Only halfway through 2014 and it is clear the year will be remembered
for a number of seismic shifts occurring in the Asia-Pacific region. Because
Asia in the early 21st century is, as Europe was in the early 20th, the center
of world power and potential, the implications for the wider global order are
considerable.
The
center of the Asia Pacific Region is China. The “pivot to Asia,” whether in its
original American form, or its many reiterations, is in fact a “pivot to
China.” During his Asian “pivot” tour to Japan, South Korea, Malaysia and the
Philippines in April, US President Barack Obama kept insisting that his
policies — whether the Trans Pacific Partnership, from which China is currently
excluded; mega-regional trade pact; or the 10-year defense pact with the
Philippines — were not meant to contain or control China. He seems to protest
too much!
In the
meantime, Japan, which has a fair number of issues with China, including a
tense dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, is
proposing under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to “reinterpret” the pacifist
constitution so as to allow Tokyo greater maneuverability in boosting
collective defense: another “pivot to China.”
Russia
is making its own “pivot to Asia,” after the recent Ukraine kerfuffle, as
highlighted by the May meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and
Chinese President Xi Jinping, in Shanghai culminating in a 30-year energy
agreement. This apparent Sino-Russian “rapprochement” — complete with a joint
naval exercise — reversed a frigid relationship arising from the 1960 Sino-Soviet
split, only marginally improved in the 1990s, of tense distance between Beijing
and Moscow.
To the
south, China is engaged in hostilities with Vietnam in the South China Sea, as
it was and almost certainly will be again with the Philippines, as well as having
disputes with Brunei and Malaysia. That Hanoi looks to Washington for support
in its confrontation with Beijing is perhaps one of the more flagrant paradoxes
of history. All member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
are torn between economic benefits of a rising China and security assurances
from a seemingly retreating America.
The
landslide election of Narendra Modi has electrified India and observers
throughout the world. Can this “strongman,” as The Economist dubs him, “unleash
India”? The Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China, respectively
established in 1947 and 1949, are geographically close, but not are not
congenial neighbors, politically or emotionally. There was a war between the
two in 1962, the bitterness of which is ingrained in the collective Indian
memory. There are territorial issues — as recently as May 2013 the Chinese
People’s Liberation Army made a deep incursion into the Ladakh region in India
causing widespread resentment and alarm.
Perhaps
most ominously there is a potential for major confrontation between India and
China over water, as China controls the flows from the Tibetan plateau, sources
of which are vital to India and surrounding countries. Modi’s “pivot to China”
could either take the form of “doing a Nixon,” as some Chinese commentators
have suggested — referring to US President Richard Nixon’s historic visit to
Beijing in 1972 thereby laying foundations for renewed Sino-American relations
— or, as he seems inclined, beefing up the relationship between Tokyo and Delhi
as a means to enhance both economic and security partnership: a sort of
Indo-Japanese entente cordiale.
Ties
between China and the Korean peninsula are bizarre. Seoul and Beijing are major
trading partners. South Korean investments and technology represent a critical
component in China’s economic development and performance, and because of
territorial and historical legacy disputes with Tokyo, Seoul is bolstering ties
with Beijing. Pyongyang, however, continues to depend on financial, political
and military support from Beijing. While Beijing has expressed frustration in
its alliance with Pyongyang, any break is unlikely as China does not fancy the
idea of a united Korea, allied to the US, with troops stationed along the frontier
at the Yalu River. The Korean peninsula is likely to remain a bubbling
cauldron.
Closer
to home for China are Hong Kong and Taiwan. Since July 1997 Hong Kong has been
a “Special Administrative Region” under the so-called “one-country-two-systems”
regime. While Hong Kong has a degree of autonomy, and retains the rule of law,
it has become highly dependent economically on China, including in tourism,
which has, in turn, spurred a considerable degree of anti-mainland China
sentiment. Hong Kongers chafe at the Chinese leash, and demonstrators demand
democracy. The test may come in 2017 when, as earlier promised by Beijing, Hong
Kongers expect universal suffrage in the election of their chief executive. The
incumbent, pro-Beijing tycoon C.Y. Leung, is deeply unpopular, arising from the
perception that he is catering to the Hong Kong elite and Beijing, while
ignoring the concerns of the Hong Kong citizenry.
Similarly
China has been a huge boon to the Taiwanese economy; some 10 percent or more of
the Taiwanese population, 2.5 million in all, live, work and make money in
mainland China; Taiwanese companies, including Foxconn and others, account for
a large proportion of China’s exports; mainland Chinese visitors are a bonanza
to the local tourism industry. While Taiwan’s own economy flounders and would
be floundering even more were it not for China, a significant number of
Taiwanese ferociously wish to preserve their identity and autonomy — as
illustrated in recent massive demonstrations in Taipei, including occupation of
parliament, staged in protest at the proposed China-Taiwan cross-strait
agreement on trade in services. President Ma Ying-jeou, who campaigned on a
platform of closer relations with Beijing, is a lame duck.
At home,
or so official Beijing policy upholds, there are strong separatist movements,
not only in Tibet, but arguably far more alarming for Beijing in the western
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Whereas Tibetan pro-independence separatists
engage mainly in self-immolation, Muslim Uyghur nationalists have resorted to
terrorist acts that have left scores of people dead or injured. Chinese
authorities can’t help but worry about Xinjiang’s ties with global networks of
Islamic organizations.
The
Sino-centricity of this age is not limited to China’s neighborhood. Economies
in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America have become highly dependent on
the Chinese locomotive, whether in terms of exports, especially commodities,
including energy; investments; and development assistance. China’s multi-billion
dollar investment in a Pan-East African railway eventually linking Kenya,
Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and South Sudan is one of many examples.
A
Chinese economic crisis or hard landing would have deleterious consequences for
many economies. As the saying now goes: If China sneezes, the world will catch
pneumonia. This also applies to the industrialized economies.
Japan,
the European Union and the United States all, in different but significant
ways, have “pivoted” their economies towards China. China is Japan’s biggest
trading partner. Germany exports more to China than it does to the United
States. Chinese firms are saving failing French companies — consider recent
Chinese investments in Peugeot and Club Med. The United States depends on China
to finance its debt at the macroeconomic level, and American universities
relish all the massive fees they collect from Chinese students at a more micro
level.
This is
the world stage in the early 21st century. The United States, long accustomed
to the limelight, must now share this with China. Does China have a script?
Indeed is China one actor or are there several actors within China seeking to
write the scripts? Today, no questions are more burning than these.
Jean-Pierre
Lehmann is emeritus professor, IMD; founder, The Evian Group; visiting
professor at Hong Kong University and at NIIT University, Neemrana, Rajasthan;
and co-author with John Haffner and Tomas Casas i Klett of “Japan’s Open
Future: An Agenda for Global Citizenship.”
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