Less than six months into his tenure
as President of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte has embarked on what even he
considers to be risky foreign policy moves. In September 2016, he declared that
he is about to ‘cross the
Rubicon’ in the Philippines’ relationship with the United
States.
The ‘crossing’ Duterte refers to is his
plan to enhance the Philippines’ relationships with Russia and China. Plans to
strengthen ties with Russia extend into both the defense and economic spheres.
In the military realm, Duterte revealed his
intentions to purchase weapons from Russia. In return, Russia will give the
Philippines favorable credit conditions, with repayment not expected until
2025.
Russia stands to benefit from a closer Manila–Moscow defense relationship,
which could provide Russia with extra leverage in the South China Sea dispute.
Deputy Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov barely mentioned the South China Sea
tensions at this year’s Shangri-la conference in Singapore. Russia’s position
on the dispute is that it is not prudent to ‘internationalize’ it beyond the
scope of regional actors directly involved. This is consistent with Russia’s
stance that countries should not intervene in the internal or bilateral affairs
of other countries.
At the same time, Russia has made clear
its desire to affirm its status as a global great power. Involvement in the
South China Sea is critical for Russia to realize this aim. But Russia will not
be viewed as a credible player in the South China Sea if it only acts as a
surrogate or supporter for China.
So rapprochement with the Philippines
opens up an opportunity for Russia to have a voice in the dispute without
simply riding on China’s coattails. Russia hopes to act as an intermediary, but
this can only be realized if Russia acts in a balanced manner between China and
the other countries involved.
The prospect of closer ties between the
Philippines and Russia was reported just before Duterte took
office and his administration has wasted no time in acting upon this
opportunity. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov met his Filipino counterpart Raymundo
Elefante on the sidelines of the Ar
my-2016 expo held in Moscow. The two sides
expressed interest in closer defense cooperation and enhanced dialogue on
regional and global security issues. Antonov also highlighted the need for a
legal and rules-based partnership in Philippines–Russia defense relations.
Duterte’s comments about ‘crossing the
Rubicon’ imply a zero-sum choice — that the Philippines are sealing their fate
by enhancing ties with Russia. But this notion is inaccurate for two main
reasons. First, the idea of closer Philippines–Russia defense cooperation is
not particularly new. And second, it could mark a shift away from unilateral
cooperation with the United States to a more diversified Filipino
foreign policy.
Countries have often faced difficulty when
including Russia while pursuing a multi-vectored foreign policy, particularly
in terms of formal integration. But in this case the Philippines is not
planning to accede to an institutional security framework. Instead the
Philippines is aiming to diversify its partners in a way that allows it to
expand its options, potentially running counter to both US and Chinese
interests.
In 2014 the Deputy Director of the Russian
Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, Konstantin Biryulin, stated that
the agency was considering supplying the Philippines with surface-to-air
missiles and radar systems. Biryulin cited the Philippines’ long, vulnerable
maritime border as well as Russian experience in dealing with elongated, porous
borders. The Philippines’ acquisition of such military hardware would likely be
directed toward China. So Russia as a potential supplier of military hardware
is acting as an extra resource — in addition to the United States — for the
Philippines to counter China militarily.
Growing closer to Moscow
is not a deal-breaker for Manila in terms of its relations with Washington.
Concurrently with the declared policy shift of closer ties to Russia, Duterte
has called for US
Special Forces to leave the Philippines. This is not the first time Philippines–US
defense relations have taken a downturn. Twenty-five years ago the US military
was expelled from Subic Bay naval base. But at the beginning of 2016, the
Philippines’ Supreme Court voted overwhelmingly to allow US forces
to return. Fluctuation is part of the Philippines–US defense relationship,
which is not consistent with the determinism implied in Duterte’s ‘Rubicon’
remark.
President Duterte’s overtures to Russia do
not constitute a zero-sum shift in Filipino foreign policy. Rather, it may
simply mean the start of a more multi-faceted outreach in defense affairs, in
which the Philippines includes Russia as a partner while balancing its ties to
the United States and China. Duterte may be driven by a desire to reduce
dependency on the United States. Yet he may have also calculated that as
tensions continue to grow, multilateralism could be the best way forward.
Anthony V. Rinna is an analyst on Russian foreign policy in East Asia for the
Sino-NK research group. He currently resides in South Korea.
This first appeared in East Asia Forum
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