Political turf wars hurting investment in Indonesia
The first 12 months of Joko
Widodo’s (Jokowi) presidency has seen progress toward reforming the extractive
sectors. Jokowi began by appointing a clean and experienced bureaucrat,
Sudirman Said, to head the Ministry for Energy and Mineral Resources (MoEMR).
Said moved to improve transparency in permitting processes, cut bureaucratic
red tape and clamp down on illegal exports.
Jokowi also ordered an investigation into
Petral, the crooked trading arm of state oil company Pertamina —
something no previous president has dared to do. Until now, political protection
at the highest levels prevented any serious legal investigations. Jokowi and
Said’s efforts are unprecedented and impressive.
But when it comes to
managing the country’s most strategic extractive contracts, the story is one of
inconsistency and chaos. Tens of billions of dollars are being held up in
delayed contract negotiations with investors. Jokowi’s inability to contain
political infighting and manage vested interests is making the situation worse.
The Abadi gas field in
Masela, Maluku, for example, contains substantial and desperately needed gas
deposits. Japan’s Inpex operates the Masela block and recently increased its production
projections from 2.5 to 7.5 million metric tons. Some experts
calculate that once it comes online this block could help prevent Indonesia
from becoming a net importer of gas.
But government infighting
has caused delays. SKK Migas, the industry regulator, recommended MoEMR approve
Inpex’s revised development plan and contract extension. But one of Jokowi’s
recently appointed Coordinating Ministers, Rizal Ramli, protested publicly,
accusing SKK Migas and Said of pandering to foreign lobbyists. The government
is now hiring an external consultant
to review the company’s business proposal.
Long and fraught
negotiations have burdened other strategic projects. Total’s contract extension
for the Mahakam block, which provides 24 per cent of the country’s gas,
underwent gruelling delays and was eventually transferred to Pertamina.
Chevron’s US$12 billion deep-sea gas project in the Makassar Straight was postponed
due to permitting and regulatory difficulties.
Much needed geothermal
investments have suffered similar setbacks. Indonesia is still highly dependent on
fossil fuels — 45 per cent of energy consumption comes from oil, 24
per cent from gas and 24 per cent from coal. Only around 5 per cent is sourced
from renewables. The government wants to attract 420 trillion rupiah (about
US$30 billion) into the hydro and geothermal
industries, which are capital intensive and high risk. But land and
permit problems have slowed the industry’s expansion and contract uncertainty
has spooked big investors.
Confusion plagues mineral
mining contracts too. Since the introduction of the 2009 Mining Law, all
foreign mining contracts are being renegotiated so that their terms reflect the
new legislation. But years of deliberation have produced only a handful of agreements.
Meanwhile, Phoenix based
miner, Freeport McMoran is readying for an US$18 billion underground expansion
of its gold and copper mine in Papua. The company is therefore seeking an early
extension for its contract that expires in 2021. The extension is complex and
controversial because Freeport has a long and checkered history in Indonesia.
In October Said was finally preparing to ink a deal. But when other ministers
got wind they publicly upbraided Said
for undermining Indonesia’s legal sovereignty and siding with a foreign
company.
Behind these protracted
negotiations are turf wars between politico-business elites, elected officials
and state bureaucrats who hold opposing views on how lucrative contracts should
be managed and who is entitled to manage them.
These wars have an
ideological dimension. For Indonesia’s nationalists, handing out contracts to
companies like Freeport, Total or Chevron means subjecting Indonesia’s natural
resources to continued exploitation by foreign capital, when the rights should
fall to domestic business. State-owned enterprises and local mining businesses
are increasingly bullish. Pertamina is demanding first right of refusal to all expiring
oil and gas contracts, domestic companies now dominate the coal, tin, and
nickel industries, and powerful tycoons are moving into gold mining too.
But others in government
doubt the technical and financial capacity of domestic players, seeing these
large strategic contracts as a source of much needed foreign investment.
Many of these conflicts are
also about access to rents. Contract extensions for large-scale projects are a
feeding frenzy for Indonesia’s rent-seeking elites. Different factions within
the politico-business class vie for influence over the terms of lucrative
contracts, trying to gain preferential access to service contracts or cheap
company shares.
For example, in November
2015 a political firestorm
erupted when it was discovered that the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Setya Novanto, and a powerful oil-trading tycoon, Reza Chalid,
met with the President Director of Freeport Indonesia and allegedly offered to
facilitate a contract extension in return for company shares. While Minister
Said wants to see Novanto removed from his post, other high level elites are
rallying to protect him.
Jokowi must assert authority
over his executive and the political operators
that surround him. Elite infighting and political turf wars will only hurt the
economy and undermine Indonesia’s international repute.
Eve Warburton is a PhD
candidate at the Department of Political and Social Change, The Australian
National University.
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