North
Korea’s series of nuclear detonations and missile tests requires new diplomatic
strategies – perhaps even liaison offices.
North
Korea’s continuing nuclear dance with the ultimate weapon, déjà vu all over
again, is becoming all too serious, and it’s time for Washington and allies
think sensibly about how to deal with what they cannot change.
The North’s fifth detonation of an atomic device following the recent
launch of a submarine ballistic missile and a slew of other rocket tests into
the Sea of Japan add yet more layers to its mounting nuclear capacity. Coupled
with the test of a space satellite, display of mobile solid fueled rockets and
expanding nuclear weapons material production, it’s evident that Pyongyang is
on the cusp of becoming a credible nuclear-armed state.
Less evident is how the international community intends to cope. Wedded
to conviction that a nuclear North simply cannot be, the community seems stuck
in a time warp. Despite the Kim regime’s nuclear persistence, the UN Security
Council stammers with repeated condemnations and impotent sanctions: Pyongyang
is in “flagrant disregard” and “grave violation” of resolutions. The body
“deplores” missile tests that “contribute…to the development of nuclear weapons
delivery systems and increase tensions.” It calls on member states to “redouble
their efforts” to implement sanctions and the Kim government “must fully comply
with [Council] obligations.”
Kim Jong Un is not listening and in no mood to listen. As a result a
shift in strategy is now required – accepting the unacceptable conceding that
North Korea is a nuclear-armed state not as a reward for bad behavior but as
the reflection of reality. The challenge moving forward requires that new
military and diplomatic means be put in place that better prevents Pyongyang
from effectively gaming or using the bomb.
Thinking the unthinkable is not the natural inclination of the
international community. Hoping against hope, the UN Security Council
finds comfort in the ritual of resolutions and sanctions to reverse the North’s
behavior. And it is not alone. The Washington
Post recently reported that some former US government officials
meeting with senior North Korean diplomats this year see a glimmer of hope with
Pyongyang’s possible interest in resuming arms-control talks coupled with
a peace treaty.
But moving Pyongyang off its nuclear course is a chimera. The
uncomfortable fact remains that North Korea has violated every nonproliferation
commitment it has entered: the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, the 1992
North-South Korean peninsula denuclearization agreement, the 1994 Agreed
Framework and the 2005 Six Party Talks nuclear elimination accord, and the 2012
“leap year agreement” to freeze nuclear and missile tests. The pattern of
violations meshes with the North’s 2012 constitutional amendment that defines
the nation as “a nuclear armed state,” confirmed at the party congress earlier
this year.
Pursuing the illusion that talks, sanctions and UN resolutions make a
material difference is dangerous wishful thinking. Such refusal to accept
reality takes attention away from preventing the North’s coercive manipulation
of the bomb or use. Although some take solace that for decades the nuclear
taboo has overwhelmed the temptation for military application, the quixotic Kim
regime does not reassure. The challenge going forward requires constructing a
strategy that assures that Pyongyang never uses its bomb or gains from issuing
threats.
Finding the right formula can draw from historical cases, but crafting
the deal may be more challenging due to Pyongyang’s peculiar political culture.
Then there is the fact that other entrants into the nuclear club were better
connected with the world, tempering the risk of nuclear
crisis. Unfortunately, dealing with the nuclear North raises more
questions than answers.
Classically when an adversary gets the bomb concerned nations attempt to
do the same. In response to the feared Nazi weapon, the United States raced for
its own. Moscow spurted to catch the US. Then soon Britain and in time France
followed as Washington spread its nuclear umbrella across allied Europe and
Asia to prevent copycats. China pursued its nuclear arsenal in response to the
United States while India and Pakistan today are bulking up nuclear wares to
deter the other.
The end of the Cold War brought a dramatic reduction in the superpower
arsenals including elimination of US weapons in South Korea. North Korea’s
acquisition raises questions whether South Korea, like other nations under the
nuclear gun, should start its own nuclear program.
Questions abound about whether the weapon would make Seoul more or less
secure. Analysts must assess whether a South Korean weapon or return of US
weapons would make Pyongyang more anxious and trigger happy. Nuclear
weapons in the South also is an issue for neighbors. China might ratchet up its
own program or turn a blind eye to the North’s development. Japan and Taiwan
could reconsider nuclear abstinence. The broader nonproliferation regime could
be threatened as a result. The United States could consider whether flouting
its nuclear naval capacity already in the western Pacific would be the better
brake on proliferation while still enhancing nuclear deterrence.
Alternatively, Seoul’s conventional deterrent backed by a strengthened
US tripwire – for example, porting of US naval vessels and stationing
conventionally armed strategic bombers in South Korea – might be sufficient to
make Pyongyang think before issuing nuclear threats or worse. The Park
government has boosted its conventional posture, in 2015 inaugurating a
five-year defense plan that annually increases expenditure by 7
percent. Modernization includes longer-range missiles and state of the art
F-35 aircraft. To buck up missile defenses, the United States, to the ire
of a China alleging threats to its nuclear deterrent, is on track to deploy the
sophisticated Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense system, or THAAD.
Keeping nuclear waters calm requires more than a beefing up of
deterrence but also an uptick in diplomacy to prevent nuclear crisis. Save for
Israel and North Korea, all other nuclear-armed countries have diplomatic ties
with adversaries. Relations have not been sufficient to prevent conflict generally,
but they open the door to mute risks – in the nuclear realm, consider the
diplomatic interface between Soviet-American officials in Washington during the
Cuban missile crisis. On and off telephonic hotlines between the Koreas
illustrate recognition that some form of direct contact is mutually
beneficial. But an operating hot line is no substitute for a diplomatic
presence in each capital.
For the North, an unconditional liaison office in Washington
and US representation in Pyongyang would be a coup of sorts for the Kim regime
and represent recognition that North Korea is a nuclear power. Surely the
alternative – an isolated, paranoid, insecure, poorly informed nuclear
Pyongyang on hair trigger is not good for anyone.
Many US nonproliferation and defense purists cringe at the notion of
nuclear acceptance. And, Pyongyang could try to game nuclear “recognition” and
demand concessions, for example, an end to the US alliance with South Korea,
withdrawal of US forces, removal of US naval vessels from the Western Pacific,
as well as economic assistance. Washington’s response must be a firm
“no,” conceding nothing to a US/South Korean defense/deterrent posture absent
meaningful reciprocation.
Granted, repeating the UN Security Council ritual of condemnation and calls
for sanctions feeds the view that “at least we are doing something.” But the
ritual avoids hard reality: Nuclear North Korea will be with us at
least as long as the Kim dynasty remains. The time is overdue for planning on
how to deal with the uncomfortable truth.
*Bennett Ramberg (PhD, Johns Hopkins; JD,
UCLA) served as a policy analyst in the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in
the George H.W. Administration. The author of three books on international
politics, including what is considered the classic treatment of consequences of
military attacks on reactors (Nuclear Power Plants as Weapons for the Enemy, University of
California Press) and editor of three others, Ramberg has published in
more than a dozen professional journals and magazines. His opinion essays have
been published in major American newspapers including The New
York Times, The Los Angeles Times, and The Wall Street Journal
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