The
passage of the collective self defense bills– enabling Japanese participation
in military activities beyond its home territory under restrictions that appear to be rather elastic.
In case
Japan faces “a survival-threatening situation,” in which the United States and
other countries that have close ties with the nation come under an armed attack
by a third country and that poses a threat to the existence of Japan and the
livelihoods of Japanese people, Japan now can use minimum necessary force.
–had a
feeling of inevitability to me.
They give
more freedom of movement to the Japanese government in its security policy,
more leverage in its foreign relations, and more gravy to the corporate
sector. These are opportunities that most modern governments, especially
a right-wing government like Abe’s, would be eager to exploit.
And I
think it’s accurate to describe them as a “normalization” of Japan’s
international status, especially if “the norm” is understood to be a downgrade
from the Japan’s previous condition, in other words a decline from the
idealistic, pacifist aspirations of Japan’s US-imposed constitution to ordinary
government-business-and-media driven war-grubbing.
The Japanese people as a whole appear to be more at home with these
aspirations—which they grew up with—than the Abe ambition to restore Japan as a
regional security player despite the risk it poses to Japanese lives, treasure,
and honor.
Abe had
to abandon his plans to revise the constitution to make “collective self
defense” legal, and ignore the fact that an overwhelming majority of
constitutional lawyers regarded his Plan B—“reinterpretation” of Article 9—as
BS. Then he had to turn his back on massive demonstration against the
bills to push them through the legislature.
It was
ugly. And Japan’s somewhat less special now.
Abe has always wanted his “normalized” “remilitarized” “no more
apologies” Japan and he got it…with an assist from the United States.
The
United States under President Obama decided to take the plunge and openly
commit to a China containment strategy keystoned on Japanese participation.
Even as
many Asian nations—not just the PRC—expressed ambivalence over the re-emergence
of Japan as a potential regional military force—US strategists have
enthusiastically promoted the process, doing their best to dismiss popular
opposition, the violence done to the constitution, and to the grotesquely
counterproductive effort to force the Futenma base plan down the throats of the
Okinawans.
The
feeling, I suppose, is that all this shall pass—or can be managed—and we’ll
have a capable, willing ally ready to help us execute our China strategy and
toeing the US line thanks to the restraints imposed by the constitution
and the security legislation.
US Asian-natsec strategists are, I believe, delusional.
I predict we’re not going to get Japan as our “UK in the Pacific” i.e. a
slavishly obedient ally that has decided, as a fundamental national principle,
to join itself to the hip to the United States in security policy.
We’re
going to get something more like our “Israel in the Pacific”, an occasional,
contentious, and conditional partner advancing its own agenda, an agenda that
may well turn out to be more reckless and confrontational than it would be
otherwise thanks to the moral hazard of strong US backing.
A while
back I wrote in Asia Times Online:
Japan, the linchpin of the US pivot strategy — and a source of
orgasmic pleasure to US China hawks when it revised its defense guidelines to
permit joint military operations in East Asia with the United States — already
plays its own hand in Taiwan, South Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Myanmar, as well as the Philippines.
Historically inclined readers might note 1) these are all countries that
Japan invaded and/or occupied as a matter of national interest in World War II
and 2) Japan is run by the spiritual heirs—or in the case of Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe, the direct heirs — of people who ran Japan back then and
implemented that policy until the United States defeated them …
When you
anoint Japan as a theater-wide anti-PRC military ally, you’re not getting the
same ally you had when Japan’s main job was hosting US bases and poking around
in its own territorial waters and airspace.
And the
ability of the United States to “manage” Japan and “lead” Asia is on a downward
trajectory:
(T)he pivot to Asia is, in my mind, fundamentally flawed because it is
built upon the premise of US leadership in Asian security, and ‘US leadership’
looks to be a wasting asset.
It’s not just the PRC. Everybody’s getting bigger, and the US’s
relative share is shrinking.
PricewaterhouseCoopers took the IMF’s 2014 GDP numbers and worked the spreadsheet magic using projected growth rates.
In 2050, here’s how they see the GDP horserace playing out, in
trillions: China 61; India 42; USA 41; Indonesia 12; Brazil 9; Mexico 8; Japan
7.9; Russia 7.5; Nigeria 7.3 and Germany 6.3. Poodlicious Euro-allies UK,
Italy, and France will be out of the top ten in 2050. Australia drops
from 19th place to 28th.
Put it another way, the US will have 14 percent of the world’s GDP and
Asia, the region we’re purporting to lead, will have 50 percent …
America’s Pacific Century…is not going to be pushing around overmatched,
grateful, and anxious allies like the UK, Poland, and Germany while trampling
on small borderline failed states in the Middle East. It’s going to be
contending with half a dozen rising Asian nations, all with experiences of
empire and aspirations to at least local hegemony…and on top of them, there’s
China.
I think
Asia is robust enough to accommodate and restrain the ambitions of the PRC…and
resist US attempts to “lead” it.
Ditto for
Japan.
I
wouldn’t be surprised if historians look back at the passage of the Japanese
security bills and regard them as a milestone in the decline of American
influence in Asia…one that was eagerly and shortsightedly celebrated by US
strategists at the time.
Maybe
we’ll be saying September 19, 2015 didn’t just mark the end of Japanese
pacifism. We’ll say that the sun began to set on America’s Pacific
Century…before it even had a chance to rise.
Peter Lee runs the China Matters blog. He writes on the intersection of US policy
with Asian and world affairs.
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