Refusal
to disavow involvement in the Erawan Shrine bombing prompts concern that
separatists could extend theatre of violence outside the region
It
was supposed to be a press conference at which members of the MARA Patani, a
forum of longstanding separatist groups, emerged in public in order to enhance
their bargaining power with the Thai government.
But in the end, it was something that the panellists refused to say that wrenched the nerves of Thai security officials.
The question was whether the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) had informed the Thai government that its organisation was not behind the August 17 bombing in Bangkok that killed 20 people injured over 100.
In spite of its silence, hardly anyone believes the BRN was behind the bombing, as the Bangkok attack was outside the separatist insurgents' traditional theatre of violence, namely the historically contested Malay-speaking southernmost provinces.
However, this doesn't mean that the BRN has never carried out an attack on the scale of the Erawan Shrine bombing. But the BRN will push the violence only up to a point, long-time observers within the Thai security community say. It cannot afford to lose its moral high ground or jeopardise its grass-roots support, they add.
In the early stages of the current wave of insurgency violence, which surfaced in 2001 and went into full swing in January 2004, combatants did push the limits too far, murdering public school teachers and Buddhist monks as well as mutilating corpses of soldiers killed in their attacks. If insurgency is a form of communicative action, then the audience at the time was mainly local communities, as well as military commanders who would naturally be demoralised to see their soldiers decapitated or castrated.
But the insurgents consistently gauged local community sentiment and adjusted their focus accordingly, away from "soft targets" and towards the military and police.
Although there are direct attacks against civilians once in while, these acts are understood to be tit-for-tat killings between the state and the insurgents. One example is the murders of three Buddhist women who were shot at close range in February 2014, their bodies then set on fire. The incident was apparently retaliation for the murder of three young boys in Pattani's Bacho district, reportedly carried out by two paramilitary rangers, who retracted their confession in court a year later.
The vast majority of insurgent attacks come in the form of ambush and roadside bombings against security force patrols, essentially aimed at discrediting the security apparatus.
In May, for example, the city of Yala was rocked by almost 40 explosions in a bombing spree that lasted three successive days. Security planners were left speechless when their hastily implemented measures failed to stop the bombing.
For the record, according to BRN sources, no shrapnel was used in the bombs and only a handful of people suffered injuries, which were minor.
Even when BRN combatants have attacked targets outside the region, like Hat Yai, Phuket and Samui, achieving a high body count has never been part of the plan.
In one such incident, for example, a pick-up truck bomb with a blast radius of 500 metres was parked at the Phuket Police Station on December 2013. BRN sources said the operative left the bomb switch off on purpose, choosing merely to demonstrate their capabilities, as well as their disapproval at the absence of rules of engagement among government troops.
The same operation also saw Songkhla's Sadao district come under simultaneous bomb attacks, fulfilling a vow made earlier by insurgents.
While the Sadao attacks demonstrated the BRN could live up to its word, the Samui attack in May this year was a stern warning against the flouting of rules of engagement and against a so-called peace process in which the separatist organisation's name was being used without their approval and their people harassed to come on board.
BRN sources said the groups' ruling council did not endorse the peace initiative begun under Thaksin Shinawatra's administration and continued under his sister Yingluck's rule, or the current "pre-talks" with MARA Patani aimed at reviving negotiations.
With no genuine channel of communication between the BRN and Bangkok, Thai authorities have rushed to rule out any connection with the southern insurgency whenever a fresh incident occurs - whether it be the explosives left at a Bangkok street corner in May 2013, the Phuket Police Station truck bomb in December 2013 or the Samui car bomb in April this year.
The only exception was the December 31, 2006 New Year bombings in which three people were killed and 40 injured.
A lengthy investigation implicated the insurgents, yet the military-installed government downplayed the findings and instead suggested it was the work of people who had been ousted from power, ie, the Thaksin camp.
