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Suharto: A Declassified
Documentary Obit
National
Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 242
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Washington,
DC, January 28, 2008
- As Indonesia buries the ex-dictator Suharto, who died Sunday at the
age of 86, the National Security Archive today posted a selection of
declassified U.S. documents detailing his record of repression and
corruption, and the long-standing U.S. support for his regime.
The documents include transcripts of meetings with Presidents Richard
M. Nixon, Gerald Ford and Ronald Reagan, as well as Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger, Vice-President Walter Mondale, then Vice-President George H. W.
Bush, and former Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke.
Additional documents detail U.S. perceptions of Suharto from the
earliest years of his violent rule, including the 1969 annexation of West
Papua, the 1975 invasion of East Timor, and the so-called “Mysterious
Killings” of 1983-1984.
“In death Suharto has escaped justice both in Indonesia and East
Timor,” said Brad Simpson, who
directs the Archive's Indonesia and East Timor Documentation Project. “But
these declassified documents, detailing the long record of U.S. support for
one of the twentieth century’s most brutal and corrupt men, will contribute
to our understanding both of Suharto’s rule and of the U.S. support which
helped make it possible."
Most of the documents posted today have been declassified as a result
of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests filed by the Archive, in
addition to documents unearthed in the National Archives (NARA) and
Presidential libraries.
In the coming weeks the Indonesia and East Timor Documentation Project
will be posting additional documents concerning the events leading up to
Suharto’s downfall in May 1998.
Read
the Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format. You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view. Initial Report on Suharto
National Intelligence Estimate
(NIE) 55-68, December 31, 1968
Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 165, NIE 55-68. Secret http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxvi/4436.htm
This National Intelligence Estimate prepared by the CIA at the end of
1968 offers a positive portrait of Suharto and the New Order regime he had
assembled following his ouster of Sukarno in March 1966 and consolidation of
control in the intervening months. Just 18 months after the bloody massacres
involving the murder of between 500,000 and one million alleged supporters of
the Indonesian Communist Party, the NIE states that “the Suharto government
provides Indonesia with a relatively moderate leadership.” The estimate
reports, “There is no force in Indonesia today that can effectively challenge
the army's position, notwithstanding the fact that the Suharto government
uses a fairly light hand in wielding the instruments of power. Over the next
three to five years, it is unlikely that any threat to the internal security
of Indonesia will develop that the military cannot contain; the
army--presumably led by Suharto--will almost certainly retain control of the
government during this period.”
Suharto's Meetings With U.S. Officials
National security adviser Henry Kissinger briefs President Nixon on
his upcoming visit to Indonesia and likely conversations with Indonesian
President Suharto. Kissinger argues that there is no U.S. interest in getting
involved in the issue of West Irian and that its people will choose
integration with Indonesia. In Nixon's talking points, Kissinger urges that
the President refrain from raising the issue except to note U.S. sympathy
with Indonesia's concerns.
Department of State, SECRET
Memorandum from Henry Kissinger for the President, Subject: Your Meeting
with President Suharto of Indonesia, May 26, 1970
Source: Richard M. Nixon Papers, Subject Numeric Files, 1970-1973, Box 2272
Suharto made his first visit as head of state to the U.S. in May 1970.
The trip came amidst a major crackdown on political parties in Indonesia
aimed at insuring the dominance of the Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups
(GOLKAR) and the Army in parliamentary elections scheduled for 1971, as well
as detailed revelations of pervasive corruption among government and military
officials including smuggling, bribery, kickbacks and nepotism. Privately the
U.S. Embassy in Jakarta warned that the corruption and authoritarianism of
the New Order would progressively undermine its rule even as it eliminated or
co-opted its opponents. Publicly, however, the White House fairly gushed over
the state of relations with Jakarta and the Suharto regime’s performance,
viewing the trip as a chance to strengthen its already cozy ties with the
Indonesian dictator (who must have been surprised to learn that he presided
over one of the “largest democratic countries in the world”). “There are
no issues between the U.S. and Indonesia,” Henry Kissinger wrote the
President approvingly, “and relations are excellent.” Suharto was offering to
help support the U.S.-backed Lon Nol government in Cambodia, the regime
continued to welcome American investors and pursue a “pragmatic” five year
development plan, and Indonesia was increasingly identifying with U.S.
regional goals as the Administration began its inexorable drawdown in South
Vietnam. “What Suharto has done and is doing accords perfectly with your
concept of Asian responsibilities under the Nixon Doctrine,” the national
security advisor observed.
