The Sino–US balance of power
has changed greatly since 2008 and the power disparity between the two is
shrinking. The rise of China causes deepening unease and anxiety in the United
States and forces a costly adjustment in mutual calculations. China now expects
to have an equal say in joint cooperation. Many American analysts and political
leaders are concerned about the possible disruptive impact of China’s rise, yet
they also realise that the cost of confrontation is increasingly high.
Mutual interdependence is a
great incentive for cooperation, even if it requires hard work and creates
vulnerabilities. It is crucial for the United States and China to establish a
new model of major powers relations — as Xi Jinping has suggested — on the
basis of three simple concepts: no conflict, no confrontation and win-win
cooperation.
The Obama–Xi summit should
lead to significant progress in this new great power relationship, with some
pragmatic achievements in areas such as climate change, cyber security, market
access and people-to-people exchanges.
The current US presidential
nomination campaigns must not interfere with
the negotiations. Republican presidential candidates have engaged in
active ‘China bashing’, causing some damage to Xi ‘s visit. The stuff of
American electoral politics, these remarks can be understood from the
perspective of US domestic politics, and should not be taken too seriously, but
they could yet have a serious impact on China–US relations and undermine mutual
trust in the public. An effort to depoliticise the relationship would help
tremendously.
But leaders on both sides
must address their respective concerns. China–US relations are complex: the two
are highly interdependent, but strategic competition is escalating. Both
countries must cooperate to safeguard their common interests and prosperity, while
remembering that a degree of competition is inevitable. Indeed competition is
already apparent in the region.
The United States is
concerned about China’s military build-up (especially in the South
China Sea) and cyber security, seeing both as threats to US
security. There is also some concern about China’s economic fluctuations, given
America’s economic interdependence and commonality of interests with China. On
this front, the two sides have more room to work together to improve their
economies.
The two have already greatly
expanded the coordination and cooperation on macroeconomic policies since 2008,
mainly through venues like the Strategic and Economic Dialogue and the G20.
Much progress has been achieved in fighting the global financial crisis and
cooperating to stimulate the world economy.
China is concerned about the
US Asia Pacific strategy, which appears increasingly organised to counter its
rise. China does not want to see the US engaged in a military encirclement, to
build up a so-called ‘Asian version’ of NATO. Meanwhile, China has deep
concerns about US support for Japan’s recent moves to revise its constitution,
as well as its encouragement of Japan’s involvement in the South China Sea.
Of course, China recognises
that it should not overreact. It seeks to deal with the United States calmly
and from a position of strength. If China can maintain good relations with
neighbouring countries, it believes that the strategic containment, pushed
forward by US hardliners, will ultimately fail.
For its part, the United
States must abandon the concept of ‘absolute security’. America has long been
accustomed to the status of absolute superiority of national power and military
strength and has put emphasis on maintaining ‘absolute advantage’ and
‘absolutely security’. Yet, this ignores the fact that this strategy also
generates regional insecurity.
What kind of relationship
will China and the United States eventually form in the Asia Pacific?
Over the past 30 years, the
Asia Pacific has emerged as the dynamic core of the global economy, mainly due
to continued peace and stability and to the Sino–US partnership. The challenge
is how the US-led regional security order will adapt to the rise of China: will
the United States insist on maintaining the old order and cause confrontation
with China or will it take part in the establishment of a new security order,
based on the concepts of mutual and cooperative security, inclusive of China?
The future of the Asia
Pacific region depends on benign Sino–US interaction, China’s handling of
neighbouring relations and China’s own stability and growth. Forces for change
in the existing regional security structure have increased. South Korea and
many Southeast Asian countries are not willing to ‘choose sides’. But Sino–US strategic
competition could generate unintended consequences of a scale that
neither side could control, eventually leading to a new Cold War. We must be
very wary of such an outcome.
China has currently launched
new initiatives to alleviate tensions: both the establishment of the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the One Belt, One Road initiative aim
at providing regional public goods and promoting international economic
cooperation. These initiatives are expected to help maintain the regional
security order and ease Cold War-like tensions in the Asia Pacific.
While the two global giants
compete in the Asia Pacific, they have proven more able to cooperate on global
issues. China and the United States share common interests in nuclear
non-proliferation in North Korea and Iran. As major CO2 emitters, they share
responsibility to ensure the success of climate negotiations in 2015 and
beyond. While the two may have different approaches to global issues, they have
exhibited more common interests than differences.
The relationship is now a
key pillar for global cooperation. The better China–US relations,
the more cooperation one can expect on global issues. Equally, the more
problematic the bilateral relationship is, the harder it is to achieve
practical cooperation. As cooperation on global issues shapes the development
of bilateral relations and the regional order, China and the United States
should carry out more extensive and higher levels of cooperation on such
issues, to ensure increased mutual trust and better outcomes. In this regard,
the outcome of the Xi–Obama summit will be important.
Wang Yong is a professor at
the Peking University School of International Studies and visiting chevalier
chair professor at the Institute of Asian Research, University of British
Columbia, Canada.
Yves Tiberghien is an
associate professor of political science and director of the Institute of Asian
Research, University of British Columbia, Canada.
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