China bashers in Washington
are "baying for blood" regarding China's behaviour in the South China
Sea. Although it may be tempting for the US to respond aggressively, the
negative consequences of doing so may well outweigh the positives.
Specifically, some US
officials and many politicians and analysts say America should stand up to
China on its "reclamation" (some call it island building),
militarisation and imposition of navigational restrictions around features
there. In response to the growing chorus of calls for action, US Secretary of
State John Kerry told an Asean-hosted meeting of the region's foreign
ministers, including Wang Yi that, "The United States will not accept
restrictions on freedom of navigation and overflight, or other lawful uses of
the sea."
Going further, US Defence
Secretary Ashton Carter ordered the US military to develop options for
assertive freedom of navigation operations with regard to the features China
has "reclaimed". In such operations, US military assets would
penetrate China's supposed 12-nautical-mile territorial seas and airspace
around and over the features. Penetration of the airspace would be a direct
challenge to China's claim of sovereignty. Sending a warship within the limit
would violate China's legal regime requiring prior notification and permission.
This US gambit
could result in serious international conflict, threatening regional peace
It must be very tempting for
the US navy to do this. Washington has already sent surveillance flights and a
top-of-the-line littoral combat ship close to the features - and publicised
that it did so. This must have embarrassed China's military and political
leadership.
But Beijing dug in its
heels. Indeed, these forays did little or nothing to dissuade China from its
construction activities on the features. However, it did announce that it has
ceased - perhaps completed for now - its "reclamation" programme.
Nevertheless, many US and foreign critics want more, and more aggressive,
challenges. This is not a good idea.
First, it is not clear that
China does or will claim maritime zones from submerged features it has
"reclaimed". Moreover, the much publicised "warnings" to a
US Poseidon P8A surveillance overflight - and to previous Philippine air force
flights - may have been for them to avoid a "safety zone" of 500
metres allowed by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea around
artificial structures. Also, sailing a warship or flying a warplane into or
over the territorial sea to demonstrate the right of free navigation could be
construed as a threat to use force - a possible violation of the UN Charter and
the Law of the Sea - and at the least not a positive example of peaceful
resolution of disputes. The US seems divided as to what to do, and so far its
military assets have stayed outside the 12-nautical-mile zone - much to the
chagrin of anti-China activists.
But this is a minor squabble
compared with the more fundamental strategic issues. The main purpose behind a
public American challenge would be to dissuade China from restricting foreign
military activities, and from "militarising" the features.
But doing so may well blow
up in Washington's face. Beijing may not back off and instead confront the US
with its own ships and aircraft. What if there is an accident or
miscalculation? Perhaps US policymakers think this unlikely, and they may be
right. But what if it did happen?
More worrying: what if
Beijing thinks the US will not go to the mat over this issue and pushes back,
hard? The US would suddenly be faced with a critical dilemma of its own making
- either risk escalating a crisis or stand down. The latter would demonstrate
weakness, damage its reputation and raise doubt over its commitment to its
allies. The US may underestimate the zeal of China's leadership to maintain its
legitimacy. China has publicly positioned its sovereignty and claims in the
South China Sea as a matter of redemption for its "century of
humiliation". Obviously, this will make it very difficult for the
leadership to back down.
So this US gambit could
result in serious international conflict, threatening regional peace. Is it
worth the risk? Some Southeast Asian nations might not think so.
But if the US doesn't
confront China militarily, what should it do? Whatever it does, it will not
placate the bellicose anti-China crowd.
Basically the US needs to
strike a "grand bargain" with China. It should use the opportunity of
President Xi Jinping's visit to Washington next month to do so, or at least put
the elements in place. Conceptually, the US has to accept and accommodate a
major role for China in Asian security. In return, China has to do the same
regarding a continuing US role and military presence in the region. In
practical terms, the US should put less emphasis on the military dimension of
its rebalance to Asia. As a corollary, the US could diminish or cease its
provocative, close-in surveillance of China. These probes antagonise the PLA
and are probably unnecessary. China would, in turn, not overtly
"militarise" the features and more importantly not declare an air
defence identification zone in the Spratlys. A modus operandi for air-to-air
encounters would be agreed, resulting in a mutually respectful stand-off.
But the current US
anti-China drum beating is unlikely to be muffled - especially during the
presidential campaign - and China's leaders must understand this. Nor will
Chinese nationalists fade away, and the US must understand that.
Advocates, analysts and
decision-makers on both sides need to look beyond their narrow nationalist
pride and predilections for confrontation and consider the implications of
their actions for the region and its people. If they do not, Asia and Asians
are in for a rather rough 21st century.
Mark J. Valencia is an adjunct senior scholar at
the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, Haikou, China
This article
appeared in the South China Morning Post print edition as Feeling the heat
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