But, while it is a ‘stunning’
decision for some, a few points about the decision should be
clarified.
First, the
case was limited to only one plank of Japan’s social security and welfare
system — tax-funded public assistance for poverty relief (seikatsu hogo).
The reasoning does not apply to other areas such as unemployment insurance,
health or nursing insurance, age pension or child assistance.
Second, the
decision will not necessarily impact current practice. Foreigners with
permanent residence status are typically granted public assistance. Indeed, the
plaintiff in this case was granted public assistance in 2011 on her second
application.
Some have speculated that in light of fiscal and demographic pressures, local governments will
use the case to justify denying foreign residents poverty relief. But this
claim exaggerates the autonomy of local governments to deny benefits contrary
to central policy. Also, it has often been local governments that have taken
the lead in collaborating with non-profit organisations to meet the challenges
of an increasingly diverse society and address the legacies of past
discrimination. Examples include establishing language support for ‘new’ immigrants, ad hoc retirement
funding for ‘old’ foreigners who have not met the qualifying period for a
public retirement pension, and inclusionary approaches to local political participation.
Third, the
underlying constitutional issues were well settled. The principle that the
fundamental civil, political, social, and economic rights enshrined in the Japanese Constitution apply to foreigners was settled by
the Supreme Court in 1978. The caveat was that some rights may by their nature
only be applicable to Japanese nationals in certain contexts.
Differential
treatment of nationals per se is not objectionable in light of practice
elsewhere in the world: foreigners are usually (but not always) excluded from
the franchise and senior government positions, for example. In fact, the 1978
judgment went further than the historical record perhaps allows. According to Dower, the compound word kokumin as
the translation of ‘the people’ deliberately emphasises connection to nation —
one of the few victories of Japan’s immediate post-war conservative ruling
clique in their tussle with Occupation forces over the content of the new
constitution. On the other hand, an inclusionary approach better comports with
the universal values underpinning Japan’s ‘bill of rights’.
The Japanese
Supreme Court had developed an inclusive approach in relation to the general
law, for example, on negligence claims. This was also true for some welfare
cases, such as foreigner entitlements to benefits for victims of atomic bombs.
However, these turned out to be exceptions: in 1989, the Court found that the nationality
criterion in the Disability Welfare Act did not amount to unreasonable
discrimination, nor did it contravene the constitutional guarantee to a minimum
standard of living. The Tokyo High Court followed this position in 1997,
finding the nationality criterion in the Public Assistance Act constitutionally
valid (at least in relation to ‘unlawful’ immigrants). The Fukuoka High Court
had offered a more inclusive approach based on a wider historical and
international law-based argument. It observed that the process surrounding
ratification in 1981 of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention entailed removing
nationality as a criterion under most social security and welfare legislation.
The only reason the Public Assistance Act was left unamended was that a Diet committee
deemed that, given the practice of providing public assistance to foreigners in
need, no amendment was necessary to meet the requirements for ratification.
Unfortunately, on appeal the Supreme Court rejected the notion that this could
give rise to any implied rights on the part of foreign permanent residents.
Given the
hierarchical, bureaucratic structure of Japan’s judicial system, one should not be surprised that the application of
constitutional tests regarding fundamental rights and duties has not been
particularly progressive. The more likely avenue for inclusive welfare reform
is through internal and external pressure on lawmakers, although this is
perhaps less promising in the current climate of rising tensions linked to territorial disputes.
So where to
from here?
While still
relatively small, the percentage of residents in Japan that are of foreign
nationality has more than tripled over the past 30 years (from 0.68 per cent in
1982 to about 2 per cent in 2014). Given the projected decline of Japan’s
population, it is likely that this percentage will increase because immigration is seen by some policymakers and politicians as one means of replacing
retired workers. From a human rights perspective, and to smoothly integrate the
foreign population, Japanese lawmakers should grant firm welfare entitlements
to permanent residents regardless of nationality.
The case also
highlights the need for Japan to depart from its relatively strong adherence to
the jus sanguinis principle of nationality by blood and allow more
people to possess dual nationality, especially children born in Japan to
permanent resident foreign parents. Only with such moves can Japan stave off
criticism that its laws and social policies remain underpinned by notions of
racial purity once linked to the concept of nationality in a bygone era.
Trevor Ryan is
Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Business, Government and Law, University
of Canberra.
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