Thailand is currently under
the strictest military regime the country has seen since the early 1970s, an
era when China-backed communist guerrillas threatened to overthrow the
established monarchy-military symbiotic order. Despite rising controversy
surrounding the current National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) junta’s
heavy-handed rule, it’s a military regime that will likely remain in power for
the foreseeable future.
To
understand the present and project into the future, it’s important to
understand Thailand’s recent past. The 2014 military coup marked the crescendo
of anti-government street convulsions, staged initially against an amnesty bill
that would have paved the way for the criminally convicted self-exiled former
prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra to return to Thailand a free man under his younger
sister Yingluck Shinawatra’s elected government.
Those
protests later morphed into broad, if not vague, calls for cleaner governance,
an end to corruption and an overhaul of democratic politics. The street
protest-enabled coup, rather than an answer to a popular reform call, was
clearly orchestrated by royalist elites to ensure that top generals, rather
than squabbling politicians, are in control at the time of what many view will
be a delicate royal succession.
Since
seizing power, Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha’s junta has advanced reform
rhetoric while simultaneously consolidating a strong and increasingly efficient
police state bent on ferreting out and squashing dissent. Crackdowns on
journalists and activists have become progressively more severe, including the
recent commando-style abduction and physical beating in an open field of an
anti-junta student activist. It has also ramped up punitive anti-royal charges
against both critics of the crown and anti-military opponents.
The vow
to restore democratic governance and hold new elections is and remains a sop to
Western governments, namely the European Union and the United States, as well
as certain local middle class constituencies who support the country’s long and
painful struggle for democracy over military-led authoritarianism. The junta’s
time table for new polls has been progressively pushed back, first promised for
late 2015, then mid-2016 and now mid to late 2017.
That’s
based on the assumption a new draft constitution passes a July referendum,
which seems unlikely given reports that it, like a previous scrapped version,
includes various controversial provisions that aim to uphold the military’s
overarching political role. It’s not altogether clear what will happen if the
charter is voted down, though it would almost certainly further attenuate the
junta’s hold on power beyond 2017.
Rather
than a near term democratic transition, Thai politics will more likely be
steered by the military for the foreseeable future. Thailand has arguably
already entered an end-of-reign new political order, where the military, rather
than a democratic government, has begun to fill the inevitable power vacuum
that will open at the end of the current king’s long and storied reign and the
crowning of a new, inevitably less influential, heir.
Who wears
that crown, however, is not a complete given. How a contest between competing
royalist camps plays out in the weeks and months ahead could have significant
implications for stability. Even with a calm and predictable succession, it is
expected that the military government will invoke martial law to enforce an
extended period of national mourning until the transition is deemed as safe and
secure.
If there
is any hint of turmoil around that process, either from a competing royalist or
oppositional camp, the military leaders now in charge will likely jettison
their self-professed commitment to restoring democracy and hunker down for an
even longer stay. Only when the succession is considered settled and the
monarchy upheld will the country begin to move back towards some type of, most
likely highly circumscribed, democratic order.
Consolidation
Many
observers were taken aback by how easily the military consolidated its power in
light of the political saber-rattling that preceded the 2014 coup. Unlike the
2006 military coup that ousted Thaksin’s elected government, characterized by
commentators at the time as “smooth as silk,” Prayut’s putsch has employed
especially hard tactics to consolidate its control.
Civil
liberties have been sharply curbed, political opponents have been threatened
and harassed, the press intimidated and censored, and the general population
given strict marching orders to think only happy thoughts. Those measures were
initially employed to counter the threat that Thaksin’s allies might mount an
insurgent response to the coup, but as that threat fades its clear the junta
has no intention of lightening its grip.
Thaksin’s
allies had threatened civil war if Yingluck’s government was overthrown in a
democracy-suspending coup. There were news reports at the time citing Thaksin’s
“Red Shirt” protest group members saying that their stronghold northern and
northeastern regions would secede from the kingdom if Yingluck was ousted
through extra-legal means. Yingluck disassociated herself from the threats at
the time, while the military sought harsh repercussions against the vocal
activists.
