The dams will put at risk the food security and livelihoods of tens of
millions of people — especially in Cambodia’s lowlands and Tonle Sap Great
Lake, the world’s most productive inland fishery, and in the Mekong Delta,
Vietnam’s rice bowl and home to nearly 19 million people. While Laos has
technically complied with the principle of prior notification, consultation,
and cooperation as described by the 1995 Mekong River Commission
(MRC) Treaty, it has used misleading information to advance its
hydro projects.
In 2012, for example,
Vientiane claimed that engineers involved in Laos’ dam-building would design
fish passages that would allow fish to travel freely across the Mekong River
branches in Laos. However, the MRC has not had the opportunity to review and
test Laos’ fish passage design. Scientists contend that this design is inadequate
because of its one-size-fits-all approach to diverse fish species and its focus
on upstream rather than downstream fish migration. And the MRC has no legal
authority to prevent violations of the Mekong Treaty.
But what is more concerning
is the shifting geo-strategic landscape surrounding the dam conflict.
China’s increasingly
dominant role in controlling upper Mekong waters has worsened relationships
with its neighbours. Vientiane and Phnom Penh are building dams based on the
assumption that China will allow more water to flow during the dry season. But
China can theoretically release or stop releasing water if and when it pleases.
A lack of transparency about water
management has led China’s neighbours in Southeast Asia to believe
that water control may not only serve China’s water needs but also be utilised
as a form of coercion over them.
China and the lower Mekong
countries tend to make policy based on an outdated interpretation of
international water law that emphasises a ‘first come, first served’ approach,
rather than cooperation among all countries along the river. Without a
comprehensive cooperative framework to manage water disputes, these disputes
could spill over into diplomatic and political arenas.
There is no clear evidence
that Beijing has been dictating to Vientiane on decisions over the recent
Xayaburi and Don Sahong dam projects. Indeed, the problem lies with
Laos itself. It has undermined the cooperative framework of the MRC,
while downstream governments have largely failed to stand up to it. There isn’t
a strong history among the Mekong countries of using formal mechanisms,
including international law, to resolve problems that transcend national
boundaries.
And Vietnam is itself divided.
While some in the Vietnamese government are vocally opposing dam-building on
the Mekong, other Vietnamese who have close economic and political ties with
Laos’ leaders are not. Vientiane has taken advantage of this lack of consensus
in Vietnam to advance its interests at the expense of its neighbours.
Downstream in Vietnam, there
is also concern about the broader strategic uncertainties linked to the race to
the bottom among the Mekong countries. China’s influence expands from the north
on Vietnam’s Mekong Delta to the South China Sea. Vietnam believes these waters
to be its exclusive economic zone and in the past there has been escalation of
conflict between Vietnam and China. The two nations are stuck in a vicious
cycle of historic, deep-seated distrust. Beijing is attempting to make Cambodia
and Laos buffer states between China and Vietnam. If it does so successfully,
China will become the paramount regional hegemon that can change the rules of
engagement and ‘discipline’ Vietnam and other Southeast Asian states.
It is unclear how Beijing’s
aggressive rise in South China Sea may spill over to water politics in the
Mekong and vice versa. In Vietnam, there is popular resistance to Chinese
interference in domestic politics: Vietnamese nationalists attack attempts to
‘sell’ the country to foreign forces. But organised opposition to China does
not obviously exist in Laos or Cambodia, leaving Beijing free to try to
influence policymaking in these countries.
Relations are deteriorating
among the lower Mekong countries and within ASEAN over the dam conflict, while
Beijing continues to exploit this division for its own geopolitical interests.
Ultimately, to ameliorate the race to the bottom among the Mekong countries,
technical solutions must be connected to efforts to improve the broader
strategic landscape, the MRC procedures, and stakeholders’ attitudes and
behaviours toward regional cooperation.
Nhina Le is a research
associate at the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason
University.
No comments:
Post a Comment