The
Chinese media exhaustively covered Obama’s visit to Japan on 23–25 April. There
were references to the exorbitant cost of the Abe–Obama sushidinner and the ¥25
million worth of entertainment laid on by Prime Minister Abe. But it was
Obama’s verbal guarantees regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands that attracted
the most attention.
Obama stated that US
commitments under the US–Japan security treaty ‘extend to all the territories
under the administration of Japan, including the Senkaku Islands’ and that the
United States ‘opposes any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan’s
administration of the Senkaku Islands’. He also supported Japan’s consideration
of exercising the right to collective self-defence.
These
commitments were roundly condemned in several quarters throughout China. The
most concerted attacks focused on the US–Japan Security Treaty. For instance,
Yuanhai Liu argued that the title
of the Joint Statement ‘The United States and Japan: Shaping the Future of the
Asia-Pacific and Beyond’ clearly demonstrates a ‘great ambition [to]
proactively … participate in international security affairs [that goes] well
beyond the traditional scope of the US–Japan Security Treaty’. In reality, the treaty truly is global in
its reach: the 1960 version obliges both Parties to settle any international
disputes by peaceful means and to contribute to the development of peaceful and
friendly international relations, while both the 1952 and 1960 versions refer
to the maintenance not only of Japanese security but also ‘international peace
and security in the Far East’.
Other
criticisms suggested that the US–Japan alliance is a Cold War relic. A senior
official of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Qin Gang, stated that the security
treaty was a product of the Cold War era and urged the United States and Japan to abandon
their Cold War mindset in order to avoid disturbing regional peace and
stability even further. The Chinese ambassador to the United States, Cui
Tiankai, made similar comments at an
event at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Cui
pointed out that the US–Japan alliance originated in the Cold War years and
questioned whether it had appropriately adapted to the challenges of the 21st
century.
It is
historically accurate to describe the US–Japan alliance as a product of the
Cold War: the major strategic purpose of the alliance when it was signed and
re-signed in 1952 and 1960 was to contain the Soviet threat and defend against
the spread of communism in East Asia.
Beyond this,
there are interesting questions about why alliances endure beyond the original
purpose for which they were established. Alliances will not persist if they no
longer serve the interests of members. When the specific threat on which an
alliance is predicated disappears, alliances are unlikely to survive.
What, therefore, has kept the US–Japan alliance strategically relevant? Yumi
Hiwatari argues that growing concerns over a rising China and nuclear
developments in North Korea are ‘Cold War-type security concerns and threats’.
In other words, the Cold War is over but the type of traditional security
threat that it represents is not.
Stephen Walt
contends that a state poses a threat when it has the intention and capability
to attack or invade another country — or to coerce them to adopt policies
contrary to their national interests. By this definition, whether China and
North Korea pose a ‘threat’ to Japan and the United States is a legitimate
question. Both China and North Korea have and are acquiring military forces
that could be used to attack the United States and Japan, or used to coerce
them into adopting policies that they would argue are contrary to their national
interests. China and North Korea also have governments that are unconstrained
by internal democratic processes or by the external pressures that alliance
partners can bring to bear. And both use nationalism to buttress government
legitimacy. The core function of defence and deterrence in the US–Japan
security treaty therefore remains relevant today.
Alliances
also remain relevant in the absence of direct threats. A state’s security can
be at risk if its surrounding region is plagued by instability. Although these
conditions do not threaten the political or territorial integrity of a state
directly, they can escalate, creating military and political problems that have
the same security-diminishing effects as traditional threats.
In 1996, the ‘Japan–US Joint Declaration on
Security: Alliance for the 21st Century’ was made in response to
such threats. The declaration embraced the concept of ‘regional cooperation…to
achieve a more peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific
region’. It paved the way for Japan to undertake greater defence cooperation
with the United States.
Since then,
the stability of Japan’s security environment has deteriorated even further as
territorial disputes have intensified in the South China Sea. Japan’s principal
security interests in this area are twofold: first, the potential disruption to
the regional sea lanes and secondly, the undermining of existing international legal norms. In fact,
Japan’s territorial disputes with China and those between China and South East
Asian states have, to a significant extent, combined to diminish Japan’s
security in both the traditional and non-traditional senses.
Alliances
also tend to endure when they are supported by other major powers and regional
states for helping to maintain peace and stability in particular areas of the
globe. US forces stationed in Japan have long been considered providers of a
public good because of their contributions to regional stability and prosperity
through the deterrence of conflict.
Finally, allies may use specific
political assets such as joint policies, statements and commitments to strengthen deterrence. The
Joint Statement that resulted from the Obama visit to Japan represents exactly
this kind of political asset. The targeted verbal attacks on the US–Japan
alliance from China following Obama’s visit serve to underline its strategic
interest in unravelling the US–Japan security relationship. Yet ironically,
Chinese actions and statements have served to cement the alliance rather than
undermine it.
Aurelia
George Mulgan is Professor at the University of New South Wales, Canberra
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