On Oct. 9, as many as 500 to 800 people armed with
knives, slingshots and a small collection of firearms launched three separate,
coordinated attacks on border police bases in northern Rakhine State, near
Myanmar's border with Bangladesh. Nine police officers and eight attackers were
killed, and at least 50 weapons and 10,000 rounds of ammunition were looted.
There have been several deadly clashes since, as the security forces attempt to
capture the attackers and retrieve the arms cache, with at least 22 further
casualties on both sides.
More than 90% of the population in this area is
from the long-oppressed minority Muslim Rohingya group. It now seems almost
certain that the attackers were mostly local people, probably with some form of
assistance from across the border in Bangladesh -- where many Rohingya have
sought refuge -- or possibly further afield.
How they were organized, and whether this
represents the emergence of a new mujahedeen armed group, or a local uprising
with no institutional structure, remain unclear. But the large number of
attackers and their sophisticated tactics showed an unprecedented level of
planning in a conflict that up to now has seen little sign of organized violent
resistance from the Rohingya.
The broader concern is that a new threshold of
violence has been passed, and that the years of oppression, resentment and
hopelessness among the Rohingya have morphed into a violent response. The idea
of organized resistance has been discussed as a theoretical option by some in
the Rohingya community since at least 2012. But the practical difficulties, a
majority view that violence would be counterproductive, and slivers of hope of
a better future under a new government militated against violence.
Over the last year, there has been a creeping
sense that nothing is going to change, and the escape valve of illegal
migration by boat to Malaysia has largely been closed following crackdowns
there and in Thailand. Faced with a grim reality today, and no sense of hope
for tomorrow, it is little wonder that radical solutions may have become more
appealing to some Rohingya.
Downward
spiral
The majority of this community and its religious
leaders continue to eschew violence. But the latest attacks, which appear to
have been several months in the preparation, threaten to draw the entire
population into a downward spiral of deadly confrontations, violent crackdowns
by the security forces and toxic relations between local communities and the
authorities.
There will be no winners, and ordinary Muslim
villagers will almost certainly be the biggest losers. The security forces do
not have the community relations in this area that would help them effectively
distinguish friend from foe. This means that all adult Muslim men will be
regarded with suspicion, and potentially suffer violations of their dignity and
rights, further polarizing the situation.
At a national level, the space for even
incremental progress on Rakhine has likely all but closed, and Suu Kyi's
efforts to steer the country in a more moderate, tolerant direction have been
dealt a serious setback. The recent attacks, whether found to be linked to
regional or global jihadi movements or not, will amplify the existing angst
over an Islamic extremist threat to the country, and a pervasive distrust of
Muslims among the Buddhist majority. Radical Buddhist nationalist groups -- who
have been on the back foot since the elections -- will be emboldened and are
already using the incident for fearmongering. It will now be much harder for
moderate voices to be heard.
At the same time, and unconnected with the
situation in Rakhine, armed conflict is escalating again in Myanmar's
northeast, imperilling the peace process. Suu Kyi's peace initiative got off to
a fairly good start after her administration took office earlier this year. Her
"Panglong-21" peace conference in early September was important for
its broad inclusion of armed groups, something the previous government had not
been able to achieve.
Yet, the
challenges are enormous. Many groups attended not out of support for the
process, but because they considered they had no alternative given Suu Kyi's
wide domestic and international support and legitimacy. Many felt they were
treated poorly and the conference was badly organized. The largest opposition
armed group, the United Wa State Party, sent only a junior delegation that
walked out on the second day.
The
escalation of fighting in northern Kachin and Shan states in recent weeks,
including use of air power and long-range artillery by the Myanmar military,
has further eroded trust -- particularly as civilian targets have been hit.
Photos of a dead child, and others being treated for gruesome injuries in a hospital
across the border in China, have been widely shared and prompted great anger in
minority communities.
From
here, the peace process gets much more difficult. The announced scheduling of
further Panglong-21 conferences every six months (the next in February 2017)
imposes a rigid timeframe that limits the flexibility required to overcome
obstacles, and provides an easy target for spoilers. It will take difficult
negotiations to convince most armed groups to sign the Nationwide Ceasefire
Agreement, a necessary condition for participation in future peace conferences
and related political dialogs that has been clearly articulated by both the
government and military. So far, only eight out of 18 groups have signed.
Devastated lives
The
importance of making progress should be compelling for all sides. The current
government's five-year term may be the best chance for a negotiated political
settlement to almost 70 years of armed conflict that has devastated the lives
of minority communities and held back Myanmar as a whole. Suu Kyi has expressed
firm support for a federal solution and has unparalleled political authority to
deliver it, particularly with the Burman majority.
Now is
the time to seize the opportunity and start discussing the contours of that
deal. But the lack of trust is stifling progress and the complexities of a
peace process with at least 18 armed actors, pursuing diverse agendas, is
overwhelming. Optimism for substantial progress over the next few months is
starting to recede.
For
Rakhine State and the peace process, relations between the civilian and
military branches of government are critical. Earlier concerns that there might
be confrontational relations between the two, or that the military might
actively seek to undermine Aung San Suu Kyi, have receded. It is now clear that
there is reasonably constructive cooperation between her and the
commander-in-chief. Rather, the concern is that the implicit basis for those
constructive relations is that neither side interferes in the other's domain. Some
armed groups have stated that the upswing in clashes is an attempt by the
military to use its might to pressure them to sign the ceasefire agreement. The
reality is likely more worrying: that the close, strategic civil-military
coordination required under such a scenario does not yet exist.
Rather,
the military feels relatively unconstrained in pursuing its security agenda --
which would mean that if its actions start to undermine any prospects of
progress in the peace process, as they probably already are doing, there is no
one to pull it back. The bottom line is that only with very close, day-to-day
coordination between Suu Kyi and the commander-in-chief -- or, even better,
civilian control of the military -- would it be possible to calibrate a good cop/bad
cop approach. Without it, the current escalation in fighting represents a grave
threat to the process.
In
Rakhine, the actions of the security forces over the coming days and weeks will
be critical in whether a downward spiral of confrontation and violence
develops. Here too, Suu Kyi has given the right messages, but lacks the ability
to directly calibrate the security response to ensure it is consistent with her
political objectives.
The
attacks in Rakhine and difficulties of the peace process are a reminder that
the biggest challenges facing Myanmar are not easily fixed by a new government
armed with good intentions and better policies. They are deep structural
problems that have bedeviled the country since independence. This harsh reality
is now coming to the fore. The new government's honeymoon period is over.
Richard Horsey is an independent political analyst based in Yangon.
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