A 1524 painting held in the Shinshōgokuraku-ji, a Buddhist Tendai temple
in Kyoto, depicts the prosperous maritime trade between China and Japan.
The latest
GENRON poll confirms
that Sino-Japanese relations are souring. This trend began as early as 2005
according to the GENRON data but an argument could be made that from a
historical point of view, Sino-Japanese relations have been cautious if not
guarded, with Japan being consistent in a buffering approach when it comes to
Sino-Japanese relations.
As far as the Japanese are concerned, contemporary explanations for
these sentiments are rooted in the perception that China continues to exploit
historical tragedies for political purposes. Despite obliging and conciliatory
post World War II behavior, ODA and other assistance, China continues to
criticize Japan for being unrepentant and unapologetic for its imperial past.
It also has sincere concerns over China's military expansion and intentions in the East and
South China Seas.
Prime Minister Abe is keenly aware of the challenge China's re-emergence
as the largest economic, political and security force in the region is for
Japan's political, economic and security. They also have understood that
Japanese geographic position, economic links in the region, history and rivalry
with China dictate that Japan cannot isolate itself from China or the region
and it cannot escape the propensities facing the region. Reading these
propensities, Prime Minister Abe and his foreign policy team have chosen a
foreign policy approach that these maximizes opportunities based on this
propensities. This essay argues that rather than openly competing with China economically,
politically or militarily, Japan’s approach is a return to Japan’s historical
approach of buffering and nullifying (防范/Fángfàn/ 予防) China to
enjoy the benefits of trade relations but avoid a relationship that is too
close in which China could dominate Japan in the economic, political or
security spheres. The term balancing and hedging are intentionally not used in
the context of this essay as they convey the sense that Japan is
"conducting business as usual" with China instead of what I argue is
a reorientation of relations at several levels to maintain autonomy and embed
its presence and influence in the region and globally through shared norms,
economic statecraft and the bolstering of multilateral security networks.
The
trajectory of future relations
It appears that Japanese foreign policy under Prime Minister Abe is
returning to its traditional relationship with China first established after
the massive cultural infusion Japan enjoyed in the Tang Dynasty. The legacy of
this period of exchange is seen in the writing system that Japan uses, the
architecture that Japanese enjoy, in city planning and many other political,
economic and cultural areas. Another lasting legacy of this exchange is an
approach to China that neither attempts to isolate itself from China nor to
engage it as equals.
Japan, having understood its precarious position vis-à-vis China as
early as the 9th century found it prudent to buffer and nullify (防范/Fángfàn/予防) itself against the power and
might of the Sino-centric system by distancing itself from the cultural,
political and economic largess of ancient China. Returning to this one thousand
years old, well-practiced statecraft can ensure Japan avoids an arms race with
China, maintain its post World War II pacifist tradition and continue engaging
with China on its own terms while not being vulnerable to China's size and the
influence that comes with that size.
Today, Japanese foreign policy makers seem to be applying a similar
choice vis-à-vis China. We can see this at several different levels including
economic, political and security relations. At the economic level, Japan
is both engaging and reorienting its interactions with China to secure market
access, to dampen the potential for political friction affecting Japanese
business profits and avoid being dominated by the expansion of the Chinese
market. It is doing this at several levels. First, as a result of
anti-Japanese sentiments following territorial incidents
in 2005, 2010 and 2014 which negatively impacted Japanese businesses in
China, Japanese business have shifted their manufacturing strategy to one in
which the Chinese production network was a platform for global exports of
Chinese made Japanese products to one in which products are made in China by
Chinese for Chinese with Japanese technologies. This strategy enables Japanese
businesses to continue to profit from the Chinese market while importantly it
insulates them from the potential problems associated with souring
Sino-Japanese relations like we witnessed following the nationalization of the
Senkaku Islands.
The second level has been an incremental and accelerated investment
through ODA and FDI and proactive diplomacy into ASEAN. Slowly, ASEAN countries
and in particular but not only Vietnam are playing a larger and more important
role for Japanese manufactures. What we are seeing is Southeast Asian countries
becoming the production site for Japanese products for global export including
to other Southeast Asian countries. The second level in this shift has taken in
consideration the increased costs of doing business in China and political risk
associated with Sino-Japanese relations.
Prime Minister Abe's courage to fight against interest groups such as
the agricultural lobby and join the TPP bolsters this strategy as it links
Japan's economy to the other TPP members that have complementary, comparative
advantages in their economies that lend themselves well to PM Abe's foreign
policy and his strategy to strengthen, consolidate and secure Japan's domestic
economy but also its economic autonomy in the region (read not be dominated by
China).
