As China’s One Belt, One Road policy unfolds in Central Asia, strategic alliances within the region are
becoming increasingly complex. While existing partnerships are deepening, new
opportunities are emerging for key South Asian players. India, a long-standing
absentee in the region, may very well hold the key to the balance of power in
Central Asia as a potential ally of Russia.
Missed Opportunities
India
began to develop a presence in Central Asia following the collapse of the
Soviet Union. In 2002, Russia and India signed an agreement to launch the International North
South Transport Corridor (INSTC). In 2012, New Delhi devised its
official Central Asian policy,
a 12-point list aiming at increasing connectivity among the five Central Asian stans,
taking advantage at the energy potential of the region and developing its
banking sector. Opening roads to Central Asia, China’s prime objective in the
region, has also been India’s priority for a decade. Ensuring that these roads
aren’t carrying only Chinese goods, however, will remain a key priority for
India as it does for Russia. This is one of the reasons why the two countries
may both stand to gain significantly from active collaboration in the region.
Narendra Modi
has been more proactive than his predecessors on Central Asia policy. The
Indian prime minister toured the five Central Asian countries in July 2015.
Among the multiple deals signed with Central Asian leaders, Modi secured an
agreement with Kazakhstan to supply 5000 tons of uranium to Delhi for the next four years.
The belated Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline was
discussed with Turkmenistan, poised to take the lead on the project. Although a
recent boom in construction, IT and pharmaceuticals has stirred the Kazakh,
Turkmen and Uzbekistan economies, poor infrastructure and geographic distance
has severely limited trade between India and the region.
Conversely,
India figures relatively high in Central Asia. New Delhi enjoys a reputation as a neutral country. A former
leader of the non-aligned world during the Cold War, its presence in Central
Asia threatens neither China and Russia. India’s clearly stated willingness to
engage in the multinational bodies associated with the region is a relief in
the context of fears over Chinese and Russian dominance.
An Indo-Russian channel
In Great
Game, Local Rules (2012), Professor Alexander Cooley at Barnard College
argues that India’s success in Central Asia has been greatly overstated.
Nationalism in the Indian media over its ‘’Northern Strategy’’ has largely
exaggerated India’s diplomatic successes in Central Asia. That said, India’s
ambitions do have real significance for the Kremlin. According to Cooley, India’s ability to
bring balance to Central Asia can be a game changer: “The inclusion of
India and Pakistan will take the spotlight away from the China-Russia
relationship and tensions over the organization’s purpose and role, and recast
the organization as a more comprehensive regional forum.”
The
“organization” in question is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In
fact, it was less than a year ago that Russia actively supported India’s
nomination as a full-fledged member of the SCO, a Chinese-led security
organization chiefly regarded by Moscow as an encroachment on its Near Abroad. Launched
by China in 2001, the SCO has devoted much of its energy to fighting terrorism, separatism and
religious extremism, all of which are of great concern to India as
well.
Meanwhile,
Russia, India and China, three members of the BRICs, may act as a springboard
for the recently established New Development Bank and create momentum for trade
within the bloc. India, a long-time Russian ally, has also been one of Moscow’s
steadiest arms buyers. For these reasons, closer cooperation between Moscow and
New Delhi could greatly facilitate hopes for Eurasian integration.
Soviet
friendship, however, is now a thing of the past. The physical obstacles to
commerce have done little to bring the two powers together. In 2014, bilateral
trade between India and Russia amounted to less than $10 billion dollars.
Moreover, the United States has increasingly nudged Russia aside by providing India with
more and more military hardware. This is nothing the Indian government is ready
to admit publicly, arguing it is the result of a shift in defense relationship “from a
simple buyer – seller framework to one involving joint research.”
Perhaps a
bigger strain in bilateral relations came in September 2015 when Russia agreed
to sell its fourth-generation Su-35 fighter to Pakistan,
India’s security arch-rival. The contract has arguably cast a shadow over
Russian-Indian relations, as did the earlier sale of Mi-35 Hind attack
helicopters and Limov RDP93 engines for its
series of JF-17 fighters. Although Russia initially courted India
(and indeed China) as a possible buyer for the Su-35 fighter, the decision to
deal with Pakistan sent a powerful message to the Indian establishment,
confirming the decade-long decline in the Russian share of arms sales to India,
as well as a lack of political commitment to Indian security.
Indian
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s first visit in Moscow in December
2015 may have changed that. The two countries signed 16 agreements, including a
$6 billion sale of S-400 supersonic air defense systems. On May 9, India took
part in Russia’s high-profile military parade commemorating the 70th
anniversary of the end of World War II. Perhaps unsurprisingly, nuclear
energy stands atop the key areas of cooperation, Russia being effectively the
only country engaged in the sector with India. Moscow helped built two nuclear
power units equipped with some of the world’s safest light water reactors at Kudankulam.
If Russia
and India both fear a Chinese-dominated Central Asia, the same is true with
Central Asian leaders, who do not want the opening of Eurasia’s core to be
single-handedly organized by Beijing. India, a major market, is seen as a
competitor with China, and as such is a reassuring presence in the
neighborhood.
In a
sense, both India and Russia are struggling to find their role in the
international order. Everything now depends on Russia and Indian’s capacity for
real cooperation in Central Asia, and their ability to send powerful messages
about the depth of their commitment to security in the region.
Pierre-Olivier
Bussieres is a Desk Officer for the Montreal Institute for Genocide
and Human Rights Studies and Research Analyst at the Canadian Ministry of
Natural Resources. He is also Editor-in-Chief of Republic of the East, an online web
journal on post-Soviet spaces.
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