Too often, the authorities' knee-jerk reaction has come back to haunt them when evidence emerges to undermine their claims. It was subsequently revealed that vehicles used to ferry the Phuket and Samui bombs were from Pattani and Yala. Meanwhile the culprits behind the May 2013 Bangkok bombing were said to be part of an organisation seeking to force its way into the Yingluck peace initiative. The irony was not lost on observers.
Although moral high ground is important, it doesn't mean that the BRN would never carry out an attack in the deep South of the size and scale of the Ratchaprasong bombing.
Take, for example, the triple car bombs on Yala's Ruammit Street that killed 14 people and injured about 120 in late March 2012. The attacks were in response to an overture made two weeks earlier by Thaksin Shinawatra towards the 16 leaders of various separatist organisations in a bid to have them join the peace process.
The absence of any attacks on this scale outside the region is another indication that the BRN realises that Bangkok and the international community would not tolerate such a broadening of the theatre of violence.
Failing to heed the warning sent by the Yala attack, the Yingluck government pressed on with the relaunch of peace talks a year later on February 28, 2013.
Today, MARA Patani is a manifestation of that half-baked peace initiative launched under Yingluck's watch, with the junta uncertain of what else to do except to go with the flow. Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha must know he cannot afford the publicity disaster that would ensue if he was to ditch the initiative.
Back when the Yingluck initiative was in the pipeline, MARA Patani was treated as a side-show, often referred to as "Track 1.5".
The Ruammit triple car bomb shows that the BRN is willing to use a body count to make a point. The incident received significant media coverage, partly because the scale of the tragedy and partly because of the fact that Hat Yai was also hit. But it quickly became yesterday's news. The prevailing attitude among the Thai public and policymakers is that, as long as the violence is confined to the deep South, people will continue to tolerate it.
For the BRN and other separatist organisations, extending attacks beyond the historically contested region is a way of warning the Thai state of their disapproval of aspects of the peace negotiations and also the culture of impunity among security officials.
But more importantly, the perception of BRN moral high ground must remain intact, especially in the eyes of the local Malay Muslim residents. How long this quid pro quo arrangement will stand, on the other hand, remains to be seen.
Don Pathan is an independent security analyst and a freelance development consultant based in Yala, Thailand. He is also the founding member of the Patani Forum
But in the end, it was something that the panellists refused to say that wrenched the nerves of Thai security officials.
The question was whether the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) had informed the Thai government that its organisation was not behind the August 17 bombing in Bangkok that killed 20 people injured over 100.
In spite of its silence, hardly anyone believes the BRN was behind the bombing, as the Bangkok attack was outside the separatist insurgents' traditional theatre of violence, namely the historically contested Malay-speaking southernmost provinces.
However, this doesn't mean that the BRN has never carried out an attack on the scale of the Erawan Shrine bombing. But the BRN will push the violence only up to a point, long-time observers within the Thai security community say. It cannot afford to lose its moral high ground or jeopardise its grass-roots support, they add.
In the early stages of the current wave of insurgency violence, which surfaced in 2001 and went into full swing in January 2004, combatants did push the limits too far, murdering public school teachers and Buddhist monks as well as mutilating corpses of soldiers killed in their attacks. If insurgency is a form of communicative action, then the audience at the time was mainly local communities, as well as military commanders who would naturally be demoralised to see their soldiers decapitated or castrated.
But the insurgents consistently gauged local community sentiment and adjusted their focus accordingly, away from "soft targets" and towards the military and police.
Although there are direct attacks against civilians once in while, these acts are understood to be tit-for-tat killings between the state and the insurgents. One example is the murders of three Buddhist women who were shot at close range in February 2014, their bodies then set on fire. The incident was apparently retaliation for the murder of three young boys in Pattani's Bacho district, reportedly carried out by two paramilitary rangers, who retracted their confession in court a year later.
The vast majority of insurgent attacks come in the form of ambush and roadside bombings against security force patrols, essentially aimed at discrediting the security apparatus.
In May, for example, the city of Yala was rocked by almost 40 explosions in a bombing spree that lasted three successive days. Security planners were left speechless when their hastily implemented measures failed to stop the bombing.
