While it is
certainly correct to suggest that the U.S. isn’t ‘sitting on its hands’ as its ‘Third Offset’
strategy clearly demonstrates, this argument can also be reversed. China has
flown hypersonic glide
vehicles, is deploying counter-stealth
radars, and has the world’s largest unmanned air
vehicle capability.
China is catching up in anti-submarine
warfare, with the deployment of fixed acoustic arrays and Jingdao class ASW corvettes, as well as new
maritime patrol aircraft. In air defence, China will likely acquire the S-400 SAM which is effective against
stealth aircraft, and long-range air combat capabilities epitomised by the J-20 can exploit the U.S. reliance on
forward-deployed AEW&C and airborne refuelling aircraft to further
reduce US ability to project airpower.
In terms of submarine quieting, nuclear submarines are always going to be
noisier than conventional boats. China deploys both the Yuan and Kilo
636 conventional submarines which are very
quiet and difficult to detect in acoustically challenging waters in the South
China Sea. The RAND report notes that “China’s newer submarines are becoming
quieter and better armed, and there is every reason to believe that their
capability to find and attack U.S. surface ships has vastly improved [since
1996].” It is the ability of these boats to fire long-range supersonic
anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), such as the new 290nm range YJ-18, that
according to Andrew Erickson allow China to “out-stick” the U.S. in long-range
anti-surface warfare. This submarine-ASCM combination is quite deadly.
It is correct to caution against seeing the PLA
as ten feet tall, but it would be equally unwise to dismiss China as
inconsequential in military-technological terms. China is rapidly catching up,
and what matters is where the PLA goes from here, and how Beijing uses its
growing military power across Asia.
In considering Paul Dibb’s analysis on the Chinese
People’s Liberation Army (PLA), I’d recommend anyone interested in the state of
China’s military start by reading Roger Cliff’s China’s
Military Power: Assessing Current and Future Capabilities.
Cliff argues that “…by 2020, the quality of China’s military doctrine,
equipment, personnel and training will likely be approaching, to varying
degrees, those of the US and other Western militaries.”
Although prevailing weaknesses in
organizational structure, logistics and organizational culture will limit the
effectiveness of PLA weapons and platforms, “defeating China in these scenarios
[Taiwan and South China Sea] could nonetheless be difficult and costly for the
United States’ primarily as a result of the geographic advantages that China
enjoys, as well as specific systems capabilities.”
Finally, he suggests, “the 2020s are likely to be a time of power transition in
East Asia, from a region in which the United States has had the capability to
defend its allies against virtually any form of aggression, to one where China
has the capability to, at a minimum, contest control of the seas and airspace
and where an attempt to oppose a Chinese use of force will be dangerous and
costly for any country, including the United States.”
Cliff’s conclusion is also echoed in a
recent RAND report, “The US China Military Scorecard,” which
argues that China is catching up to the U.S., is becoming more assertive and
confident, and has geography on its side. The report notes that “China [has
been able] to narrow the military gap in almost every area and move ahead in
some” and that the “overall capability trend lines are moving against the
United States.” The report also highlights the speed of change in
China’s military: it’s pushing forward in key capability areas and its
modernization is occurring more rapidly than that of the U.S. China is
leapfrogging, whilst the U.S. is plodding.
These two accounts suggest worrying trends
and highlight that an analysis of the PLA which is based on superficial
glimpses of selected areas of capability misses the bigger picture. The speed
of China’s military modernization, its sustained investment in terms of
double-digit spending levels, and the types of capabilities it is acquiring
highlight China’s strategic objective of eroding America’s
military–technological advantage so that Beijing may resolve territorial
disputes and ensure the success of the China Dream.
Even though China does face real domestic
challenges, so does the U.S. in the form of growing national debt and
destructive political partisanship in Washington that together reduces its
ability to sustain defence spending in coming years to
offset Chinese capability growth. That’s occurring as security risks in Europe and the Middle East multiply to impose greater
burdens on shrinking forces. The end result is reduced
U.S. readiness and overall effectiveness at a critical time later this decade.
Dismissal of PLA capabilities seems to
lack operational context and overlook PLA capabilities now in service. A key
emerging issue is the survivability of naval surface forces in
the face of PLA anti-access-area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. Here PLA ability
to wage information warfare against vital U.S. C4ISR networks through
counter-space operations with ASATs, integrated network-electronic warfare
(INEW), and cyber warfare need to be considered more deeply as winning the information battle against China is vital
to countering their A2/AD capabilities. The RAND report notes that Chinese
offensive counterspace capability, for example, is growing faster than the U.S.
defensive counter-space options. There may be technological silver
bullets to mitigate such developments but they must first be funded through to
operational status, and then proven to work in battle. Asia Times
No comments:
Post a Comment