The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is becoming
increasingly significant in the world arena. Recent discourse has focused on
China’s naval ambitions in the IOR and potential US–India cooperation in
response to China’s presence. To some extent, the ‘China Factor’ is one
explanation behind the recent improvement of US–India relations, as both the US
and India are anxious about Chinese entry into IOR.
Particularly in India, many strategists are concerned about the imaginary
Chinese ‘string of pearls strategy’. However, an in-depth analysis of the three
countries’ strategic outlook could lead to a different conclusion
The perception of the ‘China threat’ mainly derives from a
fear of China’s different political system and its astonishing rise, both in
scale and speed. But when analysed in relation to intention, capability, or
aspiration, it is clear that the potential threat of China has always been
over-exaggerated. China’s strategic focus is the Pacific rather than the Indian
Ocean. It lags far behind the US in terms of maritime power and does not
enjoy India’s geographic advantages. More importantly, China has traditionally
had a peaceful maritime policy.
Even when China was a pre-eminent maritime power, it promoted peace and
commerce, as was clearly illustrated during the Ming Dynasty.
Today, China’s naval strategy is to ensure a ‘harmonious
sea’ through capacity building and international cooperation. China views the
region surrounding the Indian Ocean as a vital energy and trade route, not a
battlefield for power struggle. China’s seaward policy is strongly influenced
by trade and energy motives, and its open economy is becoming more
interdependent with the outside world, particularly the Indian Ocean. Chinese
involvement in building infrastructure in IOR littorals is part of China’s
economy-oriented ‘Going Global’ strategy.
Although it is frequently argued that
China should and must develop into becoming a strong maritime power, the
Chinese government has always emphasised that their maritime power is totally
different from Western-style maritime power. Many Chinese scholars even warn
against having a military presence in the IOR.
Nonetheless, the US and India have a history of having
different Indian Ocean strategies.
Although China’s presence will always promote US–India cooperation, the
democratic peace theory will not supersede realistic politics, and the
differing interests of the US and India in the IOR will be difficult to
reconcile. The US and India have had contradictory strategic policies regarding
the Indian Ocean since the Cold War era. In the 1960s, when the US wanted to
inherit Britain’s influence in IOR, India opposed the “theory of power vacuum”
and instead supported the idea of an ‘Indian Ocean Peace Zone’. During the 1971
Indo–Pakistan War, the US dispatched its Seventh Fleet into the Bay of Bengal,
causing great concern from the Indian side.
India’s view of the IOR can be summarised as a sense of
crisis and destiny. Regarding the sense of crisis, Indian politicians and
strategists pay great attention to the linkages between Indian Ocean and
India’s national security. India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru argued
that India’s independence and survival depended on India’s control of the
Indian Ocean. India’s Maritime Military Strategy (2007) highlighted that
‘whatever happens in the IOR can affect our national security and is of
interest to us’. As for destiny, India’s unique geographic location forms the
cornerstone of India’s aspiration to dominate Indian Ocean or even to transform
Indian Ocean into India’s Ocean. Many Indian strategists view the Indian Ocean
as India’s ‘rightful domain’ and contend that ‘India will have to play a very
large role (in the Indian Ocean) if the prospects for peace and cooperation are
to grow’.
In contrast, the US seeks to be a hegemonic maritime power
that is not only dominant in the Atlantic or Pacific, but also in the Indian
Ocean. Although it stresses the importance of a cooperative maritime strategy,
the US is still trying to maintain its status as a pre-eminent maritime power.
In accordance with the shift of the world power balance, the US will seek to
sustain its strong presence in the Indian Ocean. The US has taken many measures
to achieve this goal, including strengthening its presences in Diego Garcia and
Bahrain, updating its military cooperation with established allies, and setting
up forward military networks to control key choke points.
Thus, although confrontations and conflicts between China,
US and India have been predicted in this region, particularly with the rise of
China’s maritime power, their different strategic goals may lead to different
results. Given the China’s policy aims, intent and capability, China cannot
afford to challenge either the United States or India. But with the rapid
growth of its economic and military power, India is likely to adopt a more
assertive maritime presence in the Indian Ocean. Thus, considering that the US
wants to maintain its maritime dominance, an India–US potential power struggle
in the Indian Ocean is more likely to characterise the IOR landscape than the
‘China threat’. LOU Chunhao is the Assistant Director at the Institute of
Maritime Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations.
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