The death of Islam Karimov sparked discussions, not only on the future of Uzbekistan, but also on
the geopolitical meaning of Central Asia. One thing is clear: despite the
region’s importance, the major outside powers encounter significant
difficulties when attempting to improve their standing there. The West, Russia,
China, India, Turkey, the Gulf states and Iran all have reasons to engage with
Central Asian republics, and all need to expend a great deal of effort to
secure sustainable results for their policies.
In this game, Russia might be proving
itself to be the strongest player.
The Great Game of the
nineteenth century—the competition between the Russian and British empires for
dominance in Central Asia—had two main characteristics. First, Russia was a
challenger to Great Britain already dominating India and South Asia. The
British Empire pushed back against Russia’s efforts to extend its influence to
the south from Central Asia, challenging British positions. Second, with the
importance of India and the British fear of losing “the brightest jewel in the
British crown,” this contest was to a significant degree secondary
to European politics, defining the international relations of that age.
Today, while analyzing the modern Great Game in Central Asia, there is no clear
dominating power or challenger—or, for that matter, multiple challengers.
Several current players in the region have different advantages and
shortcomings. Although it is hard to determine the central zone of today’s
world politics, with the continued significance of Europe, and the prominence
of the Middle East and the Pacific Rim in terms of global security, Central
Asia’s importance is hard to underestimate.
In the short run, the Muslim masses of the Central Asian
region, which can hardly be considered affluent, present one of the most
promising sources of recruits for Islamic extremism. Gulmurod Khalimov, a former Tajik special-operations colonel
who became one of ISIS’s senior military leaders, is only the most well known
among the thousands of Central Asia–born terrorists. However, the bigger
challenge for countries along the borders of Central Asia, whether Russia or
China, and for global security in general, lies in the possibility of a
wide-scale Islamist insurrection that could transfer the region into to a
hotbed of global extremism.
Central Asia’s energy resources are important in the long
run. But one can argue that since the demise of Soviet Union they have been overestimated.
Moreover, against the background of falling oil prices, these resources are
less sought after. But considering the growing global demand for energy, and
oil and gas constituting the biggest share for at least the next twenty-five
years, countries strategically managing their energy security and energy
companies fighting for market dominance in the coming decades cannot help but
retain a presence in Central Asia. Even with lowered estimates, the region
remains rich in hydrocarbons.
Every major power active in Central Asia is involved for
its own particular reasons. But all of them know the extent of the difficulties
that need to be overcome to establish a sustainable presence in the region.
Despite their geographical proximity and a long history of relations with the
region, Iran, Turkey and, to a lesser degree, Saudi Arabia currently have too
much on their plates to divert their attention to increasing their influence in
Central Asia. The wars in Syria and Yemen, and the struggle for influence in
Lebanon, Iraq and other places in the Middle East, coupled with the challenges
of domestic development, have pushed Central Asia to the back of Iran’s
foreign-policy priorities. Iran’s counterpart in many of these struggles—Saudi
Arabia, arguably the most influential Arab power in the Gulf—is also too
occupied to become actively involved in the region. Furthermore, the growth of
Saudi activities in Central Asia and elsewhere in recent decades has
been connected to the involvement of groups considered by many to be extremist.
Bearing in mind the current international situation, one could argue that it is
not the best time for Riyadh to support these activities.
Ankara is also too busy to raise its profile in Central
Asia. The peculiarity of Turkish situation is determined by the fact that the
advancement of Turkish “soft power” in Central Asia was connected to Fethullah Gülen’s organization. Today, Gülen’s
networks are persecuted by the Turkish state, both domestically and
internationally. For India, despite all its interest in foreign energy sources,
Central Asia seems still beyond its diplomatic means. Competition with Pakistan
for influence in Afghanistan takes up too much of India’s foreign political
resources to plan any for further advancements to the north.
After twenty-five years
of discussions about Central Asia’s importance, the West has nothing to show in
terms of development of cooperation with the region. The United States secured
enough support for its Afghan campaign, which was not a difficult task
considering Central Asian rulers’ fears of Islamic extremism, but still has to
prove it that has both crucial strategic interests in the region and an
effective policy to protect them. The EU, with its endless rhetoric about the
need to substitute Russian energy resources with those from Central Asia, has
not advanced in accomplishing this task. After decades of countless speeches,
lengthy policy papers, and deep academic articles and well-written op-eds,
there are no significant energy supplies from the region reaching the EU, with
the exception of oil from Kazakhstan. However, Russia participates in the
production and transfer of that oil to a significant degree, and most
importantly, the amount delivered is still five to six times smaller than that
coming from Russia.
There are different explanations for this
situation, but several of them are worth emphasizing. On the one hand, despite
all the talk, energy supplies from Russia are still much more attractive
economically than those from many other countries, including Central Asia. If
energy supplies from Russia were a real security and economic threat to Europe,
the threat would have been addressed a long time ago. On the other hand, any
idea of Western cooperation with Central Asian states comes to an immediate
halt when Western representatives start lecturing Central
Asian potentates on democracy and human rights.
Compared to the West, China seems to be in a far better position: it
drastically needs Central Asian energy resources, and knows better than to
discuss democracy. However, Chinese involvement in Central Asia, as in many
other regions, is limited. Certainly, energy resources are welcomed, but
aside from that Beijing is in no rush to offer anything. It takes a stretch of
the imagination to see Chinese troops on the Tajik-Afghan border, or to
contemplate how China can drastically help the economic development of these
post-Soviet nations given the multitude of social and economic problems in
Chinese regions bordering Central Asia and beyond.
After analyzing the positions of other players in the new
Great Game, we can argue that the skeptics proclaiming Russian policy towards Central Asia to be
doomed are wrong. Still, Russia’s success is not guaranteed. The Central Asian
republics might not have been the ones looking forward to a Soviet Union
collapse, but their leaders had no problem becoming absolute rulers of their
newly independent domains, able to counterbalance Russia’s effort to return to
dominant positions. (Especially when Russia was not seriously trying to regain
its dominance during the first post-Soviet decade.) One of the factors in this
success was the fact that Central Asian, Russian and, for that matter, almost
all post-Soviet leaders shared a common background. Their political careers
were determined by the common experience of rising through the ranks of Soviet
bureaucracy. They had common language, attitudes and mentality. Their modus
operandi for dealing with Gorbachev—and, later, Yeltsin—could be depicted as cooperation,
but nevertheless involved severing ties with Russia.
Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma, a former member of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, was the master of that
policy: while pretending to be a representative of eastern Ukraine, and a
politician friendly to Moscow, he significantly diminished Russia’s influence
in Ukraine. Islam Karimov also knew how not to be openly hostile to Moscow and
still gain space for maneuvering in a direction that was not necessarily
pro-Russian. The epoch is changing for Russia’s relations with Central Asia in
general, and Uzbekistan in particular. There are no guarantees that new leaders
will be or pretend to be pro-Russian, and the chances are high they will not.
But it will cost them significant effort to retain power in turbulent times.
And in this situation, Russia might again become their partner of choice.
Moscow has a great deal to offer: security and energy cooperation, its labor market and
education for the Central Asian population, trade, and investments—and all this
not from charitable generosity, but because of the economic and security
interests Russia has in the region. The forms that this cooperation takes are
varied, from bilateral projects to the full-scale economic integration of the Eurasian Economic Union.
As time goes by, this cooperation is determined less by the nostalgia for the
common country of the past, and more by clearly understood interests and a
realpolitik approach.
Nikolay
Pakhomov is a political analyst and consultant in New York City. He is a
Russian International Affairs Council expert
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