The 24th Asean Summit in Myanmar this weekend took place in the
aftermath of the ramming of Vietnamese ships by the Chinese near the Paracel
Islands in the South China Sea. The summit undoubtedly also saw the issue of
regional power balance take center stage as China has shown itself reasserting
its traditional role as the central power of Asia.
For
Indonesia, Beijing’s active preponderance has become a doubly important issue
as our own waters around the Natuna Islands are now included in the infamous
nine-dash line to indicate Chinese sovereignty in the South China Sea.
To best
formulate an effective policy at the national level, and at the regional level
through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, we need to consider a few
points that underline Beijing’s desire and possible plans for the South China
Sea.
China’s
insistence on its hegemony in the East, South China and Yellow Seas may seem
intransigent and unreasonable to the neighboring state. Yet from China’s
strategic point of view it is paramount to the defense of its own coastline,
not against its smaller neighbors, but against US military forces.
In
Beijing’s eyes, China’s coastline has been and is surrounded by US military
bases stationed throughout Asia: in Singapore, the Philippines’ Subic Bay and
Clark, Guam, Pearl Harbor and various bases in Japan and South Korea. All these
bases fall outside the perimeter of the three seas, and China may simply see
the seas as its buffer against possible military action by the US aided by its
allies in Asia.
In the
event of war between China and the US, Chinese supremacy on the three seas
would ensure maximum difficulties for the US Navy’s Virginia-class nuclear
submarines to launch attacks close to the Chinese coastline. The fact that the
US Navy just ordered ten more of these submarines for the next ten years may be
proof enough for Beijing that these submarines carrying nuclear warheads may be
central to the American military strategy in the future.
From a
historical perspective, Beijing’s desire to secure the three seas is
understandable. After all, as the US emerged a global power early in the 20th
century, it soon established its own hegemony in the Gulf of Mexico and the
Caribbean Sea. The Soviet Union, and Russian Federation today, has also sought
to ensure supremacy in the Baltic, Black and Caspian Seas.
But if
it is indeed hegemony that Beijing seeks in the Asian theater, Chinese leaders
may want to effect more persuasive policies that can indeed assure their
neighbors that Chinese hegemony is preferable to its US version. Perhaps
Chinese hegemony in Asia is inevitable in the future and in this respect there
is not much Indonesia can do to prevent it from happening. However, Indonesia
as a leading force and the biggest state in Asean and in Southeast Asia can
certainly play a crucial role to balance and moderate Chinese supremacy in the
region.
To
achieve this, Indonesia would have to maximize cohesion within Asean while
ensuring that all Asean member states seek to upgrade their own defense
capabilities, especially around the disputed areas such as Natuna. Indonesia
must also adhere to its “free and active” foreign policy directive more
stringently so as not to give the impression it favors the United States over
China.
The
South China Sea is even more valuable to China as it may contain sizeable oil
and gas deposits, which explains China’s construction of a drilling rig in the
waters of Paracel Islands, which the Vietnamese ships tried to prevent last
week.
Indonesia’s
own Natuna Seas possess the promising Natuna gas field with reserves estimated
to be around 1.3 trillion cubic meters, most of which remain untapped as
production has not started. It would be naive to believe hat Beijing’s
interests in the Natuna Seas is unrelated to gas, especially as China is fast
relying on natural gas its source of energy.
As
China’s former dependence on coal as its main energy source proves destructive
to its environment and air quality, the Chinese government has proclaimed a
moratorium on the construction of coal-based power plants and is replacing them
with gas-powered alternatives. China’s consumption of natural gas accordingly
is expected to account for one-fifth of the global total in the foreseeable
future.
So it is
no wonder that Beijing has been moving fast to secure its own future energy
sources. Spurning Russia’s offer, China has been steadily working out its gas
import deals with Central Asian states such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
Indonesia
also supplies China with natural gas through the 2002 Tangguh gas deal, which
recently became contentious as Indonesia seeks to renegotiate the gas price,
deemed too low by today’s standards. It will fall to the next government to
renegotiate the Tangguh gas deal with China, which presents an opportunity for
Indonesia to become a respected and valuable partner. In supplying Beijing with
the much-sought-after natural gas, Indonesia’s position is of special
importance to Chinese interests.
While it
is also reasonable that we expect market prices for our gas, it is crucial to
our own future interests that China continues to be supplied with our gas.
Involving Chinese companies in the consortium that will develop the Natuna gas
field may also be a good initiative to bind Chinese interests to ours as well
as diversify the composition of foreign companies that take part in our oil and
gas industry.
Johannes
Nugroho is a writer and businessman from Surabaya
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