Commentators hailed the judgment as a win–win, although it
might also be described as a lose–lose. Neither side obtained what they wanted.
Cambodia had sought to
redraw the boundary around the temple according to the colonial-era French map
known as the Annex 1 map. This map
had played a large part in the court awarding the temple to Cambodia in its
original 1962 judgement. But
this time the court decided the map could only be used to define the northern
edge of the temple area, not the boundaries to the east, west and south. These
boundaries would be decided by local geographic features and, where this was
insufficient, negotiations between the two parties.
Thailand had sought to deny
the relevancy of the Annex 1 map entirely, hoping to retain the boundaries it
had unilaterally demarcated following the 1962 decision. But the court ruled
that the location of Thailand’s barbed wire fence border around the temple was
inconsistent with its 1962 judgement, and called for it to remove the fence and
its forces.
One year on, what progress
has been made in implementing the court’s judgement?
On the surface, the answer
seems to be: very little. The court did not define a precise boundary in its
judgement, leaving it to the two parties to jointly determine ‘in good faith’.
But bilateral negotiations are yet to commence and no announcement has been
made as to when they will start.
Despite this, there have
been promising signs regarding the broader bilateral relationship. Most
recently, Thai Prime Minister General Prayuth’s visit to Cambodia in
October yielded some progress on tourism cooperation, including a MoU. And on
15 October, the Thai Ministry of Affairs advised that an international legal
advisory team had been assembled, a map drafted and the court judgement
translated.
Cambodia, for its part,
appears to be taking a relaxed approach to moving forward on the issue. After
Cambodian Defence Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Tea Banh visited Thailand
in July, a Thai spokesman said that Cambodia understood that the ‘political
situation in Thailand’ meant that the issue could not progress quickly.
A particularly positive
development was Cambodia’s release, on 1 July, of Thai nationalist protestor
Veera Somkwamkid. Veera had served three-and-a-half years of a six year
sentence for trespass and espionage, after he and other nationalists were
arrested at the temple in December 2010.
While Cambodia is proceeding
with tourist and hotel development on its side of the temple, border relations remain
uncertain. In early June, reports emerged that Thailand was building
a new fence at the site. These reports appear to have been false, with a Thai
spokesman suggesting that in the dry weather, trees shedding foliage had merely
revealed old barbed wire. In October, there were reports of shots fired in the
area that resulted in injuries, but a Thai military spokesman later denied that
there was a clash.
More worrisome is that the
issue remains political poison in Thailand, at least for politicians associated
with the ill-fated joint World Heritage registration of the temple in 2008,
which triggered the three year conflict.
Shortly after the 2013
judgement was announced, the former prime minister, Yingluck Shinawatra,
immediately stated that her government would not implement the judgement
without a parliamentary resolution. When baited by opposition leader Abhisit
Vejjajiva as to whether she would explain the loss of territory resulting from
the judgement to the Thai people, Yingluck denied that she had ever accepted
the court’s decision. Instead, Yingluck stated she had only said that she would
maintain order and relations with Cambodia.
Meanwhile, former foreign
minister Noppadol Pattama (who with former prime minister Samak Sundaravej
negotiated the ill-fated 2008 joint communiqué with Cambodia) continues to
fight off assaults on his reputation by politicians who allege he ‘gave Preah
Vihear to Cambodia’.
A Thai military government
may be better placed to move forward on a joint border demarcation with
Cambodia than an elected government. Civilian politicians of all persuasions
continue to be vulnerable to accusations that they are eroding Thai
sovereignty. These accusations fit the dominant narrative of Thai nationalist
history, which frames the loss of the Preah Vihear temple as a further episode
in a ‘wounded history’. In covering last year’s ‘win-win’ decision, one Thai newspaper
article included alongside its analysis a table detailing fourteen occasions in
Thai history where territory has been lost. The fourteenth was the loss of
Preah Vihear in 1962.
It is possible that this
uneasy modus vivendi could persist into the future, with both sides
content to eschew accurate border demarcation. This would allow Thai
governments to avoid the accusation of ceding territory and allow Cambodia to
proceed with developing the temple’s tourist potential.
Thai–Malaysian border
negotiations provide a precedent for this model. Although most of the border
between Thailand and Malaysia was agreed on between 1973 and 1986, one
intractable location at Bukit Jeli remains disputed. There both sides have
given up trying to determine sovereignty over 42 hectares, with one politician
dubbing the arrangement the ‘carbon sink solution’ because trees are allowed to
grow there. A similar pragmatic stance over the disputed Preah Vihear temple
could provide the best option for forestalling further conflict between Cambodia and
Thailand.
Greg Raymond is a PhD
candidate in the Politics Department, La Trobe University.
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