The exclusive economic zone
(EEZ) regime is outlined in UNCLOS Article 56,
which states that a country has within its EEZ ‘sovereign rights for the
purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing […] natural
resources’. UNCLOS and its subsequent interpretations imply that the right of
exploitation is exclusive, as the name implies: other countries can
participate in the exploitation of this country’s EEZ only with its agreement.
When a country becomes an UNCLOS signatory it gives up any claims to any rights
to fish within other countries’ EEZs, regardless of historical fishing
activities. In return the country gains the exclusive right to fish in its own
EEZ.
Gupta misinterprets the
Permanent Court of Arbitration’s (PCA) ruling in the Eritrea–Yemen maritime
territorial dispute as support for the view that an UNCLOS signatory has the
right to continue its traditional fishing activities in other countries’ EEZs.
When the PCA awarded sovereignty
over some islands to Yemen but also let the fishermen of Eritrea continue the
traditional fishing regime in the vicinity, the ruling was in regard to
sovereignty over the islands not the EEZ. In international law, the acquisition
of sovereignty and the rights over resources within a country’s EEZ are
governed by two different legal regimes.
The PCA took into account
‘Islamic tradition’, ‘regional legal traditions’, ‘the Islamic system of
international law’, the fact the islands had had characteristics of res
communis — a common area not subject to the legal title of any state
— for centuries, and Yemen not acquiring sovereignty over them until
towards the end of the 20th century. When it awarded sovereignty of the islands
to Yemen but also gave free access of the surrounding waters to Eritrea’s
artisanal fishermen, that was a ruling tailored to the particular history of
sovereignty over those territories. It was not a general rule of international
law. The PCA was not required to strictly apply the concept of sovereignty,
primarily a creation of the West.
The creation of the EEZ
regime bears no resemblance to Yemen’s acquisition of sovereignty over the
islands. This regime was not a creation of the West but negotiated by the
international community. China voluntarily subscribed to it when ratifying
UNCLOS. Therefore, the international courts are unlikely to uphold the view
that China has the unilateral right to fish in other countries’ EEZs.
Overwhelmingly, they do not give any country the right to fish in another’s EEZ
unless there is an agreement between them to that effect.
Drawing lessons for the
South China Sea, if an international court was called on to resolve the
disputes, it might award sovereignty over the different islands to different
countries together with clauses to award access to these islands and their
12-nautical-mile territorial seas to artisanal fishermen from other countries.
But it is extremely unlikely to give China the right to fish in the entire
nine-dash-line area, and it is very difficult to characterise modern
fishing in the South China Sea as artisanal fishing.
It is doubtful if China
itself shares Gupta’s view. While China claims to have a
historically-established right to unilaterally fish within approximately 50
nautical miles of the uncontested coasts of other countries, does it accept
that they have the same right within 50 nautical miles of its uncontested
coast? It is worth mentioning that since 2009 China has been using force to
drive Vietnamese fishermen out of their traditional fishing grounds around the
still-contested Paracel Islands.
The ‘historic fishing
rights’ argument is in fact a late tack-on and has nothing to do with the
original purpose of the nine-dash line. According to Taiwanese President Ma
Ying-jeou, when China’s Kuomintang Government published the eleven-dash line
map, which later became the nine-dash line, it was only a claim to the
enclosed islands, not to rights over maritime space.
But as China’s power grew
after Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, its ambitions in the South China Sea also grew.
This gave rise to the view that this line was not just a claim to the islands
but also a claim to rights over the maritime space enclosed by it. The problem
is that, according to international law regarding maritime delimitation, this
line cannot possibly be a valid claim to an EEZ.
Faced with this, Chinese
scholars have argued that ‘historic rights’ are the basis for China to make
maritime claims well beyond what would be consistent with jurisprudence on EEZ
delimitation. However, leading international scholars have convincingly shown
that that argument is flawed. The view of the US Department of State on this
question remains far more convincing. Historic fishing activities by the
peoples around the South China Sea in
what was at that time international waters cannot give China the right to fish
in other countries’ EEZs today.
One of the best possible
avenues for fairness and stability in the South China Sea is for China to recognise
the meaning of the nine-dash line map as clarified by Taiwan’s President Ma. It
should recognise that of the islands enclosed are the subjects of territorial
disputes and negotiate with the relevant countries the EEZ belonging to these
islands on the basis of international law.
Huy Duong is a UK-based IT
consultant.
Tuan Pham is Associate
Professor at the University of New South Wales.
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