Shinzo Abe wants to
draw Australia into a much closer defence and strategic partnership with Japan.
This is the key message in the Japanese Prime Minister’s visit to Canberra
today. The big question for Australia is whether we should to agree to this. Mr
Abbott seems to think we should, but he might well be wrong.
We need to look at
the context to see why. Last week, in a decisive shift from Japan’s unique
brand of pacifism, Mr Abe removed key restrictions on Japanese military
operations. In future, under a new policy of "collective
self-defence", Japan’s armed forces will be able fight alongside allies
against a common foe.
Now Mr Abe is looking
for allies to fight alongside. He has already found the common foe. His
historic and highly controversial step to collective self-defence has not been
taken so that Japan can do more peacekeeping or disaster relief. It is in
response to the rise of China.
As China’s power
grows it is becoming more threatening to Japan, and America appears more
reluctant to confront China on Japan’s behalf. The Senkaku/Diaoyu crisis makes
this very clear. Japan therefore fears that the old policy of relying on America
to protect it from China won’t work as well in future.
That is why Mr Abe
wants to expand Japan’s ability to defend itself, and recruit new partners to
help. He has the Philippines, Vietnam and India in mind, and he wants Australia
in there too. So let’s be quite clear what this week’s visit means, behind the
diplomatic circumlocutions and the promises to help with things like
submarines. Mr Abe wants Australia to become Japan’s ally against China.
Mr Abbott’s
enthusiastic support for Mr Abe’s polices, and his eagerness to build closer
defence links, suggests he wants the same thing. That is certainly how his
words and actions will be read in Beijing, Tokyo and Washington.This is why we
should be careful.
There is no doubt
that China’s rise poses real security concerns for Japan, which require big
policy changes. Certainly, Japan has a perfect right to do what is needed to
protect its own security. And Mr Abbott is right to say that, 70 years after
the war and with a record of good international citizenship, there is no reason
to fear resurgent militarism despite Mr Abe’s desire to whitewash past
misdeeds.
But that leaves two
big questions to be answered. First, is it wise for Japan to seek security by trying to build a coalition of regional allies against
China? Probably not: it is hard to see that the best way to build a stable
future for Japan is to divide Asia into mutually-hostile armed
blocs.
Second, even if its
works for Japan, would Abe’s plan work for us? One obvious problem is that it
will damage our relations with China, which is not something we should do
lightly. But fear of displeasing Beijing is not the only reason to be careful
here. We need to ask: would Australia be more secure if it was tied more
closely to Japan on strategic matters as Japan’s relationship with China
worsens? Will Australia be more secure is we see Asia divided into hostile
blocs such as these? And how sure are we that our interests will always align
with Japan’s over coming decades – especially if Japan’s alliance with America
grows weaker?
There is no sign that
Mr Abbott has considered any of these questions. One reason might be that he
simply does not understand what’s happening in Asia today, and so he doesn’t
really understand what Mr Abe is after. This might seem hard to believe, but Mr
Abbott often speaks as if he simply does not accept that strategic tensions are
growing. For example he told a Washington audience recently that America should
not worry about China’s rise because it is not a strategic rival. I doubt Mr
Abe would agree.
A second possibility
is that Mr Abbott is just pretending not to understand. He does understand what
is going on in Asia, and has decided that, as regional strategic rivalries
escalate, Australia’s best move is to spur them on – not just by strengthening
our alliance with America, but by becoming Japan’s ally against China.
One wonders whether
he could really have thought through what that would mean in practice. For
example, has he considered how Australia would respond in the event of a
China-Japan clash over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands? The government has refused
to reply to recent awkward questions about this. But, while it is quite right
not to comment on such things publicly, it would be extremely irresponsible not
to have thought about it very carefully in private. After all, even the most
sober analysts agree that a clash could break out at any time, that America
would immediately be drawn in and that Australia would very quickly receive a
request for help from Washington, and from Tokyo.
Mr Abe of course
hopes that Australia would say yes. Securing that kind of support from
Australia is the whole point of his diplomacy this week. But what does Mr
Abbott think? Would he really be willing to take Australia to war with China to
defend Japan’s claim to these rocks? And if he wouldn’t, is he wise to talk and
act as if he would? Because that is what he’s doing with Mr Abe this
week.
Hugh White is an Age
columnist and professor of strategic studies at the Strategic and Defence
Studies Centre, ANU.
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