Hyperbole and daydreaming have been
two distinguishing traits of Indian foreign policy under Prime Minister
Narendra Modi’s administration. The government resorts to unreal exaggeration
to emphasize the real situation, while the reality gets blurred and often gets
substituted by a visionary fantasy, especially one of happy thoughts, hopes or
ambitions.
Nowhere is this more evident than
when it comes to Modi’s policies toward China. It’s time to abandon the
three-year-old notion that calibrated moves to create irritants in the
bilateral relationship will incrementally compel Beijing to negotiate on
India’s terms.
The assumptions on which Indian
policies toward China have been predicated – the US “pivot to Asia” – have come
unstuck. Yet, Modi’s government is unsure how to adjust to the shift in
Washington’s Asia strategies under Donald Trump.
There are three four major templates
where adjustments are needed. But, fundamentally, India needs to think through
a new strategy toward China.
The Modi government gleefully
adopted an idea (which was originally handed down by the Obama administration)
that India deserved to seek membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group —
nations that have agreed to a set of rules to prevent proliferation of
materials used to build nuclear weapons.
In all probability, the Obama
administration could not have overlooked that China would take a principled
opposition to the idea, given India’s refusal to sign the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Again, the Modi government and the
Obama administration embarked on a joint venture to get the Pakistani terrorist
Masood Azhar included in the UN watchlist. This was even though China’s consent
as a veto-holding member of the Security Council would be needed for that,
which was unlikely to be forthcoming given the imperatives of China’s own
cooperation with the Pakistani military on counter-terrorism.
Modi himself, surprisingly enough,
raised both issues – NSG membership and Azhar – with Xi Jinping in two separate
meetings and thereafter Delhi publicized these highly sensitive exchanges that
were of a confidential nature. The intention was apparently to corner Beijing.
Meanwhile, a third issue appeared in
the nature of India’s opposition to the US$54 billion China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor. The Modi government blithely resurrected what had been up until two
years ago a mere propaganda plank – namely, India’s notional claim to Pakistan-occupied
Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan.
The Modi government made it an issue
of territorial sovereignty and went on to allege that China had violated Indian
sovereignty by implementing the CPEC.
These irritants and the ensuing
steady decline in India-China relations gave a raison d’etre to the pro-US
tilt in the Modi government’s foreign policies. The Obama administration
happily played along.
The Modi government was confident
that under a Hillary Clinton presidency, the US pivot strategy in Asia would
get a new cutting edge and that Beijing would eventually have no option but to
compromise with India’s tough line.
Incredibly enough, just a fortnight
before last November’s US election, the Modi government hosted an
unprecedented visit by the then-American ambassador Richard Verma to Tawang in
Arunachal Pradesh, the disputed border region with China. Delhi also taunted
Beijing by disclosing six months in advance that an official visit by the Dalai
Lama to Arunachal Pradesh was also on the cards for April.
Delhi hoisted the petard to signal
to Beijing that there was going to be big trouble once Clinton was sworn in as
president.
Alas, the calculus has dramatically
shifted. Hillary and Verma have gone into retirement. And Trump is jettisoning
the pivot strategy and is eagerly planning a meeting with Xi to explore the
terms of a brave new Sino-American engagement that boosts his “America First”
agenda.
A historic meeting between Trump and
Xi that could rewrite the power dynamic in Asia is on the horizon.
To be sure, the Modi government also
began a corresponding move to switch to non-belligerent mode vis-à-vis China.
Hyperbole of another kind stressing “convergence” with China even where none
exists – such as over Afghanistan – has taken over.
But on Friday, the foreign ministry
in Beijing drew the red line:
The Indian side knows very well the
seriousness of the Dalai issue and the sensitiveness of the boundary question.
Under such circumstances, India’s invitation to the Dalai Lama to the disputed
areas between China and India will bring severe damage to peace and stability
of the border areas and China-India relations.
China is firmly opposed to the Dalai
Lama’s activities in the disputed areas between China and India and has
expressed its concern to the Indian side several times. We urge again the
Indian side to honor its commitments on the Tibet-related issues, follow the
important agreement between the two sides on the boundary question, refrain
from actions that would further complicate the question, not provide a stage
for the anti-China separatist activities of the Dalai group, and ensure the
sound and steady growth of China-India relationship.
At the same time, veteran diplomat
Dai Bingguo floated
a seemingly conciliatory idea that the two countries could be at the “gate” of
a final settlement of the border dispute as a whole if only India “takes care
of China’s concerns” over Tawang in an overall spirit of “meaningful and
mutually acceptable adjustments to their respective positions on the boundary
question in order to reach a package settlement.”
How this complex mix pans out
remains uncertain. The Dalai Lama could always fall sick and plead inability to
travel to Arunachal Pradesh. However, Beijing has thrown the gauntlet at Modi.
Beijing seems to be saying that if
Modi is the strong man he claims he is, and can take difficult decisions, why
settle for a mere shadow play involving the Dalai Lama? Why not take the bull
by its horns and come to the real stuff – the intractable border dispute
itself?
Paradoxically, while Modi is indeed
a strong man, he is not strong enough to jettison India’s unrealistic,
maximalist stance on the border dispute. A “package settlement” demands
give-and-take. But if Modi makes concessions, his acolytes in the Hindu
nationalist constituency and the Indian security establishment will feel let
down.
Simply put, Modi is not strong
enough to take bold, visionary decisions. He must, therefore, settle for
hyperbole and daydreaming as the stuff of India’s China policy.
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