A look at what we might expect from
Beijing.
As I reported previously, on Wednesday Indonesia
destroyed a Chinese vessel caught fishing illegally in Indonesian waters near
the South China Sea, the first since President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo declared
war on illegal fishing when he came into office late last year.
How might we expect Beijing to react?
So far, the only publicly-confirmed reaction from
China has come from Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei, who said that
Beijing was concerned about the reports and was seeking clarification with
Jakarta.
“China is gravely concerned about relevant reports,
and is asking the Indonesian side to make clarifications,” foreign ministry
spokesman Hong Lei reportedly said.
“We hope that the Indonesian side can press ahead with
fishery cooperation in a constructive manner and safeguard the legitimate
rights and interests of Chinese companies.”
What might China do beyond this?
Though there is always a risk of incidents like these
eventually spiraling out of control, the most likely scenario is that Beijing
will register its concerns and both sides will work the issue out
diplomatically. It is unlikely to significantly damage the overall bilateral
relationship. Incidents of this sort have tended to be resolved in this way
even if they seem like flashpoints at the time.
For example, when, on June 20, 2009, eight boats
containing 75 Chinese fishermen were seized for infringing on Indonesia’s
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the South China Sea, an agreement was
eventually worked out between the two sides which saw the release of most of
the fishermen. That case is particularly relevant today since Indonesian media
reports suggest that the Chinese vessel sunk on Wednesday was one of those
seized in the 2009 incident. While Beijing is admittedly dealing with a
government in Jakarta now that is far pricklier when it comes to sovereignty
and territorial integrity, it is also true that the stakes are lower in this
case. The issue at hand is the sinking of an empty vessel rather than the welfare
of fishermen.
Furthermore, as I have written before, both sides
attach great importance to the Sino-Indonesian relationship. Ties have
blossomed over the past decade, with trade quadrupling to $66 billion and
investment increasing to $2 billion as both countries went from strategic
partners in 2005 to comprehensive strategic partners in 2013. People-to-people
relations have also expanded appreciably, while military ties have advanced,
albeit at a more cautious level.
Under Jokowi, the two sides have been looking at ways
to further solidify cooperation, and Indonesia’s enthusiasm for the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and ongoing conversations about how
Jokowi’s global maritime fulcrum doctrine can potentially complement Beijing’s
21st Century Maritime Silk Road idea suggest that there is at least some
promise there (See: “China and Indonesia Under
Jokowi: Show Me The Money”). Of course, as I have consistently
pointed out, there is still lingering distrust towards China in Indonesia and
outstanding concerns in several areas, including Beijing’s nine-dashed line
which encroaches into the waters surrounding Jakarta’s resource-rich Natuna Islands
(See: “No, Indonesia’s South China Sea
Policy Has Not Changed”). The point is that the relationship is
important enough for both sides cautious about letting irritants get in the way
of advancing ties even further.
In addition, as I noted in my earlier piece, Indonesia
has demonstrated great caution in the way it has gone about the sinking of this
first Chinese vessel. As opposed to other Asian states whose vessels were sunk
with immediate effect, Indonesia’s stance towards China evolved more gradually.
The seizure of several boats in December led the government to revoke a deal
signed with Beijing on cooperation in the fisheries sector in early 2015 before
the first actual sinking was carried out this week. The Chinese vessel was also
destroyed along with 41 vessels from other neighboring states, rather than
alone or in much smaller numbers as has been the case with other countries. In addition,
Indonesia’s Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Susi Pudjiastuti, was
careful to emphasize that the sinkings were not a show of force, but merely a
case of Indonesia enforcing its laws.
The more interesting and difficult
question is how this might affect unrealized cooperation going forward, rather
than cooperation that is already ongoing. This is particularly true in the
maritime domain, including in fisheries which Hong referred to. That will be
contingent on a number of other critical factors, including whether the sinking
of the Chinese vessel represents the beginning of a stricter Indonesian line
that we will see applied periodically moving forward, as it has been with other
countries. By Prashanth Parameswaran
Why Did Indonesia Just Sink a Vessel From China?
ReplyDeleteA brief look behind a significant development.
As I reported previously, on Wednesday Indonesia sank a Chinese vessel caught fishing illegally in Indonesian waters near the South China Sea, the first such instance since President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo declared war on illegal fishing The boat was among 41 vessels simultaneously destroyed to commemorate National Awakening Day, with the others being from neighboring states including the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.
But why did the Jokowi government choose to sink its first Chinese vessel now?
A standard reply from government officials would be that the sinking of the Chinese vessel, just like the sinking of any other vessel, was scheduled in line with legal proceedings. That is, the timing of the sinking of the empty Chinese vessel was dependent on when other legal issues were resolved via court proceedings and when the proper authorization was obtained.
It is certainly true that the legal aspect of this is significant. Close observers know there has been an ongoing debate about the extent to which Indonesian practices are conform with international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (See: “Explaining Indonesia’s ‘Sink The Vessels Policy’ Under Jokowi”). Thus far, Jakarta has displayed regard for the law even while carrying out its controversial policy.
ReplyDeleteBut it is also true that the legal argument leaves much left to be desired. First, it accounts neither for the clear differences in the way that these sinkings have been carried out nor Indonesia’s greater caution in dealing with China on this question relative to other countries. While Indonesia has sunk boats from Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam over the past few months, it held off on sinking ships from China until this week, despite seizing them and claiming that it would not be afraid to do so. (See: “Indonesia May Sink Chinese Vessels: Jokowi Adviser”). And as I noted in my previous piece, even when it did sink a Chinese vessel, the way it did so — by placing it among 41 vessels in line with a particular national occasion, rather than sinking the Chinese ship alone or in a smaller group — suggested that Jakarta was more cognizant about backlash in this case than it has been in others.