None of
those civil war threats, however, even remotely came to fruition after the
coup. The military’s threat to seize the well-investigated personal assets of
key Red Shirt leaders if they agitated has proven highly effective in muzzling
and neutralizing their criticism and resistance. More hard-knuckled tactics,
including intrusive surveillance and strongly enforced bans on political
gatherings, have been deployed to suppress possible organization and unrest in
the provinces.
Those
tough tactics have underpinned the stability that has defined Prayut’s military
rule. There has been barely a peep of street level resistance to the coup in
Bangkok, and arguably less so in the provinces, despite the rolling back of
civil liberties and heavy-handed rule. But the calm has been achieved largely
through intimidation, not genuine reconciliation – a notion that the junta’s
spin machine has bid to perpetuate through its North Korean-like “returning
happiness to the people” mantras spread nightly over state media.
At the
same time, former army commander and now prime minister Prayut has seemed to
grow increasingly comfortable in his political role. While his off-the-cuff and
often impolitic comments are often portrayed critically in the press, his tough
talking, straight-shooting manner has given him a certain populist appeal at
the grass roots, similar in respects to the cowboy antics Thaksin leveraged to
win and maintain popular support.
Accommodation
Has
post-coup stability held more due to military suppression or Thaksin’s
inaction? It now seems clear to many diplomats and analysts that a certain
accommodation between Thaksin and the military was put in place at the time of
the coup where Thaksin’s personal and family interests have been left
unmolested in exchange for him unplugging his political machine, including his
withholding support for earlier calls among his political allies to establish
an exile government.
Anti-government
street protesters that helped to topple Yingluck had often bayed from their
protest stages for an uprooting and expulsion of Thaksin and his family clan’s
influence and interests. That has happened to a degree in the bureaucracy and
state enterprises, and increasingly through what some view as a politicized
anti-corruption campaign targeting the former premier’s power base in the
police, but Thaksin’s personal assets and his family’s businesses have been
left largely untouched since the coup.
His son’s
Bangkok-based Voice TV news station, while under the same strict censorship
guidelines of other private stations, has not been singled out for harassment
despite a sometimes critical edge. The Shinawatra family-run property concern
SC Asset, where Thaksin’s son-in-law serves as a top executive, has been
allowed to roll out its new high-end properties unimpeded without politicized
probes of its land bank acquisitions and finances.
That soft
touch, as well as nod-and-wink perceptions that Thaksin could receive a royal
pardon, or at least more sympathetic treatment, if and when Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn
is crowned king, has likely factored in Thaksin’s mostly muted response to the
coup and military government. Despite the heavy harassment of his political
supporters, proposed measures to curb his party’s future electoral chances, and
occasional ad hominem attacks on his personage, Thaksin’s criticism has been
sparing and infrequent.
Twenty
months since the coup, Thaksin is now arguably fighting a battle of relevance,
with indications of flagging support and a lack of connection with his former
grass roots support base. Some of his supporters say they are waiting for a
“signal” to move, while others have complained they no longer receive funds
from their past paymaster. It is notable that Thaksin’s call late last year to
wear red as an act of civil disobedience fell flat, though this too begs
questions of how much is driven by fear and how much disenfranchisement.
As
Thaksin’s perceived threat fades, Prayut’s junta could feel emboldened to take
a harder line against the former premier’s in-country and family interests amid
criticism from certain royalists the regime has been soft on the ex-premier.
One move in that direction is the criminal trial of Yingluck for alleged
corruption her government’s boondoggle rice price support scheme. If found guilty,
the coup-ousted ex-premier could spend a decade behind bars, though many
analysts doubt such a divisive verdict will ultimately be handed down.
Divisions
With
Thaksin’s perceived threat in retreat, or at least dormant, divisions are
becoming more apparent among factions in the armed forces and their opposed
royalist backers.
The coup
firmly consolidated the power of the Queen’s Guard regiment, an elite force
committed to protecting Queen Sirikit, with its alumni gaining control of the
military’s influential command positions and inside the junta government. That
consolidation has come at the expense of King’s Guard troops, capped by the
largest out-of-cycle reshuffle the country has seen since pro-Thaksin soldiers
were purged in the aftermath of the 2006 coup.
