How to Spark a War in Asia - Both
Washington and Beijing need to prevent their allies from creating security
crises
A major challenge for a great power is
preventing allies and client states from creating unwanted security crises. No
matter how close or friendly an ally might be, it has its own policy agenda,
and that agenda may differ from that of its great power protector. Failure to
rein in a client can be calamitous. Serbia’s pursuit of a stridently
nationalist parochial agenda against Austria-Hungary in the years before World
War I, for example, was a major factor in eventually entangling its patron,
Russia, in the conflict.
Both the United States and China need to
be cognizant of this danger as they conduct their overall policies in East
Asia. North Korea’s provocative and disruptive behavior, especially Pyongyang’s
multiple ballistic missile and nuclear tests, highlights the problem for
Beijing. Chinese officials appear increasingly frustrated as their North Korean
“ally” seems determined to engage in such conduct despite China’s pleas,
requests, and warnings to refrain. It would not
be surprising if apprehension is rising in Chinese leadership circles that Kim
Jong-un’s regime might do something truly reckless that triggers a war on the
Korean Peninsula. The problem is that unless Beijing is willing to adopt
draconian measures, such as cutting off North Korea’s food and energy supplies,
the influence it can exercise over its rambunctious ally is decidedly limited.
The United States faces somewhat more subtle dangers with two of its allies in
East Asia, but the dangers are still very real. Taiwan is one of those
allies--or more accurately a protectorate under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act.
U.S. officials had become accustomed to cooperative behavior from Taipei during
the eight-year administration of Kuomintang President Ma Ying-jeou. Ma went out
of his way to placate Beijing and always kept Washington in the loop regarding
various initiatives.
There has already been a deterioration in cross-strait relations
under the new government of Tsai Ing-wen of the pro-independence Democratic
Progressive Party. Her government has taken a number of actions that have
angered Beijing. One was to refuse to embrace the so-called 1992 consensus in
which the two sides agreed that there was only one China, although they
disagreed about the specific nature of that entity. Another was to have a rally in Taipei
commemorating the Tiananmen Square massacre—the first time that such a
commemoration had been held in Taiwan.
Now Taipei has taken action that further
complicates the already delicate situation in the South China Sea. Even as
Washington has repeatedly admonished Beijing not to enhance the islands and
reefs that it occupies in that body of water, media reports indicate that
Taiwan is pursuing an ambitious agenda. According to United Press International,
relying on reports in China Times and other Taiwanese sources, Taiwan
is now building anti-aircraft defenses on Taiping (also known as Itu Aba)
Island, the largest island in the disputed Spratly chain claimed by China,
Taiwan, Vietnam, and the Philippines. That follows on the heels of an upgraded
military airstrip. The latest construction apparently consists of four
anti-aircraft gun blockhouse towers. To make matters even more ominous, the
Taiwanese government apparently asked Google to blur out
images of the site to conceal the military construction. At a minimum, Taipei’s
conduct will make Washington’s next lecture to Beijing on maintaining the
status quo in the South China Sea considerably more awkward.
The other small East Asian client that has
the potential to make life difficult for Washington is the Philippines. So far
at least Manila has not done anything irresponsible following the favorable
ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. But President
Rodrigo Duterte is the personification of a loose-cannon ally. Indeed, his
intemperate language and behavior makes Donald Trump look like a model of
dignity. Among the lowlights of his presidency thus far was labeling President
Obama a “son of a bitch,”
which cost him a summit meeting with
the leader of his country’s patron and protector. Americans tended to focus on
the crudity of the comment rather than the context, but the context was
important. Duterte was emphasizing that he was answerable only to the Philippine
people and that Manila’s foreign policy would not automatically follow
Washington’s wishes. Although that statement might be primarily for domestic
consumption, U.S. policymakers may be dealing with a leader stubbornly inclined
to pursue his own agenda.
Basic norms of decency do
not seem to limit Duterte’s behavior. His domestic conduct has been as alarming
and reckless as his rhetoric. Chief among his offenses is his regime’s death
squad-style killings of more than
2,400 accused drug traffickers—all without even a semblance of due process. One
dare not assume that a leader willing to commit such crimes will behave in a
responsible fashion on international issues that Washington deems important.
And although he has not yet done anything
especially confrontational toward China, there is little doubt that he expects the United
States to support him in whatever foreign policy he does adopt. Since we do
have a long-standing bilateral security treaty with Manila, it might not be
easy to extricate ourselves from a counterproductive, or even dangerous,
commitment in the midst of a crisis. It’s not the most comforting thought that
America’s security could be directly impacted by actions taken by the likes of
Rodrigo Duterte.
Both China and America would benefit from a comprehensive reassessment of alliance
policies. Do security ties to small, often volatile, sometimes uncontrollable,
client states really benefit great powers? Or are they more often mousetraps
leading to unwanted and unnecessary wars? Policymakers need to ask themselves
such questions before the next crisis erupts.
Ted Galen Carpenter, a senior fellow in
defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and a contributing
editor at the National Interest. is the author of 10 books and more than 600
articles on international affairs.
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