Russia’s campaign in Syria may signal that the heyday of the land attack
cruise missile is here at last.
Earlier this week, Russia stepped up its military operations in Syria by launching
a volley of land attack cruise missiles (LACMs) against Syrian opposition
fighters. This type of attack, similar to a multitude of attacks by the United
States, represents the culmination of several political and
technological trends, and could herald a moment that many analysts have
suggested is a long time in coming: the diffusion of precision LACMs across the
international system.
Reports
indicate that the Russian (apparently 3M-54 “Klub”) missiles were fired from
two missile boats operating in the Caspian Sea, meaning that they needed to
travel over a thousand miles of Iranian, Iraqi, and Syrian territory before
striking their targets. Launching the missiles from the Caspian may have
allowed Russia to avoid problems with the INF
Treaty, which restricts development of ground launched cruise
missiles.
LACMs,
whether launched from ships, aircraft, or ground installations, face different obstacles
than their anti-ship cousins. LACMs need to navigate complex land terrain,
avoid air defenses, and figure out how to differentiate their targets from the
rest of the landscape. Thus, using LACMs means overcoming fairly intense
communication, data, and processing problems. This is one reason why, despite the spread of basic
cruise missile technology around the world, very few states have
successfully integrated LACMs into their arsenals.
In the
form of the Tomahawk, LACMs have provided one of the foundations of American
military dominance since the first Gulf War. Launched from submarines and
surface ships, Tomahawks have enabled the U.S. to project power around the
world, whether or not it has aircraft available. Moreover, LACMs have allowed
the US to “kick in the door” of anti-access air defense networks, reducing the
danger to American planes and pilots.
The
cruise missile attacks don’t add anything in particular to Russia’s
capabilities in Syria; although Russian aircraft lack the precision munitions
of their Western counterparts, they can still conduct the kind of strikes, in
uncontested airspace, that the LACMs are supposed to replace. Rather, the
attacks represent a test of concept for the Russians, demonstrating to
themselves and others that they can fire precision LACMs from long distance.
That the missiles had to cross Iranian and Iraqi airspace helps even more, as
it demonstrates Russia’s political power in the region.
The
missiles themselves came from two types of Russian surface vessel, the 1500 ton
Gepard class frigate, and the 500 ton Buyan class corvette. Russia has already
exported both types, with six Gepards on their way to Vietnam to form the core
of the surface flotilla of the Vietnam People’s Navy. Russia has also
exported several versions of the 3M-54 “Klub”cruise missile, although almost
all of these are intended for anti-ship usage.
While
some have argued that the attack represents a sales pitch to potential LACM
customers, Russia may be reluctant to sell such capabilities to just anyone. In
particular, Beijing might resent the export of LACMs to countries like Vietnam,
which would undoubtedly plan to use them against Chinese targets. Moreover,
while the data and communications requirements necessary to successfully
fielding such systems have become more surmountable, it’s still easier for a
country like Russia to use them than for a country like Vietnam.
Still,
people are watching. Russia’s innovative use of Caspian seapower will almost
certainly generate greater interest in LACMs in the near future, with
potentially significant consenquences for how big countries relate to mid-sized
powers. By Robert Farley
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