This
intra-military tension explains, at least until recently, occasional obscure
allusions in the local press of a possible counter-coup against Prayut’s
royalist junta. While certain elite soldiers remain peeved about being
sidelined after the coup, internal tensions have also turned on the notion that
Prayut and Defense Minister Prawit Wongsuwan, the junta’s two highest ranking
members, have not gone far enough in purging Thaksin’s influence amid rumors
confirmed by diplomats that the latter has met secretly with Thaksin in
Singapore.
A recent
scandal surrounding the military’s construction of larger- than-life statues of
past kings at a royal park has implicated top-ranking Queen’s Guard soldiers,
including a former army chief, and delivered the first knock against the
junta’s claims that it is above the corrupt practices of elected governments
and politicians.
The
damaging revelations are known to have come from within the Queen’s Guard, in
what appears on the surface to reflect a personal feud between sitting army
commander Gen Teerachai Nakwanich and his predecessor, Gen Udomdej Sitabutr.
It’s also seems clear that the local press received a signal from senior
royalists that they could pursue the sensitive story without fear of reprisal.
Privy Council President Prem Tinsulonda was quoted in one local report
admonishing the military to be more careful in its spending.
The
scandal sparked speculation about whether Teerachai, promoted in part for his
post-coup suppression of Red Shirt activists, and his ally in charge of the
First Army Region, Lieutenant General Theppong Tippayachan, could be tempted
into leading a counter-coup on behalf of an opposed military faction and
influential senior royalists who have expressed misgivings about the junta’s
suppression of civil liberties, quality of governance and lack of transparency.
That speculation and critical reporting died down after Crown Prince
Vajiralongkorn appeared to put the embattled park’s foundation under his
patronage in January, as announced in the Royal Gazette.
The
intra-military tensions are also a reflection of known competing visions for
the succession, with the ascendant Queen’s Guard known to back heir-apparent
Vajiralongkorn’s claim and other influential royalists aligned with disgruntled
Kings Guard soldiers believed to favor an alternative scenario where the king’s
second daughter, Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn, is somehow crowned. A 1974
amendment to the 1924 Succession Law allows for a princess born of the king to
take the crown only in the absence of a fit-to-rule male heir, legalese that
could be open to the Privy Council’s interpretation. At such a high stakes
historical moment, future political events could break in a number of different
ways.
Scenario 1: Faux elex
In this
scenario, a retrograde constitution that enshrines the military’s political
role is passed either by referendum or enacted unilaterally after a “no” vote
of the current draft version. The military has made clear its wish for a
charter that gives less power to political parties to enact their own policies,
an overarching role for appointed institutions to remove corrupt politicians
and governments, and provisions for the military to legally take power during
times of crisis.
This is
the type of charter the military envisions and by hook or crook will eventually
bring into law. Organic laws drafted for the new charter will no doubt ensure
that future democratic polls are highly circumscribed and held in ways that
favor a new military front party, supposedly now in the making behind the
scenes, and other medium sized parties not overtly aligned with Thaksin to form
a “unity” coalition government.
Some
analysts speculate such a “democratic” transition would be steered from above
to resemble the coalition governments led by former army commander, prime
minister and current Privy Council President Prem in the 1980s, a period of
military-guided rule often referred to by academics as “Premocracy.” It’s a
scenario that would also assuage Western and domestic pressure to return to a
form of “civilian-led” rule.
While
consistent with the junta’s official narrative, the risk is likely still too
high that a Thaksin-aligned government is swept into power despite attempts to
tilt the electoral playing field against him. In that scenario, much of what
the military has implemented over the last 20 months, including a broad 20-year
economic plan, would be briskly swept away. There would also be the risk of
political revenge, even with an amnesty for the coup-makers written into the
charter.
The
military tried to tilt the post-coup 2007 election away from Thaksin’s new
party but wholly failed. It’s a democratic lesson no doubt still fresh in mind
among the top brass and a scenario likely deemed as too risky to the military’s
short and medium term corporate interests, particularly with the royal
succession still unresolved and no clear sign yet that the urban-based middle
classes are poised to resist continued military rule.
