Recent attacks by an
émigré-led force of trained Rohingya fighters mark a dangerous turn. To remove
a main root of the violence – Rohingya despair – the government must reverse
longstanding discrimination against the Muslim minority, moderate its military tactics,
and reach out to Myanmar’s Muslim allies.
The deadly
attacks on Border Guard Police (BGP) bases in Myanmar’s northern Rakhine State
on 9 October 2016 and the days following, and a serious escalation on 12
November when a senior army officer was killed, signify the emergence of a new
Muslim insurgency there. The current violence is qualitatively different from
anything in recent decades, seriously threatens the prospects of stability and
development in the state and has serious implications for Myanmar as a whole.
The government faces a huge challenge in calibrating and integrating its
political, policy and security responses to ensure that violence does not
escalate and intercommunal tensions are kept under control. It requires also
taking due account of the grievances and fears of Rakhine Buddhists.
Failure to
get this right would carry enormous risks. While the government has a clear
duty to maintain security and take action against the attackers, it needs, if
its response is to be effective, to make more judicious use of force and focus
on a political and policy approach that addresses the sense of hopelessness and
despair underlying the anger of many Muslims in Rakhine State. Complicating
this is that Aung San Suu Kyi has some influence, but under the constitution no
direct control over the military.
The
insurgent group, which refers to itself as Harakah al-Yaqin (Faith Movement,
HaY), is led by a committee of Rohingya émigrés in Saudi Arabia and is
commanded on the ground by Rohingya with international training and experience
in modern guerrilla war tactics. It benefits from the legitimacy provided by
local and international fatwas (religious judicial opinions) in support
of its cause and enjoys considerable sympathy and backing from Muslims in
northern Rakhine State, including several hundred locally trained recruits.
The
emergence of this well-organised, apparently well-funded group is a
game-changer in the Myanmar government’s efforts to address the complex
challenges in Rakhine State, which include longstanding discrimination against
its Muslim population, denial of rights and lack of citizenship. The current
use of disproportionate military force in response to the attacks, which fails
to adequately distinguish militants from civilians, together with denial of
humanitarian assistance to an extremely vulnerable population and the lack of
an overarching political strategy that would offer them some hope for the
future, is unlikely to dislodge the group and risks generating a spiral of
violence and potential mass displacement.
HaY would
not have been able to establish itself and make detailed preparations without
the buy-in of some local leaders and communities. Yet, this has never been a
radicalised population, and the majority of the community, its elders and
religious leaders have previously eschewed violence as counterproductive. The
fact that more people are now embracing violence reflects deep policy failures
over many years rather than any sort of inevitability.
A heavy-handed security response that fails to respect fundamental
principles of proportionality and distinction is not only in violation of
international norms; it is also deeply counterproductive.
It is
important for the government’s response to start from an appreciation of why a
violent reaction from some Muslims in Rakhine State has emerged. The population
has seen its rights progressively eroded, its gradual marginalisation from
social and political life, and rights abuses. This has become particularly
acute since the 2012 anti-Muslim violence in Rakhine. Disenfranchisement prior
to the 2015 elections severed the last link with politics and means of influence.
At the same time, the disruption of maritime migration routes to Malaysia
closed a vital escape valve, particularly for young men whose only tangible
hope for the future was dashed. An increasing sense of despair has driven more
people to consider a violent response, but it is not too late for the
government to reverse the trend.
It requires
recognising first that these people have lived in the area for generations and
will continue to do so. Ways must be found to give them a place in the nation’s
life. A heavy-handed security response that fails to respect fundamental
principles of proportionality and distinction is not only in violation of
international norms; it is also deeply counterproductive. It will likely create
further despair and animosity, increasing support for HaY and further
entrenching violence. International experience strongly suggests that an
aggressive military response, particularly if not embedded in a broader policy
framework, will be ineffective against the armed group and has the potential to
considerably aggravate matters.
So far,
though there are indications of some training and solidarity, HaY does not
appear to have a transnational jihadist or terrorist agenda. But there are
risks that if the government mishandles the situation, including by continued
use of disproportionate force that has driven tens of thousands from their
homes or across the border to Bangladesh, it could create conditions for
further radicalising sections of the Rohingya population that transnational jihadists
could exploit to pursue their own agendas in the country. To avoid that
requires subordinating the security response and integrating it into a
well-crafted, overarching political strategy – building stronger, more positive
relations between Muslim communities and the Myanmar state and closer
cooperation and intelligence sharing with regional countries.
Crisis Group, Yangon/Brussels, 15 December 2016
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