The mapping out of the political powers involved in
the aborted coup of 1965 remains unclear to this day, with historians yet to
reach consensus on what forces were behind the incident. Many historical
accounts have linked Soeharto’s place in the political power structure with the
successful military operations he launched against the now-defunct Indonesian
Communist Party (PKI), accused of being responsible for the coup.
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Among the theories are those
that suggest Soeharto knew of, if not masterminded, the coup plan, given his
difficult relationship with the generals killed in the incident. One question
that that the public has yet to find an answer to is whether Soeharto was fully
aware of the operation that would be launched on Sept.30, 1965, but let it
happen due to his disagreement with the Army generals murdered in the incident.
“The mapping of political
powers remains an unfinished task for historians because it is unclear whether
Soeharto really hated the generals as has been widely reported,” historian
Yosef M.Djakababa told thejakartapost.com in a recent interview.
He further explained that the
speculation began from a report revealing that Soeharto was accused of being
involved in budget appropriations when he was the head of the Diponegoro
Military Area Command IV (Kodam) in Semarang, Central Java, in 1946.
“Following the case, he
[Soeharto] was reassigned to a military school in Bandung, West Java, but he
was not demoted,” Yosef said.
The case is recorded in a book
containing the testimonies of Maj. Gen. Pranoto Reksosamodra, which was first published
in 2014 by Kompas with the title Catatan Jenderal Pranoto: Dari RTM Boedi
Oetomo sampai Nirbaya (The Diary of General Pranoto: From Boedi Oetomo
Military Detention House to Nirbaya).
It was Col. Pranoto replacing
Colonel Soeharto as Kodam IV Diponegoro commander that gave way to an audit
team led by Brig.Gen.Soengkono to investigate the accusations. It later found
evidence suggesting Soeharto’s involvement in illegal businesses, including a
clove-trading monopoly sponsored by a cigarette factory owners association.
Although his rank was not
downgraded, Soeharto’s military career was delayed and he was passed by younger
cadets such as Ahmad Yani, who later became the army commander and one of the
seven generals killed in the aborted left-wing coup in 1965.
After that, Soeharto was
placed at the Army Strategic and Reserve Command (Kostrad), a military unit
that was not deemed to be strategic. At that time, Kostrad was known as the
Army General Reserve Corps (CADUAD).
“Don’t think that Kostrad at
that time was a large, strategic military unit as it is now. Kostrad was a
reserve corps. Although CADUAD commander was considered a high-ranking
position, it was not an important corps. This was why for Soeharto, this
position was a humiliation for him,” said Yosef.
The historian further
explained that CADUAD’s less-than-strategic position could be seen from the
fact that it was the Army Paratrooper Command (RPKAD) that had staged the
operations to free several strategic posts controlled by the PKI, such as the
state-run broadcaster Radio Republic Indonesia (RRI), Halim Perdanakusuma
Airport and the Merdeka field, although during the vacuum of leadership after
the generals were killed, as the CADUAD commander, it was Soeharto who should
have taken the lead.
“As CADUAD had no troops at
that time, it was the Red Beret command, or RPKAD, that was summoned for the
operations to free the strategic posts,” said Yosef.
The historian explained
Soeharto had become desperate after the revelation of his alleged involvement in
budget appropriations at Kodam IV Diponegoro. He was even about to deliver his
resignation letter to army commander Gen.Abdul Haris Nasution, but the letter
was held back by Soedjono Hoemardani, then administration division head at
Kodam IV Diponegoro.
Soedjono later became the
private assistant of President Soeharto. He was also the founder of the Centre
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), which was widely known as the
Soeharto administration’s think-tank.
"In Jusuf Wanandi’s book Shades
of Grey, it is mentioned that it was Soedjono who held back Soeharto’s
resignation letter. Soedjono, as is widely known by the public, was a
practitioner of kejawen (Javanese mystical beliefs). Jusuf revealed that
Soedjono foresaw that Soeharto would become a big man in the future. This was
why the letter was never handed over to the army commander [Nasution],” Yosef
said.
Jusuf Wanandi was an
anti-communist student activist, who was also the co-founder of CSIS.
Yosef said there were too many
speculations about Soeharto’s role in the failed coup attempt that remained a
mystery, such as whether Soeharto knew in advance that the PKI would launch the
military operation. “It was strange that Soeharto was not included on the list
of targeted generals because he was also a high-ranking military commander,” he
said.
Yosef further cited a report
saying Col. Abdoel Latief [leader of the Sept. 30 operation] met Soeharto at a
military hospital, where the latter’s youngest son, Hutomo “Tommy” Mandala
Putra, was being treated for injuries from hot soup spills. Latief then
allegedly told Soeharto: “The troops to kidnap the generals are ready.”
"That is based on Col.
Latief’s testimony. It was also mentioned by Ibu Sukma (the late former
president Sukarno’s daughter Sukmawati Sukarnoputri) during the [ 1965
reconciliation ] symposium,” said Yosef, referring to the 1965 tragedy
symposium held in April.
“There are two versions of
Soeharto's reply to Latief’s report. In the first, he mentioned he already knew
about the military operation plan. In the second version, he merely nodded.
Unfortunately, nobody witnessed Col. Latief’s visit to the military hospital,"
Yosef said.
The historian added that it
was hard to confirm the truth of the meeting between Latief and Soeharto before
the Sept. 30 coup as there was no third party that witnessed the meeting. When
Soeharto was asked to confirm that the meeting had taken place, he replied: “He
(Latief) actually came to kill me".
“It is clear that at that time
the military was divided into so many factions and according a lot of the
literature, Soeharto was not in the circle of the generals but his relationship
with the PKI has remained a mystery,” said Yosef.
"The only comment I can
offer is that Soeharto was really smart in using the situation. He was a really
brilliant military strategist, when the enemy launched a maneuver, he countered
it with a better maneuver," Josef said in closing. (ebf)
- Anton
Hermansyah The Jakarta Post
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