France’s strategic
interests in the Pacific are anything but ephemeral. Hence, Paris keeps
boosting its geopolitical projection in that region, as witnessed by its
efforts to strengthen further an already sound strategic partnership with
Australia. Nonetheless, at least in its current shape, the French military
presence in the maritime domain stretching from the Strait of Malacca to the
Southern Pacific could be questioned next year, as a new leadership will take
the reins at home amid political and economic uncertainties.
At any rate, if that proves to be the case, Paris can count on the
Chinese lifeline, no matter how contradictory it may be.
The French-Aussie
cooperation
On
December 7, France signed with Australia an agreement to share classified
information. The treaty aims to underpin Canberra’s Future Submarine Program
and, in particular, includes provisions for contractors involved with it.
In April,
France’s state-owned shipbuilder DCNS won a multi-billion contract for the
design and construction of 12 Shortfin Barracuda submarines, which will be part
of the Royal Australian Navy’s next generation fleet.
The
information-sharing deal between the two countries is probably thought to
prevent the disclosure of submarines’ sensitive details. It is worth noting
that Paris was forced into an embarrassing position last August, when The
Australian revealed the leak of secret data about the combat capabilities of
Scorpene-class vessels that DCNS was building for the Indian navy.
To a
large extent, the recent arrangement takes the French-Australian security
cooperation to new heights, at a time when Canberra views Paris’ commitment to
the Pacific as a source of stability, notably for the French contribution to
maritime surveillance in the area.
Pacific power
France is
a Pacific actor. The overseas dependencies of New Caledonia, French Polynesia
and Wallis and Futuna make it the country with the world’s largest Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) after the United States; 7 million square kilometers of its
EEZ – out of a total of 11 million worldwide – are indeed located in the Pacific
Ocean. 500,000 French citizens live in these territories, and 130,000 French
expatriates reside in Asian-Pacific countries.
Paris has
a considerable military force in the southern Pacific. 2,800 troops are
stationed between New Caledonia and French Polynesia. After sending a further
naval vessel to New Caledonia in July, now the French Pacific fleet maintains 4
patrol vessels, 2 surveillance frigates, 2 multi-mission ships, 5 maritime
surveillance aircraft, besides some tactical transport aircrafts and helicopters.
This defense apparatus is largely devoted to protecting French citizens and
territories and employed in surveillance missions and EEZ protection.
France is
the one European Union (EU) nation with a Pacific-wide military potential. For
example, its navy ships routinely sail through the South China Sea. In this
respect, last summer, Paris stressed that it would be ready to lead EU’s South
China Sea patrols to bolster freedom of navigation in the region – a proposal
that has so far had no follow-up within the European bloc. Freedom of
navigation and peaceful resolution of territorial disputes in the area were
both reiterated by French President Francois Hollande during a visit to Vietnam
in September.
Possible disengagement and
arm sales
On a trip
to New Caledonia in 2014, Hollande pointed out that his country would remain a
Pacific power in the years to come. The process of decolonization still
underway in South Pacific will test this assertion, with New Caledonia – one of
the world’s largest producers of nickel metal – that is expected to hold a
referendum on self-determination in 2018.
More
importantly, as France’s economy is still in a mess, it is to see whether Paris
will raise the funds needed to advance a proactive Pacific policy down the
line. In the country’s 2107 presidential campaign, the prospective allocation
of limited fiscal resources for military operations halfway around the world
could be a hot topic.
In case
of strategic disengagement in the Pacific, France holds a trump card to secure some
sort of regional footprint there – arm sales. Paris is the world’s
fourth-largest armaments exporter, and Asia-Pacific accounts for a relevant
proportion of French sales in this sector; in the 2010-2015 period, in fact,
France sold to Asian-Pacific nations US$2.1 billion in defence equipment, which
amounts to 24 percent of its total weapon sales, according to data from the
French defense procurement office (DGA) and the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI).
Paradoxically,
China was Paris’ best client in this stint, buying French arms worth US$1.2
billion. Like other European countries, France manages to find loopholes in the
EU arms embargo on Beijing, which Brussels imposed in the aftermath of the
crackdown of Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, and systematically provides the
Chinese dragon with dual-use items and sub-systems.
Thus, one
way or the other, French arms will continue to circulate across the Pacific;
they will be definitely wielded by Chinese soldiers and, perhaps, by French
troops as well.
Emanuele
Scimia is a journalist and foreign policy analyst. He is a contributing writer
to the South China Morning Post and the Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasia Daily
Monitor. In the past, his articles have also appeared in The National Interest,
Deutsche Welle, World Politics Review, The Jerusalem Post and the EUobserver,
among others. He has written for Asia Times since 2011.
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