Timor-Leste started the year
in political chaos and ended it with a return to the confrontational politics
of the past. Cooperation between the National Congress for Timorese
Reconstruction (CNRT) and the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor
(Fretilin), which had together run the country since 2015 under a ‘government
of national unity’, was shattered following the July 2017 elections.
The aftermath
of the elections saw Timor-Leste enter 2018 with a
majority opposition alliance, which blocked the minority Fretilin government’s
budget and called on President Francisco ‘Lu-Olo’ Guterres to install it in
office. Guterres — who is also President of Fretilin and was elected with key
cross-party support in the final months of the government of national unity —
refused. Instead, he called fresh elections for May 2018.
The 2018
elections returned the opposition Alliance of Change for Progress (AMP)
coalition — comprised of the CRNT, the People’s Liberation Party and the Kmanek
Haburas Unidade Nasional Timor Oan (or KHUNTO) — as the new government.
But following allegations of corruption against eight proposed ministers,
Guterres refused to swear them in.
Three other
proposed ministers refused to be sworn in as a show of support for their
colleagues, leaving Timor-Leste without ministers of finance, health and
natural resources, among others. Guterres also refused to enact the
government’s proposed 2019 budget. The government in turn refused to approve a
visit by Guterres to the Vatican, saying that domestic matters took precedence.
Guterres’
rejection of the budget reflected his concern over Timor-Leste’s financial
sustainability and opposition to the government’s use of central bank funds to
further its ambitious Tasi Mane development
project. The government required an unavailable two-thirds majority to overrule
the President’s veto.
The
government intended to establish a liquefied natural gas (LNG) processing plant
on Timor-Leste’s Tasi Mane south coast to kick-start a petrochemical industry
that could provide jobs and income into the country’s future. But the Greater
Sunrise joint venture partners, who hold the rights to develop the energy
reserves, rejected the proposal as unfeasible. A major issue was the plan to
build a 150-kilometre undersea pipeline, which would have had to cross the
deep-sea Timor Trough.
The
Timor-Leste government spent US$350 million in October 2018 to purchase
ConocoPhillips’ 30 per cent stake in Greater Sunrise. And in late November, an
agreement was reached for the government to buy Royal Dutch Shell’s 26.56 per
cent stake for US$300 million, bringing the government’s total holding in the
project to 56.56 per cent.
Yet
Timor-Leste’s 2005 Petroleum Activities Law restricts the state to a maximum of
20 per cent equity in the project. Timor-Leste may need to sell some of its
stake to a new partner, possibly from China or South Korea.
The
remaining Greater Sunrise partners, Woodside Petroleum and Osaka Gas, oppose
the idea of a south coast processing facility. If the plan is to proceed, this
could leave the roughly US$5 billion cost of development to the Timor-Leste
government, or to new partners.
The
government’s purchase of a stake in Greater Sunrise followed the establishment
of a permanent maritime boundary between Australia and Timor-Leste in March 2018. The
agreement allocated 70 per cent of the revenue from Greater Sunrise to
Timor-Leste if the LNG is processed there, or 80 per cent if it is processed at
an offshore facility.
Processing
the LNG onshore is a key ambition of government Special Representative Xanana
Gusmao, who was the country’s first president and second prime minister. As
Timor-Leste’s key political figure, Gusmao coordinated opposition to the former
Fretilin government and brought together the parties of the 2018 AMP
government.
The
governments that Gusmao led or effectively controlled since 2007 have withdrawn
well beyond sustainable amounts from the country’s US$17 billion sovereign
wealth fund — the Petroleum Fund. Successive budgets have spent between two and
three times the sustainable limit, meaning the government has drawn on capital
as well as interest from the fund.
Income into
the fund is reducing as oil fields in the Timor Sea dry up, with the last field
expected to close by 2022. The Petroleum Fund currently pays for 95 per cent of
all state activities, which in turn supports more than 70 per cent of all
economic activity. Yet at current rates of government spending, the Petroleum
Fund will be fully depleted before the end of the 2020s. This outlook has led
to — and in turn, is exacerbated by — the government’s push to gamble on
investing in Greater Sunrise and the Tasi Mane project.
The high
cost of this development set against a limited financial reserve and its
questionable prospects of success have motivated Fretilin and the incumbent
Guterres to be more financially cautious. Meanwhile, historical disputes
between Gusmao and the three parties he was able to bring into alliance against
Fretilin continue to mark their relations, only compounded by increasingly
stark differences in their approach to how best secure Timor-Leste’s challenged
future.
Damien
Kingsbury is Personal Chair and Professor of International Politics at Deakin
University.
This article
is part of an EAF special feature series on
2018 in review and the year ahead.
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