For the record, according to BRN sources, no shrapnel was used in the bombs and only a handful of people suffered injuries, which were minor.
Even when BRN combatants have attacked targets outside the region, like Hat Yai, Phuket and Samui, achieving a high body count has never been part of the plan.
In one such incident, for example, a pick-up truck bomb with a blast radius of 500 metres was parked at the Phuket Police Station on December 2013. BRN sources said the operative left the bomb switch off on purpose, choosing merely to demonstrate their capabilities, as well as their disapproval at the absence of rules of engagement among government troops.
The same operation also saw Songkhla's Sadao district come under simultaneous bomb attacks, fulfilling a vow made earlier by insurgents.
While the Sadao attacks demonstrated the BRN could live up to its word, the Samui attack in May this year was a stern warning against the flouting of rules of engagement and against a so-called peace process in which the separatist organisation's name was being used without their approval and their people harassed to come on board.
BRN sources said the groups' ruling council did not endorse the peace initiative begun under Thaksin Shinawatra's administration and continued under his sister Yingluck's rule, or the current "pre-talks" with MARA Patani aimed at reviving negotiations.
With no genuine channel of communication between the BRN and Bangkok, Thai authorities have rushed to rule out any connection with the southern insurgency whenever a fresh incident occurs - whether it be the explosives left at a Bangkok street corner in May 2013, the Phuket Police Station truck bomb in December 2013 or the Samui car bomb in April this year.
The only exception was the December 31, 2006 New Year bombings in which three people were killed and 40 injured.
A lengthy investigation implicated the insurgents, yet the military-installed government downplayed the findings and instead suggested it was the work of people who had been ousted from power, ie, the Thaksin camp.
Too often, the authorities' knee-jerk reaction has come back to haunt them when evidence emerges to undermine their claims. It was subsequently revealed that vehicles used to ferry the Phuket and Samui bombs were from Pattani and Yala. Meanwhile the culprits behind the May 2013 Bangkok bombing were said to be part of an organisation seeking to force its way into the Yingluck peace initiative. The irony was not lost on observers.
Although moral high ground is important, it doesn't mean that the BRN would never carry out an attack in the deep South of the size and scale of the Ratchaprasong bombing.
Take, for example, the triple car bombs on Yala's Ruammit Street that killed 14 people and injured about 120 in late March 2012. The attacks were in response to an overture made two weeks earlier by Thaksin Shinawatra towards the 16 leaders of various separatist organisations in a bid to have them join the peace process.
The absence of any attacks on this scale outside the region is another indication that the BRN realises that Bangkok and the international community would not tolerate such a broadening of the theatre of violence.
Failing to heed the warning sent by the Yala attack, the Yingluck government pressed on with the relaunch of peace talks a year later on February 28, 2013.
Today, MARA Patani is a manifestation of that half-baked peace initiative launched under Yingluck's watch, with the junta uncertain of what else to do except to go with the flow. Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha must know he cannot afford the publicity disaster that would ensue if he was to ditch the initiative.
Back when the Yingluck initiative was in the pipeline, MARA Patani was treated as a side-show, often referred to as "Track 1.5".
The Ruammit triple car bomb shows that the BRN is willing to use a body count to make a point. The incident received significant media coverage, partly because the scale of the tragedy and partly because of the fact that Hat Yai was also hit. But it quickly became yesterday's news. The prevailing attitude among the Thai public and policymakers is that, as long as the violence is confined to the deep South, people will continue to tolerate it.
For the BRN and other separatist organisations, extending attacks beyond the historically contested region is a way of warning the Thai state of their disapproval of aspects of the peace negotiations and also the culture of impunity among security officials.
But more importantly, the perception of BRN moral high ground must remain intact, especially in the eyes of the local Malay Muslim residents. How long this quid pro quo arrangement will stand, on the other hand, remains to be seen.
Don Pathan is an independent security analyst and a freelance development consultant based in Yala, Thailand. He is also the founding member of the Patani Forum
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