The TPP ties the Japanese developed, high-tech economy to economies with
cheap sources of labour such as Vietnam. Manufacturing Japanese products in
Vietnam, a TPP member means Japan can export to at least 500 million consumers
from rich, developed countries (US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore,
Japan) tariff free.
The TPP and the strategy to expand economic investment, ties and
interests in Southeast Asia and across the Asia Pacific is not only an economic
strategy to prevent Chinese domination of the regional economy through
initiatives such as the One-Belt One-Road initiative, PM Abe's strategy also
astutely inculcates more stakeholders in the regions that are important
security concerns for Japan, namely the East China Sea and South China Sea.
It does this through broadening the number of stakeholders in the South
China Sea. Prior to the signing of the TPP, at least 5.3 trillion U.S.
dollars in trade was associated with the South China Sea. The South China Sea
is also the regional transport corridor for energy resources going to China,
South, Korea, Taiwan and many ASEAN countries. With expanded economic
ties between ASEAN TPP members such as Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Singapore,
non-regional TPP members such as Japan, the US, Australia and others have
increased interests in what happened in the South China Sea as it could to
varying degrees affect their economic interests.
With that in mind, Japan's economic strategy under Prime Minister Abe to
prevent being dominated by an expansion of the China dominated market has the
dual role of preventing economic domination through the expansion of Japanese
economic ties in the region and across the Asia Pacific. At the same time the
strategy contributes to allaying some of Japan's security concerns in the
region by expanding its security links horizontally (系列外交 to multilateralize security
in the region.
This strategy does not mean the containment of China or moving towards a
securitized relationship with China. Both are unrealistic and not in line with
Japan’s interests, capabilities and World War II values. In reality, the
approach is tied to Japan’s post World War II constitution and its historical
tendency towards dealing with China. Japan’s pacifist constitution and deeply
embedded pacifism norms means that Japan cannot use normal statecraft when
dealing with hard security issues. This dilemma has led to a statecraft that
employs economic ties, tools and relations to foster strong regional and global
economic ties that anchor allies, friends and competitors to Japan that
decrease the incentive for other modes of statecraft to be employed when
political frictions or problems arise.
From the Chinese perspective, Japan's approach and in particular its
strengthening relationship with the U.S. is the new U.S.-led containment
strategy. They assume that Japan has little autonomy in this process and that
Japan is a junior partner in the US’s rebalances strategy in the region.
I think this line of argument does not recognize Japan's historical
approach to dealing with Sino-Japanese relations with the exceptional the
Japan's disastrous Imperial period in which it took an aggressive,
imperialistic approach in an attempt to dominate China. The current approach
under the Prime Minister Abe administration can be understood as a strategy
returning to Japan's traditional approach of Sino-Japanese relations that allow
for limited, controlled and beneficial engagement that will buffer Japan from
Chinese domination. Borrowing a colloquial expression, we can use the
expression "goldilocks diplomacy" in which Japan aims to position
itself in a political- economic space in which it can accrue the benefits from
China while insulating itself from the inherent risks of economic success or
failure of the Chinese economy.
Importance
of communication
The aforementioned buffer and nullify (防范/Fángfàn/予防) statecraft is nuanced and open to misinterpretation.
The forging of strong economic, political and security ties under multilateral,
highly limited frameworks needs to be carefully communicated to Chinese
counterparts to avoid both countries being embroiled in a security competition.
Rhetoric must be followed by actions that incrementally decrease security
concerns of China. Assuaging Chinese security concerns whether they be about
containment or a return to a more active Japanese diplomacy in the region are
crucial to preventing an escalation in negative economic, political and
security related competition.
On the Chinese side, the recent unilateral and nonconsultative process
of island building, the placing of defensive missile and radar facilities on
disputed territories, has been unhelpful in allaying the concerns of
territorial claimants or Japan’s security interests in the East and South China
Seas. This non-consultative process needs to stop and the appropriate joint
usage of the territories needs to be discussed in a transparent, multilateral
forum. A declaration by the Chinese that disputes will not be settled by
forceful means would also pave the way for multilateralization of resources in
the SCS.
Ozawa Ichiro in his 1994 book “Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking
of a Nation/日本改造計画” he
provided useful advice for future administrations. First, he advised that any
steps towards normalization be in consultation with neighbours and that any
dispatch of the Japanese military forces only be permitted under the United
Nation. Although it would be difficult to conceive China agreeing to the
normalization process in the current Sino-Japanese environment, the current
buffer and nullify (防范/Fángfàn/ 予防) approach to Japanese foreign
policy under PM Abe could make such declarations unilaterally or some version
of the Ozawa normalization formula to allay some of the Chinese security
concerns.
Stephen R. Nagy has been an Associate Professor in the Department of
Politics and International Studies at the International Christian University
since September 2014.
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