Sri Lanka started 2015 with
a corrupt and authoritarian regime, led by Mahinda Rajapaksa, which seemed
likely to be in power for another decade. In 2009, Rajapaksa had successfully
brought to an end Sri Lanka’s decades-long civil war through the ruthless
destruction of the Tamil insurgency. Rajapaksa’s military victory, and regular
scare campaigns about renewed Tamil militancy, gave him what seemed to be an
almost permanent stranglehold over the Sri Lankan polity.
Since 2009, the Rajapaksa
family had extended their hold over key political and civil institutions,
undermining the whole fabric of governance in Sri Lanka. Over the years they
became more and more corrupt, ultimately bordering on a kleptocracy.
Rajapaksa also moved Sri
Lanka out of its traditional foreign policy orbit — that of a non-aligned
country that was broadly pro-Western and generally prudent about its relations
with India. In recent years, Sri Lanka’s relations with both the United States
and India had become increasingly tense, largely over Rajapaksa’s refusal to
reconcile with the Tamil minority or investigate claims of war crimes.
Rajapaksa became ever closer
to Beijing, awarding Chinese companies profitable infrastructure projects in
return for large kickbacks. The relationship increasingly extended into the
security realm, including giving China control of strategic ports. Visits of
Chinese submarines to Colombo in late 2014 seemed to signal that Sri Lanka may
be on the way to becoming a key defence partner for China in the Indian Ocean
region.
But all this came to a
screeching halt in January 2015. When Rajapaksa called a snap election
in November 2014, the result seemed a foregone conclusion. But in a dramatic
reversal he was challenged by one of his own cabinet ministers, Maithripala
Sirisena. In the space of a few weeks Sirisena managed to put together a
rainbow coalition and ultimately beat Rajapaksa convincingly. Rajapaksa made
another run for power in Sri Lanka’s parliamentary elections in August 2015 but
again was soundly beaten, allowing Sirisena and his allies to consolidate their
positions.
These events are an
indication that democratic instincts are deeply ingrained in Sri Lankan
society. Rajapaksa’s defeat was the result of several factors: a rejection of
Rajapaksa’s endless triumphalism over the civil war and his refusal to
reconcile with the Tamil community, the blatant corruption of Rajapaksa and his
family, and anxieties over growing Chinese
influence in the country.
For his part, Sirisena has
done remarkably well for someone who came to power at the head of a coalition
whose main point of agreement was opposition to Rajapaksa. Sirisena signalled a
new era in the governance of Sri Lanka by reversing the centralisation of power
that had occurred under Rajapaksa. He pledged to only serve one term as
president, transferred many presidential powers to the prime minister and
established independent commissions to oversee the judiciary, police and
elections. Key members of the Rajapaksa family were arrested on corruption
charges.
The new administration also
took some important steps towards reconciliation with the Tamil community.
Tamils are gradually being brought back into national politics. There are plans
to establish an independent domestic truth and reconciliation commission to
examine atrocities committed during the civil war, as well as to compensate
victims. This remains a contentious area, but the right signals are there.
Sirisena also decisively
repositioned Sri Lanka’s international stance, particularly in reassuring New Delhi
that Sri Lanka would take a ‘balanced’ stance and not allow itself to be used
by China to threaten India. Narendra Modi made the first visit by
an Indian prime minister to Sri Lanka in almost 30 years.
Sirisena has also tackled
some controversial foreign investments. Plans to build huge casinos were
scrapped. And the Colombo Port City project, awarded to Chinese companies under
dubious circumstances, is being reviewed.
Sri Lanka’s apparent move
away from authoritarianism, kleptocracy and communal division augurs well for
its future. Sri Lanka is the wealthiest state in South Asia in per capita terms
and despite suffering decades of civil war its social indicators are among the
best in the region. Although economic growth slowed slightly to 6.3 per cent in
2015 as a result of political uncertainties, the Asian Development Bank a
rebound to growth of around 7 per cent in 2016.
If political stability and
good governance can be maintained, Sri Lanka seems well positioned to take
advantage of the growing economic integration between east and southern Asia.
Its geographic location, educated workforce and relatively open economy make it
an attractive destination for low cost manufacturing industries that are moving
out of Southeast Asia and China. Sri Lanka could be a major beneficiary of
China’s Maritime Silk Route initiative, which involves developing
infrastructure and new special manufacturing zones, although it will need to
ensure that in doing so it does not antagonise New Delhi. In the coming years,
Sri Lanka has the potential to become a ‘Bengal Tiger’ to rival some of the
East Asian economic tigers.
David Brewster is a Visiting
Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National
University.
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