Throughout the 1950s and ’60s American
bombers carrying nuclear weapons crisscrossed the globe, ready at a moment’s
notice to fly into the heart of Russia and bomb it back to the stone age.
Strategic Air Command — a now defunct branch of the U.S. Air Force — commanded
this airborne alert force.
It was once the pride of the American
military. For more than a decade, SAC bombers were no more than 15 minutes from
nuking Russia. But the shifts on the bombers were long — sometimes more than 24
hours — and keeping such an alert force ready was taxing on pilots and crew.
There were many accidents.
In 1958, a B-47 carrying a nuke collided
with an F-86 Sabre in the skies above Savannah, Georgia. The B-47 jettisoned
its nuclear payload into the Atlantic Ocean. Authorities never recovered the
bomb.
Months later, another B-47 dropped its
nuke over South Carolina when a bomb technician aboard accidentally activated
the emergency release. The bomb’s conventional explosives detonated and
destroyed a nearby house.
In 1966, a B-52 crashed in Spain, spilling
the nuclear guts of two bombs onto nearby farms. After the accident, Spain
halted nuclear-armed American planes from passing through its air space.
Those were bad, but SAC and its airborne
alert survived them. Then, in 1968, a B-52 crashed near Thule Monitoring
Station in Greenland and spilled its payload all over the ice. It was one
disaster too many, and it signaled the end of America’s airborne alert program
… and Strategic Air Command’s prestige.
After World War II and through the ’50s,
SAC worked to put more nukes on more planes. In a nuclear war, it seemed,
victory would go to the aggressor. America wouldn’t throw the first nuke, but
it wanted to make sure it was ready to strike back hard if Moscow dropped the
bomb.
SAC soon reasoned that it could shave time
off its bombing strategy if it had bombers in the air 24 hours per day, seven
days a week. It may seem insane now, but it happened. In 1960, the flying
branch began Operation Chrome Dome.
For the next eight years, SAC’s airborne
alert bombers were always in the air and ready to drop a nuke on the Kremlin.
But there was a problem. How would America
know Russia had attacked? The United States had established a perimeter of
radar stations called the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System, but radar,
computing and radio communication were new technologies prone to outages.
If a U.S. radar station went silent, how
would the military discern whether it was because of an attack or a technical
problem? This was a major concern at Thule, where the harsh Arctic climate
often shut down the base’s radar and radio towers, blacking out communication.
Worse, Thule was one of America’s most
important monitoring stations. If the Russians attacked, the military reasoned,
they would use the polar route across Greenland to do it.
“I like to tell the commander at Thule
that he will probably be one of the first ones to go if we go to war, but that
there is one thing I would like to know from him and that is when he went,”
Gen. Thomas Power, then head of Strategic Air Command, said at the time.
The Arctic’s climate is harsh and the
radar station was fragile. Outages were frequent, and SAC needed redundancy to
ensure that it didn’t attack Moscow just because it lost contact with Thule.
So SAC did what it always did. It strapped
some nukes on a bomber. The air command sent one of its airborne alert
bombers — complete with live nukes — to fly above the Thule monitoring station
24 hours a day … forever.
It seemed silly to keep live nukes in the
air above the world’s head all day, every day. It was a sword of Damocles and
it dropped in 1968.
On Jan. 21, 1968, fire swept through the
cabin of the airborne B-52 watching Thule station. Smoke and flames consumed
the plane and the seven crew members ejected. Six survived. The bomber crashed
into an ice cap in the bay near the base.
The conventional explosives in the plane’s
four hydrogen bombs exploded and cracked their nuclear payloads. Radioactive
elements slid out of the bombs and onto the ice.
SAC’s Operation Chrome Dome was already on
its last legs. The Thule accident just confirmed what many politicians and
military leader already thought — keeping a fleet of nuclear-armed bombers in
the air at all times was dangerous and insane.
In any case, politicians, the public and
the military had gradually turned against the idea. The development of
submarine-launched and intercontinental ballistic missiles, the need for
bombers in Vietnam and preceding accidents before Thule didn’t help.
The next day, “SAC terminated the carrying
of nuclear weapons aboard airborne alert aircraft,” Brig. Gen. Marshall Garth
wrote in a memo. Just seven days later, SAC stopped carrying nukes on all its
bombers.
This was how America balanced its nuclear
triad. Bombers were and are still an important part of that strategy. But in
the wake of Thule, the American military put more of its faith in ICBMs and
SLBMs. A Dexedrine powered fleet of nuclear-armed bombers in the air was just
too dangerous.
Only one of the B-52’s crew died during
the Thule disaster, but his death wasn’t the end of the tragedy. The hydrogen
bombs spread jet fuel and radioactive materials across the ice cap. It busted
up the flow of the sea, blackened the ice and spread plutonium, uranium,
americium and tritium into the ice and water.
Denmark — which ruled Greenland at the
time — was angry. The Danes and the Americans came together quickly to clean up
the mess in an effort Washington called Project Crested Ice.
The Arctic cold and winds
made the project almost impossible. The temperature dipped below -70 degrees
Fahrenheit, and the winds raged at more than 80 miles per hour. Despite this,
the crews operated 24 hours a day until they removed the waste and recovered
the bomb fragments.
It took thousands of workers and nine
months to clean up Thule. They moved more than 500,000 gallons of contaminated
water at a cost of almost $10 million.
The Thule disaster had long lasting effects.
In 1971, Moscow and Washington signed the
“Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Nuclear War,” and agreed to inform
each other when accidents such as Thule happened. Both superpowers realized
they could not risk nuclear annihilation because a tragic accident looked like
a nuclear attack.
Thanks to the Thule and several other SAC
accidents, the U.S. military realized its nuclear bombs weren’t safe when a
bomber crashed. And the Los Alamos National Laboratory developed a safer
detonation method to use in America’s nuclear bombs.
But the Danish workers who helped clean up
the site are dying of cancer. Crested Ice was a rush job done under pressure
from the international community, and its leadership cut corners. American and
Danish workers didn’t have the protective gear they needed to work with the
radioactive materials.
The Danes tried to sue the United States
for compensation and 1987, but failed. In 1995, Copenhagen paid a settlement to
1,700 members of the crew. Crested Ice, the plight of its workers and the
possibility that America left contaminated material behind is a recurring story
in the Danish press to this day.
SAC was never the same after Thule. The
once prestigious society of nuclear-armed pilots dwindled as ICBMs and SLBMs
grew more important. Jimmy Stewart had starred in a film based on the branch in
1955, but by the late ’80s, that fame had faded to nothing. Pres. George Bush
dissolved SAC in 1992.
Then in 2007, the Air Force lost two
nuclear warheads when it loaded them onto the wrong plane. The military needed
a special command to handle its nukes, so it resurrected SAC and renamed it
Global Strike Command.
It now controls the Air Force’s nuclear
weapons.
This first appeared in WarIsBoring here.
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