Chinese
President Xi Jinping is now officially the most powerful Chinese leader since
Mao Zedong who died more than 40 years ago after the National People’s Congress
voted overwhelmingly in favour of a constitutional amendment which gives Xi the
right to remain in office indefinitely. Not that there was any doubt about it
but when it finally happened it seemed to be marking another red line in
China’s evolution as the pre-eminent global power of our times.
It was only last month that China’s ruling Communist Party had moved a
proposal to remove a constitutional clause limiting presidential service to
just two terms in office. This is one of the most significant developments in
global politics today given China’s growing heft in the global order.
Xi began his second term as head of the party and military last October
at the end of a once-every-five-years party congress. His real source of
authority emanates from him being the CPC’s General Secretary — a post that has
no term limit — as well as being the head of the powerful Central Military
Commission. His political doctrine, “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with
Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”, is now part of the amended
constitution. This takes China back to the good old days of Mao when he was the
supreme leader, deciding on the fate of millions based on his whims and
fancies. Xi’s elevation also marks a significant change in Chinese
political thought. Recognising the dangers of one man rule, Deng Xiaoping got
the limit of two five-year presidential terms written into China’s constitution
in 1982 after Mao’s death. That seems to have been put aside for now.
There have been some isolated critical
voices in China, mostly on social media who have compared their changing
political system to that of North Korea or underlined the dangers of a Mao-type
cult of personality, but mostly there has been support for the move in the name
of protecting the country’s long-term stability. Some have argued that as Xi’s
anti graft movement and his key Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are still in
their infancy, and whether such a move was necessary.
But let there be no doubt that this is all about Xi’s ambition. In a
marathon address to the 19th party congress last October, Xi had unveiled his
vision of China’s future of achieving ‘moderate’ prosperity in the next four
years, and emerging as an advanced socialist nation by 2050.
Underlining that China would pursue its own path of developing
“socialism with Chinese characteristics” and inviting “peoples of all countries
to join China’s effort to build a common destiny for mankind and enduring peace
and stability,” he was building a case for the “Beijing Consensus” as an
alternative to the so-called Washington Consensus.
Like the rest of the world, India will also be affected by this change
in manifold ways. New Delhi has no option but to deal pragmatically with
whoever is ruling China, given the enormous stakes in Sino-Indian relations.
Yet at a time when Sino-Indian bilateral ties are passing through one of their
worst times, a centralising figure in China’s governing system will only
complicate matters.
China has always managed to have a consistent strategic approach towards
India — to contain Indian within the confines of South Asia by assisting
Pakistan to balance India. It has refused to recognise New Delhi’s global
aspirations and not budged an inch on key issues pertaining to Indian
interests. But the growing power disparity between India and China as well as
lack of any effective leverage vis-à-vis China has also meant that India has
not been in any position to challenge China.
The Modi government started off promisingly by resetting the terms of
engagement with China. Its principled position on the BRI has been effective in
shaping the global discourse and its effective handling of last year’s Doklam
crisis enhanced its stature. But there is a danger now of slipping back into
the old mode of China policy where a mistaken belief that only if India can
brush aside the hard issues, a semblance of normalcy will return to Sino-Indian
ties.
It is a myth and especially now when Xi who remains unambiguous about
his desire to make China a global superpower and has all the time and resources
at his command to do so. It is highly unlikely that New Delhi can attain a
win-win outcome from Beijing.
Xi’s growing authority will mean that he will double down on his efforts
to militarise the Indian Ocean and expand Chinese influence in South Asia. His
pet project BRI will also see a renewed focus and Indian opposition will rankle
at his ambitious outreach. He will also wait to teach New Delhi a lesson for
what many in China feel was a diplomatic drubbing for Beijing in Doklam. And
this will happen when India goes into election mode and political bickering
will attain new heights.
The Indian political class is yet to learn to speak in one voice in
national security matters. How easy it is to divide the Indian polity was clear
when even at the height of the Doklam crisis, the leaders of India’s main
Opposition party decided to get a briefing from the Chinese Ambassador than its
own government! So as Xi’s power rises to its zenith, there are many reasons to
worry, but mostly it is India’s own ability to get its own house in order which
should concern us the most.
This article originally appeared in DNA.
Observer Research Foundation
By Harsh V. Pant
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