It is time for the two neighbors to move
beyond historical grievances
The latest tensions to emerge between Singapore and
Indonesia—this time after Indonesia named a naval warship for two marines
executed for a 1965 bombing in Singapore—caught many political observers by
surprise. Relations in recent years had remained cordial despite several
noteworthy incidents, such as the transboundary haze caused by Indonesian forest
fires (for which Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono memorably
apologized), and Singapore’s sand reclamation works on Indonesian islands. The
political fallout from both incidents seemed to have been contained by both
sides.
Yet in the recent days following Indonesia’s decision to
name its new frigate the KRI Usman Harun, no fewer than five Singaporean
ministers have spoken up against Indonesia’s actions, with the latest
development being Indonesian defense officials pulling out of the Singapore
Airshow (according to some reports, after Singapore canceled invites to junior
officials).
As with many other political events, the role of discourse
has been central to the development of these tensions. Underlying these
discursive tensions are structural factors that have made this conflict to be
particularly intractable. However, structure and discourse have often become intertwined.
Size Matters
The structural disparities between Indonesia and Singapore
have surfaced from time to time, most symbolically in for Indonesian President
B. J. Habibie’s dismissal of Singapore as “a red dot” in 1998, which struck a raw nerve
among Singapore policymakers at the time. They later deftly turned it into a
synonym for Singapore’s success, as evidenced by books such as The Little
Red Dot: Reflections of Singapore’s Diplomats, which paid tribute to the
success of Singaporean diplomacy in helping the country punch above its weight.
But size could also be a reason for the failure to resolve
conflicts between Singapore and Indonesia. Size, in this sense, can be
interpreted literally as well as symbolically, as the self-images of both
countries. Both the original conflict in 1968 as well as the current one in
2014 have been directly attributed to size. When then-Prime Minister Lee Kuan
Yew turned down a direct appeal by former President Soeharto to pardon the two
Indonesian marines, in the words of former MFA Permanent Secretary Bilahari
Kausikan, “he could not have done otherwise without conceding that the small
must always defer to the big and irretrievably compromising our sovereignty.”
However, if Singaporeans are adamant that the small must not
defer to the big, then the Indonesians are equally adamant that the big must
not defer to the small. A few days ago, Indonesia’s Coordinating Minister for
Political, Legal and Security Affairs Djoko Suyanto declared that “the fact that there is a different
perception of Indonesian government policy by other countries, in this
instance, Singapore, cannot make us backtrack or be uncertain about carrying on
with our policy decision and implementing it.” Golkar MP Hajriyanto Thohari,
deputy chairman of the People’s Consultative Assembly, went one step further, declaring “Let Singapore keep shrieking,
like a chicken beaten by a stick.”
Discourses Matter
The Singapore-Indonesia dispute could have just been like
any other in the region—and there is no shortage of them—with patriotic populations
echoing the nationalist rhetoric of their political leaders. Yet what is
particularly striking in this case is the disconnect between “official” and
“popular” discourses. While politicians have tried to drum up support for their
respective positions through the mass media, this has had limited resonance
with Singaporeans and Indonesians, who regard each other as “friends” to the
extent of questioning state discourses portraying the unreasonableness of the
other side.
The mix of voices on both sides is evidence that nationalist
narratives, while dominant, are balanced with a good dose of self-reflection
among the general public in both countries. On February 8, the Jakarta Post
published an editorial titled “Can we be more sensitive?” while on the same day,
Singaporean playwright Alfian Sa’at argued that Singapore’s denial of clemency
to the two Marines could have led to their “martyrdom,” setting off a chain of
events that led to the current dispute. It is not the purpose of this essay to
evaluate the veracity of these counter-narratives, but simply to point out that
their existence is evidence of pluralism within both Indonesian and Singapore
societies. This desire to understand the other’s perspective, despite state
appeals to patriotism and nationalism, augurs well for the relationship between
both countries, at least on a people-to-people level.
ASEAN Centrality
This article has argued that an asymmetry in size has formed
the basis of the security dilemma that exists between Singapore and Indonesia,
leading to a diplomatic impasse between the two countries. It has also shown,
however, that a gap exists between official and popular discourses. With the
exception of families affected by the 1965 bombing, the events of Konfrontasi,
which took place half a century ago, have little resonance for Singaporeans and
Indonesians who have the good fortune of living in an era of peace, one that
both their countries have played a central role in creating, as founding
members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Indeed, both Indonesia and Singapore continue to play very
important roles in ASEAN. Indonesia had an active role in mediating between
Thailand and Cambodia during the Preah Vihear conflict, through a process of
“shuttle diplomacy” that was the work of Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa.
Singapore, too, was instrumental in the setting up of many ASEAN-related
initiatives, most notably the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Plus Three, ASEAN
Defence Ministers’ Meeting, and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM).
Given the centrality of both Indonesia and Singapore to
ASEAN, it is unfortunate that an error in judgment on the part of the
Indonesian Navy has led to a diplomatic impasse from which neither the bigger
nor the smaller state can extricate itself easily and gracefully—a timely
reminder of ASEAN’s yet-unrealized dream of becoming a “security community.”
Yet it is time for Indonesia and Singapore to set aside their historical
grievances, painful as these may be, and concentrate on the areas in which
further cooperation may be achieved, thereby sustaining their shared vision of
creating a true ASEAN Community.
The author is a PhD candidate at the Lee Kuan Yew School of
Public Policy, National University of Singapore.
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