As it tussles with multiple
crises of political legitimacy and governance, Malaysia has reached a decisive
point in its more than half-century history as an independent nation. What
started as a shocking but not exceptional scandal has turned into a political
crisis of unprecedented proportions. This was underlined by the Bersih 4
protests on 29–30 August in Kuala Lumpur, attended by an estimated 250,000
yellow-T-shirted Malaysians.
First, it was discovered that
a development agency, 1 Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB), set up by Prime
Minister Najib Tun Razak in 2009, was in debt to the tune of RM42 billion
(US$9.6 billion).
Where,
it was asked, did this vast sum of money go? What mismanagement or corrupt
practices led to such a meltdown?
Then it was reported that
the sum of RM2.6 billion (US$598 million) had shown up in Najib’s personal bank
account. It has been admitted— in instalments —that this money was indeed
placed in that account, but it is claimed to have been ‘donated’ from Middle
Eastern sources as recognition of Malaysia’s role in fighting ISIS and
maintaining Sunni Islam. Given the timing (just before Malaysia’s general
election in 2013) and Najib’s claim that the funds were used for party
political purposes, the money was clearly intended and used to ensure victory
for the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition, led by Najib’s UMNO (United
Malays National Organisation) party.
Najib claims that nothing
about this was illegal, given the current lack of statutory control over
campaign spending, maintaining that he held the funds in trust for his party.
But since BN won the election with a clear minority of votes, yet a majority of
the seats in parliament, the legitimacy of the result was already in serious
question even before the donation scandal came to light.
It gets worse. Najib’s
response to attempts to get to the bottom of these matters has raised further
questions about accountability and governance in Malaysia under BN rule. At
first he was reluctant to give any explanation. Ultimately, denials followed by
evasive answers raised many further questions.
The Public Accounts
Committee (PAC) in parliament set about an investigation. The BN government
itself set up a ‘task force’ to find out what happened. The task force included
the attorney-general’s office, the central bank, the anti-corruption agency
(MACC) and the police. Both processes have been interfered with in a highly
suspicious way. Four members of the PAC were abruptly transferred into the
cabinet in a reshuffle. Two senior MACC officers were transferred to the prime
minister’s office, only to be transferred out again after questions were
raised. The attorney-general himself was equally abruptly replaced — ‘for
health reasons’ — when a report indicated that criminal charges against Najib
had been drawn up (by whom is not clear).
These events dismayed the
public and rocked the government. The reshuffle involved the sacking of four
ministers, including Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin, who had called for
accountability in respect of 1MDB. Veteran former prime minister
Mahathir Mohamad began a political assault on Najib, accusing him of
corruption and lack of leadership. There is evidence now of a serious split in
UMNO over Najib’s leadership. At this juncture, the official agencies designed
to ensure good governance have not been allowed to do their job without
political interference. Even the task force supposedly investigating the
scandals has been replaced with another multi-agency force that is not
empowered to investigate 1MDB.
The question now is: how can
Malaysia’s constitutional system move matters towards a resolution in terms of
legal and political accountability?
Najib holds the levers of power
both in government and within the UMNO party.
Party elections have been postponed.. The prime minister owes his office, under
Westminster conventions set out in Malaysia’s constitution, to his
parliamentary majority and he could therefore, in principle, be subjected to a
no-confidence motion. This would require sufficient dissent in UMNO and BN to
get 24 of their members to vote with the opposition parties. The response of
one opposition party (the Islamic party) remains uncertain, and even 24 may not
be enough.
The main problem with all of
these potential methods of levering Najib out of power is that there is no
obvious successor. For now Mahathir undermines Najib, and Muhyiddin is a focus
for UMNO dissidents. UMNO division heads apparently support Najib, but in UMNO
what passes for personal allegiance is no more than adherence to a political
personality for as long as he can deliver. Najib’s support is therefore
potentially fragile. Meanwhile, with its former leader Anwar Ibrahim
languishing in jail convicted of sodomy, the opposition too is in disarray and
in the process of reconstruction.
Malaysia has thus entered
uncharted waters. Despite internal crises over the years, UMNO has historically
been able to deliver election wins
and legitimacy in government. That record is now in doubt. The
economy is in free fall, the ringgit plunging and investors fleeing. Bersih
4 demanded Najib step aside and free and fair elections be held. Free and
fair elections cannot be held under the current Malaysian Election Commission’s
supervision: constituency boundaries are gerrymandered in such a way as to make
an opposition victory almost impossible. There is no indication that the
electoral system will be set right before the next election, due by March 2018.
Something, sooner or
later, has to give. The survival of Malaysia (not just Najib)
politically and even economically is at stake. The only real hope, as one wag
put it, is that, when the centre cannot hold and things fall apart, they might
just, somehow, land in the right place. The only safe prediction is that this
sorry tale of corruption and misrule is by no means over. Perhaps, indeed, it
has only just begun.
Andrew Harding is professor
of law and director of the Centre for Asian Legal Studies, National University
of Singapore (NUS).
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