Alarmist is when you overestimate a strategic
risk. Conversely, underestimating that risk is naïve. A sound strategic
analysis always falls between these two extremes. It’s about maintaining a
delicate balance between appreciating and courting danger.
The latest incident between China and Indonesia
near Natuna Islands incurs the risk of underestimating Indonesia’s strategic
impotence against Beijing’s growing maritime assertiveness.
When China published its
so-called nine-dash or U-shaped line map of the South China Sea in August 1993
(and again in 2009), Jakarta might have assumed that Beijing would somehow
compromise for the sake of bilateral relations by excluding Indonesia’s
exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The fact that China has never clarified what the
U-shaped line means led Indonesia to easily dismiss China’s claims. Indeed,
Indonesia has consistently rejected the U-shaped line map since; in the words
of former foreign minister Ali Alatas, it’s only “an illustrative and not a
real map” and thus rightly insists that Indonesia is a “non-claimant” state in
the South China Sea disputes. Beijing, on the other hand, reassures Jakarta
that it has no claims over Natuna Islands, yet remains ambiguous on the
purported overlap between the U-shaped line and Indonesia’s EEZ.
Downplaying the significance
of the U-shaped line has thus been Indonesia’s main approach toward China,
while offering the self-proclaimed role of an “honest broker” among the
claimants. As a result, the U-shaped line did not prevent Indonesia and China
from developing their ties into a strategic partnership in 2005, which was
elevated into a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2013.Closer ties with
China might have given Indonesia a false hope in China’s “peaceful rise”
narrative, sweetened by promises of economic and other cooperation, including
the recent China-funded high-speed railway project. In return, China might have
hoped Indonesia would become more lenient in its rejection of the U-shaped
line. China has asked Indonesia not to make their whole bilateral ties hostage
to the latest incident. But any amicable inter-state relationship is founded on
one sacrosanct principle that everything else stems from: respect for
sovereignty.
True, Indonesia has maritime
disputes with other countries as well, but the intimidating and coercive nature
by which China imposes its claims is unparalleled. Without such respect,
there’s no relationship, but a subjugation of one country by another. No
sovereign country will accept this. Nor will China.
Indeed, closer bilateral
ties haven’t amounted to a softening in China’s attitude on enforcing the
U-shaped line in Natuna Islands. On the contrary, maritime incidents involving
China in the area have been recurring, with the last one being the most
escalatory.
Clearly, China’s ambiguity
on the U-shaped line is more declaratory than actual. Notwithstanding this
ambiguity, the latest incident suggests that the line could stretch as far
south as Beijing wishes. Indonesia should see this as a tipping point, where it
must recalibrate its approach toward China. The first step to solving a problem
is to admit there is one. Perhaps to the chagrin of maritime lawyers, the
latest incident demonstrates that the South China Sea dispute isn’t just a
legal question. Rather, it’s a strategic question at heart and will remain so
for the foreseeable future, which demands a strategic answer. No longer can
Indonesia downplay the U-shaped line and assume it’s bereft of strategic risks.
Indonesia must craft alternative ways to check Beijing’s maritime assertiveness
beyond the usual bilateral diplomatic protests. First, escalate Indonesia’s
rhetoric by demanding from China a formal public apology for the recent
incident and a promise it won’t recur. If need be, make this apology a
requirement for the release of the eight Chinese fishermen of the Kway Fey.
China would predictably
reject issuing such an apology, which implies that similar incidents will
happen again. But, no worries, this will build an even stronger case for
Indonesia to accelerate expanding naval and maritime law enforcement in Natuna
Islands. Second, be more vocal in rejecting the U-shaped line whenever and
wherever circumstances allow. Indonesia can use a harsher diplomatic tone
against China in ASEAN forums and endorse the views of ASEAN claimants with
much less hesitation insofar as they’re aligned with Indonesia’s. Convince
Beijing that ASEAN is where Indonesian diplomacy can hurt China the most.
Third, don’t back off when China threatens to blackmail Indonesia economically
(such as cancelling and postponing investment pledges, or downgrading trade).
Play other cards, such as Japan, India, Australia and the US, to convince China
that it has more to lose when downgrading economic relations with Indonesia.
Remember, Indonesia’s isn’t alone in this predicament.
Fourth, deepen cooperation
with like-minded partners equally wary of China’s intentions in the South China
Sea. Enhance regular maritime military exercises with the US and include the
Air Force participation; invite military officers from Australia, Japan and
ASEAN countries as observers, and if need be, involve them selectively as third
parties; and increase civilian maritime law enforcement patrols in Natuna
Islands, such as by the fisheries ministry and the new Maritime Security Board
(Bakamla).In the meantime, review all bilateral security and maritime
agreements with China and make their implementation contingent on China’s
unqualified recognition over Indonesia’s maritime boundary and sovereign rights
in Natuna Islands. Fifth, accelerate the upgrading of Natuna’s Ranai airbase
and naval bases to accommodate greater naval and air force presence for combat
and surveillance purposes and their supporting infrastructure, particularly
radars. When money is scarce, explore opportunities for international
assistance. An expanded version of the US-funded Integrated Maritime
Surveillance System (IMSS) along the Malacca and Makassar Straits could be a
model.Finally, make sure when doing the above steps it remains on Indonesian
terms.
Prove that Indonesia isn’t
strategically inept a nation.
The writer is a presidential
PhD scholar with the Strategic and Defense Studies Center, Australian National
University
No comments:
Post a Comment