Scenario 2: Rebellion
This
scenario weighs the potential for Thaksin to mount a credible challenge to a
military-steered new political order or ramped up threats to his or his
family’s personal or business interests. It would entail, as in 2009 and
2010, the former premier mobilizing resources to ignite Red Shirt-led
pro-democracy resistance against military or perceived as proxy military rule
after a potential rigged election in 2017 or 2018.
Unlike
those previous uprisings, in light of the military’s police state
infrastructure it would likely have to be a national-level conflict with unrest
staged in the provinces as opposed to Bangkok, where any hint of organization
would be quickly detected and squashed. There’s a readymade model: a low
intensity, shadowy insurgency in Thailand’s southernmost Muslim-majority
provinces has kept the military on its heels for over a decade. A scenario
where a similar hit-and-run strategy is launched across northern and
northeastern provinces would be a nightmare for the already overstretched Thai
military.
This
scenario assumes Thaksin reaches his personal breaking point and returns to his
past brinksmanship, though there are questions about his ability to reconnect
with a largely disenfranchised support base, his willingness to lose the
pockets of Western support he and his sister have won as unfairly persecuted
“democrats,” and his willingness to venture wealth some diplomats estimate has
taken a significant hit with the collapse in global commodity prices in sight
of his known recent investments in energy, metals and other commodities.
This
scenario would fetch a strong military response, one where it moves to assert
even stronger grass roots control and without a vow to quickly restore
democracy until stability is restored. It’s a scenario that could badly and
quickly backfire on Thaksin without a decisive victory, which seems doubtful on
nearly all fronts. It’s doubtful Thaksin pursues this route until he sees how
the royal succession and his hoped for royal pardon plays out. But with the
ex-premier’s history of erratic and emotional responses, particularly when his
personal interests are in play, it can not be completely discounted.
Scenario 3: Natural causes
In this
most likely scenario, Prayut maintains power until the actuarial moment.
Martial law will likely be invoked and election plans put on hold until the
succession is deemed safe and secure. The military’s economic policies,
including big ticket infrastructure building and investments in railways, would
remain on-track during the transition.
It’s
widely held that there will be a military-enforced, prolonged period of
national mourning, an interregnum period where by some readings the Privy
Council will assume royal power until it formally puts forward a successor. In
the mainstream scenario, royalist camps close ranks despite competing visions
and jointly support heir apparent Vajiralongkorn’s claim to the throne. With a
few potential wrinkles related to recent purges of the heir’s previous family
and aides, this is still seen as the succession’s most likely outcome.
In
another less likely scenario portrayed in leaked Wikileaks documents recounting
meetings between senior royalists and former U.S. Ambassador Ralph “Skip”
Boyce, the Privy Council could in certain circumstances opt alternatively to
appoint Sirindhorn to the throne. Many royalists, including those who rallied
around her bathed in purple 60th birthday celebrations last year, are
known to favor the scenario. Depending on how it was justified and messaged,
such an outcome would either be accepted or contested by a competing royalist
camp and potentially draw the self-exiled, self-interested Thaksin into the
fray.
In yet
another scenario, Vajiralongkorn’s first daughter, Princess Bajrakitiyabha,
known affectionately as Princess Pa, a Cornell law school graduate who has been
recognized by the United Nations for her commendable work on women’s rights, is
put forward as a compromise candidate with her father’s blessing. Many believe
the 37-year-old princess, whose domestic profile has risen favorably in recent years,
including through public presentations on the need for stronger rule by law,
has been groomed specifically as a new generation source of moral royal
authority.
In any of
the scenarios, the military – if it remains united, a big if – will
aim to maintain a firm grip on power until it is clear that the succession is
safe and secure. In the case of any real or perceived threat, military rulers
can be expected to suspend their promise to restore democracy and instead
leverage their police state powers to consolidate a longer-term stay in power,
in the name of protecting the new king. The succession-before-election scenario
could take many different forms, all hard to predict and all crucial to the
future shape and direction of Thai politics and society.
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