The newly-released "Foreign
Policy Concept" of the Russian Federation contains some interesting
changes and updates. Given that this document reflects the Kremlin's strategic
mindset and how it views international relations, it is important to take what
is says seriously.
The fact that the strategy was being
prepared in parallel with the U.S. presidential election is perhaps not
accidental given two of its most noticeable features. The first is a slight but
significant shift in assessing the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons
from "unthinkable" to "unlikely." While the concept does
not anticipate a high probability of a nuclear exchange occurring, it does warn
that the risk of crises escalating between nuclear-armed states is increasing.
The second is a very loud and clear restatement of classic Westphalian
principles of how states should interact with each other in the international
order: on the basis of absolute "non-interference in one another's
internal affairs." Should a country not wish to operate from that
principle in its relations with Russia, Moscow reserves the right to utilize
harsh retaliatory measures to any perceived unfriendly actions.
Perhaps the expectation in the Russian Foreign Ministry was that Hillary
Clinton was on track to win the White House. Those two elements, in particular,
seemed designed to send a clear warning to Washington that Moscow would brook
no interference in its domestic affairs on the basis of any U.S. adjudication
of failures in democratic practices or human rights observances. Russia learned
from its momentary lapse in 2011, when appeals to the humanitarian principle of
the "responsibility to protect" caused Russia to abstain from a
United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing the creation of safe
areas for rebellious Libyans. Moscow is determined that this not be repeated in
the future, especially if such authority is used not to send forces to patrol
refugee camps but to engage in active military operations against the offending
government. It also reflects a growing Russian unwillingness to accept Western
claims that internal repression by a government seeking to retain its power
automatically constitutes a threat to regional peace and stability and
justifies international action. Russia thus signals to itself and to other
regimes that it stands by the principle that a government has the right to take
action to defend itself against threats to its rule — both internal and
external — and that it wants to raise the cost of Western-sponsored regime
change whenever possible.
The change to the assessment about nuclear
war reflects a growing consensus among experts that
indeed that risk is growing. But it also fits with a pattern displayed by
Russian president Vladimir Putin to warn the United States to back off. After
the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Putin used the metaphor of the spring to
suggest that ongoing, consistent Western pressure on Russia's frontiers had
finally produced a reaction. Even if a nuclear exchange is
"unlikely," the Russians are noting that if relations between Russia
and the West continue to spiral downward, it is no longer out of the realm of
possibility.
But this document is now released in the
context of a Donald Trump transition to the White House. During the campaign,
the candidate and many of his surrogates suggested that Hillary Clinton would
end up provoking World War III with Russia by miscalculating and pushing the
Kremlin too far— perhaps by trying to enforce a no-fly zone over Syria that
resulted in the destruction of Russian aircraft, or ending up in a clash over
the Baltic States. He also, at times, suggested that U.S. foreign policy ought
to move back in the direction of less interventionism and involvement in the
affairs of others. Humanitarian intervention does not appear to be high on the
foreign policy priorities of the new administration, while finding ways to
decrease tensions with other major powers, or at least with Russia, has been
proposed.
So it will be interesting to see whether
the new U.S. administration picks up on these signals as part of its own review
of the U.S.-Russia relationship. Compromising on or scaling back on a number of
past bipartisan policy approaches—notably the continued enlargement of NATO—in
order to decrease pressure on the “spring” might resonate with the new chief
executive. Focusing a relationship on "hard" security matters
(starting with preventing nuclear conflict) rather than on Russia's progress
with democratization would revert U.S. policy back to a pre-1991 standard
and reverse the insistence that has guided U.S. policy since that time that how
Russia is governed internally is of vital national security interest to the
United States.
Nikolas K. Gvosdev is a contributing
editor at the National Interest.
Image: 15U168 TEL 15P158 Topol
ICBM/Vitaly Kuzmin
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