The future
of the global maritime commons and the Asian balance of power is at stake in
the South China Sea. It’s valuable real estate: half of the world’s commercial
shipping and $5 trillion of goods passes through it, connecting the world’s
fastest growing economies. Beyond the economic and strategic value of the South
China Sea, the matter of how China reacts to international law offers insight
into what kind of a rising power China is, and what kind of norms it hopes to
shape for the region around it.
In his new book The Pivot: The Future of American
Statecraft in Asia, former Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell
presents a stark choice for Asia, largely shaped by great power competition
between the United States and China. Campbell sees China as the determining
factor: will its leaders end up adopting twenty-first-century rules and norms,
or will they overtly push for a return to nineteenth-century spheres of
influence?
The Permanent Court of Arbitration’s South China Sea ruling came and went
mostly as expected, overwhelmingly favoring Philippine claims and ruling
against China’s sweeping nine-dash line and “historical rights.” While many
pundits have belabored the South China Sea dispute as the litmus test
for the United States’s ability to preserve the status quo balance of power in
Asia, this echo chamber has muddied the waters and distracted from the larger
picture. The South China Sea case was just the first manifestation in a wider
contest over international law, values and the future of the global order
taking place in Asia.
The headline-grabbing decision by the
Permanent Court of Arbitration is about more than rocks and low-tide elevations
(LTEs); and it is not, for that matter, about sovereignty, as Chinese commentators have insisted.
Rather, the Philippines, in a deft nod to
the nuance of international law, petitioned the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea to determine whether certain rocks, reefs, and LTEs were
entitled to the legal definition of islands, and 200 nautical mile exclusive
economic zones (EEZs.)
The court rejected China’s definition of
its manmade maritime bases as islands, and nullified its vague claim to the
territories within the nine-dash line in which Beijing expresses so-called
“historic rights” to fishing grounds far south of its mainland. The ruling also
deemed China’s harassment of Philippine and Vietnamese fishermen within those
waters as contrary to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS.)
We have already seen China thumb its nose
at the decision of the UNCLOS tribunal; lean heavily on the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) to drive a wedge in the multilateral institution’s ability to
issue protesting statements against Chinese behavior; and ply weaker neighbors with economic enticements to
get its way. These are not indicators that Beijing will readily adhere to
existing international legal norms.
The current tension will test the
durability and flexibility of international law, and of China’s willingness to
accept the status quo or whether it will seek to revise the current
international order. As Sen. Ben Cardin noted recently in Foreign Policy, “Today
is a day for nations to choose between continuing to build a world of rules,
law, and order, or a return to a world of growing volatility add great power
politics.”
Values Still Matter
Alongside competition for resources such
as fisheries and hydrocarbon reserves and control of strategic chokepoints such
as the Strait of Malacca (currently jointly patrolled by Singapore, Malaysia
and Indonesia), China and the United States are locked in competition for
influence. The two espouse vastly different political systems, values, and
worldviews, and these manifest in U.S. preoccupations with Myanmar’s “opening”
to democracy on China’s border, Thailand’s turn toward China since its 2014
coup, and the foreign-policy alignment of traditionally neutral countries such
as Indonesia and India.
Great power competition also obtains in
U.S. support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade deal and its
not-so-subtle opposition to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(RCEP) backed by China. With these competing visions, Beijing and Washington
are seeking to write the “rules of the road” for twenty-first-century global
trade architecture. Their conflicting ambitions present divergent possibilities
for the region’s future, and reconciling these vastly different worldviews
remains a challenge for the next generation of Asia hands. Nor will they be
easy to retrench, since the governments of China, the United States and the
Philippines have staked a high degree of national credibility on claims to
national interests in this arena.
Nationalism: A Double-Edged Sword
China realizes that
nationalism is a powerful, unwieldy force, and one that could backfire on the
party if it is not careful to manage citizen calls for military action to
defend Chinese sovereignty against foreign “aggressors.” As an astute China
observer noted in Foreign Policy, “Beijing continues to
view threats to the country as originating more from within than from without.”
Pompous and bombastic statements from
hawkish voices have been made by those on both sides. PLA-Navy Admiral Wu
Shengli warned that “a minor incident. . . could spark
war,” and U.S. Admiral Harry Harris has urged Washington to confront Beijing’s “great
wall of sand.” However, there are opportunities for constructive dialogue.
China has signaled it is open to dialogue. China’s ambassador to the United
States, Cui Tiankai, told an audience at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies on the afternoon of the tribunal ruling, “China remains
committed to negotiations and consultations with other parties. This position
has never changed and will not change.”
For the United States, it will be crucial
to vocalize a broader regional strategy that aims to disabuse Chinese
perceptions of a containment strategy, while moving beyond the South China Sea
security dilemma. Senior National Security Council Director for Asia Daniel
Kritenbrink recently told an audience at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies: “We have an Asia strategy that includes the South China
Sea, and not vice versa.”
Looking beyond the recent arbitration
against Beijing’s claims, the United States would do well to engage China’s
leadership directly with frank high-level talks while pursuing an open regional
dialogue with partners in ASEAN.
Is Compromise Possible?
Ultimately, it will be important for the
two great powers to move beyond the South China Sea issue and deescalate
tensions in the wake of the tribunal’s ruling. Both sides should seek to return
to safe and predictable behavior. The jointly-signed 2014 Code for Unplanned
Encounters at Sea (CUES) forms a good basis for mutually reinforcing
responsible actions in this sphere. Beijing and Washington should also resume
their long ongoing talks on a bilateral investment treaty (BIT.)
China will likely aim to check more
extreme nationalist impulses ahead of the G20 summit it will host in Hangzhou
in September (indeed, it has already censored a spike in online messages
calling for armed conflict following the South China Sea ruling.) The upcoming
summit provides an important window of opportunity to pursue frank and
constructive dialogue at the senior-most level.
Southeast Asian voices have thus far
responded with aplomb, urging restraint. Most notably, Philippines President
Rodrigo Duterte tapped former president Fidel Ramos as special envoy to travel
to Beijing and pursue bilateral dialogue following the landmark decision.
The balance of power in East Asia hinges
on great power cooperation on a variety of international issues, from climate
change to international piracy and poverty alleviation. Indeed, as Chinese Admiral Wu Shengli told Xinhua, cooperation is “the only
correct option.” It would be a pity if the South China Sea became the impasse
preventing continued Sino-American entente and regional stability, which
benefits all countries.
Hunter Marston is a contributing member to
the Young Professionals in International Affairs Asia Pacific Subcommittee and
publishes frequently on Southeast Asia and international affairs
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