conclusions can be drawn from the East Timor experience for Australia's Royal Commission. First, a victim-friendly process is desirable, achievable and productive. If East Timor after decades of war and devastation could do it, Australia certainly can.

However victims should not take for granted that the high level of public and political support the Royal Commission proposal currently enjoys will translate into implementing its recommendations down the track. CAVR enjoyed similar levels of support at its inception. Sadly, East Timor's experience is that victims need to organise and mobilise if they are to see their recommendations implemented. 

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Pat Walsh worked in East Timor for ten years, mostly as part of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconcilation. The UN recruited him to help establish the Commission and he served variously as its executive director and special adviser. Eureka Street article