An important work of geopolitics was written 100 years ago.
One hundred years ago,
British writer and teacher James Fairgrieve (1870-1953) wrote Geography and
World Power, an important but mostly forgotten work on global geopolitics.
Written during the First World War, Fairgrieve’s book sought to “show how the
history of the world has been controlled by” geographical conditions.
Fairgrieve
was an intellectual disciple of the great British geopolitical thinker Sir
Halford Mackinder, and borrowed some of Mackinder’s concepts
in formulating his own geopolitical worldview. Fairgrieve factored into his
geopolitical analyses topography, location, climate, relative population
density, the distribution of energy, the ease or difficulty of movement, and
political and social organization.
Geography
and World Power traced the impact of geographical conditions on the course of history,
beginning with the desert, marsh and steppe lands of Egypt and Mesopotamia; to
the near and readily accessible regions of Palestine and Phoenicia; to Greece,
Carthage, and Rome; to the forest lands of Germany and Russia; to the great plain
of Eurasia from which nomadic tribes invaded the settled peoples of Europe; to
the lands of Arabia from which Mohammedans attempted to convert the known world
to Islam; to the age of exploration and the discovery of the New World; to the
African grasslands; to the Monsoon lands of China and India.
Four
years later, after the cataclysm of the First World War, Fairgrieve added an
important chapter to the book, “The Great Land Distributions: The World As It
Is.” Here he synthesized the geographical analyses of the 1915 edition and
looked beyond contemporary events to shed some light on the global geopolitics
of the future.
“Within
the last generation or two,” he wrote, “thanks largely to increased ease of
communication, the world has become a single system with no part really
independent of any other part.” The world consisted of two great land masses,
he wrote, “the Old World parallelogram and the Americas, set in a greater
ocean.” The Old World was home to three ancient settled civilizations –
European, Indian, and Chinese. The dominant geographical feature of the Old
World was the central “heartland” of “Euro-Asia,” which, Fairgrieve noted,
“occupies, from the very fact of its effective centrality and size, a unique
position in the world . . .”
Along the
periphery of Eurasia on Fairgrieve’s geopolitical map were the lands of the
“ocean border,” which included Britain, southern Europe, North Africa, the
Middle East, and the Far East. He also identified a “crush zone” of smaller
powers – Scandinavia, the Baltic States, southwest Asia and southeast Asia –
situated between the heartland and ocean powers.
Fairgrieve
identified three centers from which the Eurasian heartland could be politically
controlled by outside ocean powers: Germany, China, and India. “In touch with
the sea and tempted on to the ocean,” he wrote, “Germany is one of the sea
powers, while her situation on the western and most populous margin of the
great heartland makes her . . . a possible centre from which the heartland
might be organized.” Meanwhile, “the Chinese are yet in touch with the sea, and
reap advantages which they are ready to take from that position.” “[T]o an even
greater extent than Germany,” he continued, “China is in a position to dominate
the heartland . . .” “India,” Fairgrieve wrote, “is in an even more
extraordinary position.” “Nearest of the lands of the ocean border to the
margin of the heartland,” he continued, “it would be natural for India to take
a foremost place in dominating that heartland.”
Fairgrieve
pointed out that the “Old World system” he described shared the global stage
with the New World with the United States as the leading player there. He
expected that the U.S. would become “the seat of an ocean power, and play the
part on a vaster scale which Britain played in earlier times.” “Removed, but
not far removed by an ocean moat, from the direct effects of Old World strife,
with power of all kinds, material and economic and moral,” he wrote, “the
United States can claim to be arbiter in world disputes.”
Finally,
he noted that Japan, after defeating Russia in 1904-05, had become a modern
state and a world power whose ”influence is felt far beyond the island rim of
eastern Asia.”
The
world, he concluded, is a single economic system. The real problem of
geopolitics, he noted, is not how to live separately but how to live together.
He lamented the waste of lives and energy in the recently concluded world war,
and expressed the hope that an effective League of Nations might preserve the
peace.
Geography
and World Power did indeed shed some light on the future. A hundred years ago, at a
time when the United States was mostly looking inward, India was a colony of
the British Empire, and China was riven by domestic strife, Fairgrieve
accurately foresaw their geopolitical potential.
Francis
P. Sempa is the author of Geopolitics: From the Cold War to the 21st Century (Transaction
Books) and America’s Global Role: Essays and Reviews on National
Security, Geopolitics and War (University Press of America). He is also
a contributor to Population Decline and the Remaking of Great Power
Politics (Potomac Books). He has written on historical and
foreign policy topics for Joint Force Quarterly, American
Diplomacy, the University Bookman, The Claremont Review
of Books, The Diplomat, Strategic Review, the Washington
Times and other publications. He is an attorney, an adjunct professor
of political science at Wilkes University, and a contributing editor to American
Diplomacy.
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