Australia’s bilateral ties with Indonesia and
multilateral security ties through the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA)
are important regional security mechanisms
But there are limitations inherent in these arrangements
that preclude an amalgamation. With cross-border regional security concerns
affecting Indonesia and its contiguous countries, there is scope for a
sub-regional geographic grouping to emerge to facilitate enhanced regional
security cooperation. Such a forum — including one with Malaysia, Australia,
New Zealand, Indonesia and Singapore (or MANIS) — could help address regional
security concerns and ‘sweeten’ regional security cooperation.
Australia can look with some satisfaction at how the
relationship with Indonesia has recovered since the nadir of 1999, when
Australia led the international intervention force into East Timor. It took the
trauma of the Bali bombings, the Jakarta bombings and the Indian Ocean tsunami
to rebuild bilateral ties with Australia. These ties were rebuilt through a
concerted effort by Australia and its various government agencies.
At a recent meeting in Darwin
between Australians and Indonesians under the auspices of the Australian arm of
the Conference for Security Cooperation in Asia and the Pacific (AUS-CSCAP),
academics, journalists and officials considered the implications of the
restored ties and options for addressing additional matters that may arise into
the future.
The group observed that the Australian response to the
events from 2002–05 set the scene for Australia to sign the Lombok Treaty with
Indonesia in 2006. In turn, the Lombok Treaty paved the way for enhanced
bilateral security arrangements between Australia and Indonesia. Today,
bilateral security ties range from high-level defence and foreign ministers
talks to student exchanges and scholarships.
In seeking to address the conundrum of irregular
boat arrivals — an issue that is far more of a priority for Australia than it
is for Indonesia — Australia has drawn extensively on the networks that have
developed through diplomatic, defence, police, customs and other links with
Indonesia. As Australia looks to address these and other regional security
concerns more holistically and effectively, and as Indonesia becomes more
prosperous and powerful, Australia’s efforts to enhance its relationship with
Indonesia have become all the more important.
Despite the growing importance of Indonesia to Australia,
there is little public awareness or understanding of the depth and breadth of
the ties between Indonesia and Australia today. For policy insiders, the
strength and utility of these ties suggests there also may be benefit in
considering whether these arrangements could be the basis for wider initiatives
in cooperation: for instance by seeking to extend these arrangements to include
some other close Australian security partners such as Malaysia, Singapore and
New Zealand as well as ASEAN partner countries.
Australia has long established ties with Malaysia, Singapore
and New Zealand through the FPDA. These FPDAs were generated half a century ago
following the period of armed confrontation, at which time Indonesia was still
seen, albeit remotely, as a potential threat. Today, Malaysia or Singapore no
longer have cause for deep concerns about Indonesia’s intentions. Not
surprisingly therefore, while the FPDA has evolved and now addresses some
residual security concerns pertaining particularly to Malaysia and Singapore,
Indonesia is not interested in joining.
How can the underlying concept of the FPDA be taken further
to address today’s regional security concerns?
There is enduring utility in maintaining the FPDAs; they
provide an excellent forum for multilateral security engagement that can help
bolster regional security and stability. Australian Defence Force personnel
gain considerable benefit from training opportunities in Malaysia and Singapore
and all participants benefit from the networking opportunities and the
cross-cultural exposure which helps build mutual understanding and enhances the
regional security ‘fabric’. Malaysia and Singapore also benefit from having a
venue for collaboration that involves other trusted Commonwealth partners
including Australia and New Zealand.
Australia certainly has a range of mutual security concerns
affecting Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia as well as New Zealand — and these
mutual concerns point to the utility of formulating an arrangement that
encourages a shared approach to them being addressed.
As the countries of Southeast Asia think about security cooperation
down the road, Indonesia will be key. So far Australia has had to maintain
separate lines of engagement with Indonesia and with the FPDA countries as
these arrangements invoke a history that is distasteful to Indonesia.
Given
Indonesia’s concerns for its status, its history and also its attachment to the
notion of being non-aligned, the FPDA cannot form the basis for an expanded
network including Australia and Indonesia. Indonesia also has a legitimate
aversion to formal defence ties. But while the FPDA may not be directly
adaptable (colonial linkages too obvious, and its anti-Indonesian
character too clearly remembered), Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia may wish
to consider the utility of a broader arrangement with Australia and New
Zealand.
From Australia’s perspective, there is a growing need to
work with Indonesia, Australia’s most important neighbouring security partner,
to formulate a new arrangement to address concerns more comprehensively,
enabling the coordination of efforts with those undertaken alongside Malaysia
and Singapore as well. Beyond the bilateral Lombok Treaty and the multilateral
FPDA, however, there appears to be a need for another sub-regional geographic
grouping to facilitate archipelagic security cooperation. One way to facilitate
the desired cooperation across the countries belonging to or linked to the
archipelago is to formulate a security arrangement, or security cooperation
forum, which includes not just Australia and Indonesia, but Malaysia, Singapore
and New Zealand as well other neighbours that might be interested in joining.
Manis is the Indonesian word for sweet. It also could be an
acronym for several of the key archipelagic security partners — Malaysia,
Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia and Singapore. A MANIS Regional Security
Cooperation Forum, for instance, would not need to make redundant the FPDA or
the Lombok Treaty. Instead it could have overlapping areas of interest and
engagement that capitalise on the investment Australia and others have made in
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. There would be scope for other ASEAN
countries and Timor Leste to participate as well, recognising that participation
would have to be open-ended. Such a forum may offer an acceptable way through
for Australia and Indonesia to reach beyond the bilateral arrangements to a
multilateral regional security forum that assists in harmoniously managing the
security challenges of today and into the future.
As the Abbott government seeks to place an emphasis on ‘more
Jakarta and less Geneva’, there is scope for Australia to approach its
important neighbours to explore such a proposal. With a growing range of
security matters of mutual concern and the inability of other regional forums
to address security concerns in a timely and concrete manner, Australia should
seek to engage Indonesia as well as Malaysia and Singapore on this concept.
Australia could invite them and other interested regional security partners to
consider joining hands to develop and implement this proposal for the mutual
benefit of all concerned.
John Blaxland is Senior Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, the
Australian National University.
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