China’s
threat perceptions are going to deepen. Nuclear modernization can now be
expected to be pushed higher on China’s policy agenda. THAAD, a common
threat to China and Russia, will be a litmus test of the Sino-Russian
strategic coordination and partnership. Their shared concerns over the US
unilateralism should bring the two countries to closer cooperation in military
technology.
The United States and South Korea have announced their decision to
deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in the U.S. Forces
Korea on the Korean peninsula.
The negotiations that began in February have successfully concluded.
The development has far-reaching consequences for the regional stability
in the Asia-Pacific and the global strategic balance as a whole.
Washington and Seoul rationalize their decision in terms of the nuclear
and missile threat posed by North Korea.
The plan is to deploy one Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
battery by end-2017, which comprises six mobile launchers, 48 interceptors,
airborne radar and fire control system. A Xinhua report on the development
explained that
- The THAAD’s radar can
locate missiles far beyond the DPRK (North Korean) territory, causing
China and Russia to repeatedly voice serious concerns over the deployment.
The X-band radar can spot missile as far as 2,000 km with forward-based
mode and 600 km with terminal mode. As the two have the same hardware, the
terminal mode, which South Korea allegedly plans to adopt, can be changed
into the radar with a much longer detectable range.
The US-South Korean joint statement maintains that the THAAD will not
target any other third country and will be operated only in response to the
North Korean threat.
But the argument will not be any more persuasive than the US’s claim
that its missile defense deployments in Central Europe are directed against the
threat posed by Iran and are not directed against Russia. Unsurprisingly, China
has reacted. A foreign ministry statement Friday said,
- The US and the
Republic of Korea, ignoring the clear position of other
interested countries, including China, have announced the deployment
of the US THAAD missile defense system in South Korea. The
Chinese side expresses its extreme dissatisfaction and strong protest
in this regard.
Beijing’s reference to “interested countries” means Russia. The joint
statement by Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir
Putin, which was issued after the latter’s visit to China on June 25, had
included a paragraph specifically on missile defense:
- With a view toward the
historical experience and practice of building a new type of great power
relations, and with a sense of historic responsibility for world peace and
humanity’s future, the two sides call on all nations of the world to …
deepen mutual understanding, coordination and cooperation on the
question of missile defenses, urge members of international society to be
prudent on the issues of deploying and beginning cooperation on missile
defenses, and oppose one country or group of countries unilaterally and
unlimitedly strengthening missile defenses, harming strategic stability
and international security. We stand for the collective confrontation of
the challenges and threats from ballistic missiles, preferring to confront
the proliferation of ballistic missiles within the framework of
international law and political diplomacy, where the security of one group
of nations cannot be sacrificed at the expense of another group
of nations.
To be sure, Moscow will share Beijing’s concern over the deployment of
THAAD in South Korea. What is at stake is not so much the technical
capabilities of the THAAD system – both Moscow and Beijing would know its
vulnerabilities – but about its upgrade in the future.
Russia and China suspect that the US intends to make them vulnerable to
a US first strike. As the Union of Concerned Scientists commented in a
recent report, it “isn’t the reality of the missile defense but the US’ dream
of missile defense” that would worry Moscow and Beijing.
Russia and China would have been content with the global strategic
balance resting on the idea of mutual vulnerability, which is after all the
basis of deterrence.
But they suspect that the US is focusing on them through the massive
decades-old missile defense program, with a view to realizing the dream of
‘nuclear superiority’, which remained elusive through the Cold War era.
What
lies ahead?
Nuclear modernization can now be expected to be pushed higher on China’s
policy agenda. Beijing would see the THAAD as a starting point for improved and
expanded US capabilities later.
China’s public rhetoric against the US’ missile defense, which used to
be muted in the past, has been sharply rising of late.
The bottom line is that the deployment of theatre missile defense
systems in Northeast Asia is becoming another major contentious issue between
Washington and Beijing.
Beijing will not be far off the mark in seeing the US decision on the
missile defense deployments in the Asia-Pacific in the context of the US’
broader re-balance strategy, which is a barely-concealed containment policy
toward China.
Indeed, China’s threat perceptions would deepen. The point is, once they
become operational, the US missile defense systems can threaten the very
credibility, reliability and effectiveness of China’s woefully inadequate
strategic nuclear arsenal.
The US’ ABM deployments in the border regions of Russia and China become
a litmus test of the Sino-Russian strategic coordination and partnership. Their
shared concerns over the US unilateralism should bring the two countries to
closer cooperation in military technology.
Technical assistance from Russia could be a game changer for China’s
nuclear modernization. On the other hand, economic factors are important for
Russia’s own R&D on future weapons development and here China can play a
big role in the funding of such programs.
The big question, however, remains: Would the two countries have the
strategic congruence for pooling their resources together to overcome US
missile defenses? For Russia, this is something like sharing its crown jewels.
At any rate, Russian Defence Ministry announced in May that the two
countries would hold their first-ever computer-assisted missile defence drill:
- The Russian and
Chinese defense ministers decided to hold the first Air and Space Security
2016 joint computer-assisted command and staff exercise in May 2016 on the
premises of the Central Research Institute of the Russian Defense
Ministry’s Aerospace Defense Force to practice missile defense. The
exercise will aim to practice combined operations of Russian and Chinese
air and missile defense task forces to provide protection from accidental
and provocative attacks of ballistic and cruise missiles.
Although the statement clarified that the drill was not directed against
any third country, a noted Chinese military commentator and retired PLA colonel
Yue Gang frankly admitted,
- THAAD is a common
threat to both China and Russia. This joint exercise will serve as a
warning to the US and also mark the beginning of the two countries’
military cooperation following their diplomatic consensus (over the
missile system).
Yue added that the combined military strength of China and Russia would
enable them to defend each other in the event of a missile attack.
In the final analysis, much would depend on the response routes Beijing
chooses. China has the economic wherewithal to embark on a nuclear
modernization drive both in qualitative and quantitative terms.
To be sure, the best and the brightest minds in the strategic community
in China would have begun applying to the vulnerabilities of China’s limited
nuclear retaliatory capabilities and the range of possible Chinese responses –
keeping in view their implications for regional security, Sino-US relations, as
well as for global arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.
A number of options are open for Beijing – increasing the number of
ICBMs, deploying decoys or mobile ICBMs, developing technical counter-measures
such as multiple re-entry vehicles, ‘space control’ (eg., anti-satellite system
capable of attacking the ABM) and so on.
Each one of these possible responses would have significant consequences
for arms control and non-proliferation.
Ambassador MK Bhadrakumar served as a career
diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service for over 29 years, with postings
including India’s ambassador to Uzbekistan (1995-1998) and to Turkey
(1998-2001). He writes the “Indian Punchline” blog and has written regularly
for Asia Times since 2001.
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