Thailand is struggling. The economy has stagnated
and its political system is going backwards. This May marks two years since the
coup — Thailand’s second in less than a decade — with the military government
still in control. Thailand is also languishing in a middle income trap.
It’s not easy becoming a rich country or a democracy. Singapore and
Brunei are the only high income countries in Southeast Asia (and they are not
large countries). The only Southeast Asian country to make the successful
transition to democracy so far is Indonesia. Myanmar has started down that
path.
Things were looking up for Thailand before the Asian financial crisis in
1997. High rates of economic growth and the transition to democracy had the
country on the right trajectory. It appeared Thailand was right behind its
Northeast Asian neighbours Japan, Taiwan and South Korea in getting rich, and
on the way to consolidating democracy. But like many in Asia it was hit hard by
the crisis of the late 1990s and seems now to have lost its way. The people of
Thailand don’t currently enjoy the high incomes or political freedoms to which
they aspire — and the future prospects are not good for either.
The export-led and manufacturing-led growth model that served Thailand
well over the last two decades of the 20th century required political and
macroeconomic stability, openness to trade and investment in the manufacturing
sector and was assisted by policies that promoted exports and investment. That
is a familiar story across East Asia and has helped many East Asian economies
escape from low incomes, in a short time and reduce poverty rates.
For rapid growth by a low income country that imports and adopts
technology from abroad, a strong government that pursues high growth strategies
appears the critical element — political liberties, distributional issues and
environmentally friendly growth seem commonly to be of secondary importance. As
Thailand fell into political crisis in 2013, there were many in business and
elsewhere that hankered for a return to political stability to get the economy
back on track and implement reforms.
The junta-backed government showed initial promise. At the same time as
trying to rebuild political institutions and getting the decks cleared for
moving back to an elected government, the administration tried to kick-start
the economy with a range of measures including much needed economic reforms and
green-lighting foreign investment applications and infrastructure projects.
But 18 months later Thailand is looking at an estimated 2–3 per cent
growth for the year and continuing uncertainty on the political front. A new draft constitution, Thailand’s 20th, released in late
January is unlikely to change this, with elections to be pushed back further.
In this week’s lead essay,
Thitinan Pongsudhirak explains that the pro-coup coalition is breaking down.
The military government is losing support. Instead of bringing stability, the
coalition that supported the coup now spells instability and political
stagnation, says Thitinan.
‘The military government of Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha is stuck
between a rock and a hard place of its own creation’, argues Thitinan. ‘It
feels compelled to stay in power until it believes that Thailand can function
as a workable democracy’.
Thitinan explains that ‘the coup was staged on the pretext of cleaning
up corruption and instituting reforms to remake the country into a disciplined
democracy underpinned by traditional values and institutions’. But the problem
for Thailand is that governance is much less likely to improve under an
unaccountable government.
The longer it stays in power, the harder the military government will
find it to keep its pro-coup coalition united. Already the Democrat Party — the
opposition force that led the disruptions that brought down the Yingluck
Shinawatra government — is showing signs of dissatisfaction with the regime it
helped to spawn, as are the civil society groups and parts of the bureaucracy
that supported the coup. The support of big business appears to be holding it
all together for now but, according to Thitinan, it would be a game-changer if
that starts to wane.
The longer the delay in getting back on track towards democracy,
the more distant the prospect of breaking out of middle income towards high
income will become. Democracy may not necessarily be a precondition for
becoming high income, as neighbour Singapore shows, but among the club of rich
countries there are none that do not have a liberal political system, that are
not city-states or small countries with large resource endowments.
And Thai people have tasted democracy — a development which it is
difficult undo.
With incomes at around US$5,800 per capita — a country right in the middle of league tables — Thailand has reached a
stage of development that requires a different model of growth: one that does
not rely on export-led manufacturing. Higher incomes require openness and
innovation from a domestic base.
The constraint in Thailand is the political system and political
gridlock. The military government brought a resolution to the political crisis
in 2014; now the priority is to find a way towards a stable and pluralistic
regime. Otherwise Thailand risks becoming stuck in the trap.
The East Asia Forum editors’
group is run out of the Crawford School of Public Policy in the College of Asia
and the Pacific at The Australian National University.
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