Memorandum of Conversation,
President Suharto of Indonesia, The President, Dr. Kissinger, May 26, 1970
Source: Richard M. Nixon Papers, Subject Numeric Files, 1970-1973, Box 2272
In his meeting with President Nixon, Suharto frankly admits to having
“nullified the strength” of the Indonesian Communist Party, an apparent
reference to the mass killings of alleged PKI members, and states that “tens
of thousands” of its members “have been interrogated and placed in
detention.” President Nixon largely confines himself to questions
and supportive statements concerning U.S. support for the Suharto regime.
Over the course of Suharto’s two-day visit, the White House reassures
Indonesian officials of their continued commitment to Southeast Asia and
pledges to increase military aid to $18 million to enable Indonesia to
purchase 15,000 M-16 rifles to replace the AK-47s it is covertly sending to
Cambodia to assist the Lon Nol government which recently overthrew the
government of Prince Sihanouk.
Memorandum of Conversation between President Ford,
President Suharto, Dr. Kissinger, et al., July
5, 1975
Source: Gerald R. Ford Library, National Security Adviser Memoranda of Conversations, Box 13, July 5, 1965 - Ford, Kissinger, Indonesian President Suharto This document records a conversation between Suharto and Ford at Camp David on July 5, 1975, five months before the invasion of East Timor. Speaking only a few months after the collapse of the Thieu regime in South Vietnam, the two presidents shared a tour d'horizon of East Asian political issues, U.S. military assistance to Indonesia, international investment, and Portuguese decolonization. Suharto brought up the question of Portuguese decolonization in East Timor proclaiming his support for “self-determination” but also dismissing independence as unviable: “So the only way is to integrate [East Timor] into Indonesia.” Ford gives no response.
U.S. Embassy Jakarta Telegram 1579 to Secretary State, December 6, 1975 [Text of Ford-Kissinger-Suharto
Discussion]
Source: Gerald R. Ford Library, Kissinger-Scowcroft Temporary Parallel File, Box A3, Country File, Far East-Indonesia, State Department Telegrams 4/1/75-9/22/76
On the eve of Indonesia’s full-scale invasion of East Timor, President
Ford and Secretary Kissinger stopped in Jakarta en route from China where
they had just met with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. For more than a year the
U.S. had known that Indonesia was planning to forcibly annex East Timor,
having followed intelligence reports of armed attacks by Indonesian forces
for nearly two months. Thus, Ford or Kissinger could not have been too
surprised when, in the middle of a discussion of guerrilla movements in
Thailand and Malaysia, Suharto suddenly brought up East Timor. “We want your
understanding,” Suharto stated, “if we deem it necessary to take rapid or
drastic action.”
Ford and Kissinger took great pains to assure Suharto that they would
not oppose the invasion. Ford was unambiguous: “We will understand and will
not press you on the issue. We understand the problem and the intentions you
have.” Kissinger did indeed stress that “the use of US-made arms could create
problems,” but then added that, “It depends on how we construe it; whether it
is in self defense or is a foreign operation.” Thus, Kissinger’s concern was
not about whether U.S. arms would be used offensively—and hence illegally—but
whether the act would actually be interpreted as such—a process he
clearly intended to manipulate. In any case, Kissinger added: “It is
important that whatever you do succeeds quickly.”
U.S. Embassy Telegram 4890 from Jakarta to Secretary of
State, "Meeting with Suharto," April 18, 1977
Source: Freedom of Information Act request
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke’s visit to Jakarta in
April 1977 and his lengthy meeting with President Suharto was the first by a
high-ranking Carter Administration official. The visit occurred during
the run-up to tightly-controlled Presidential and parliamentary elections in
which hundreds of Suharto opponents had been arrested and critical newspapers
shuttered. It thus represented, in the words of the U.S. Embassy, an
“unusual opportunity” to advance concerns about human rights and democracy
more generally - had that been Holbrooke’s intention. In his meeting
with Suharto, however, the Assistant Secretary offered no criticism of
Indonesia’s human rights record while “acknowledging efforts President
Suharto appeared to be making to resolve Indonesian problems,” especially
on East Timor, where he “applauded” the President’s judgment in
allowing Congressional members to visit the territory but remained mute on
reports of ongoing atrocities. Suharto responded that Indonesia did
“not seek to hide anything” in East Timor – at a time when journalists and
relief organizations were banned and visitors allowed only under military
escort.
Memorandum for the President from the Vice President,
"Visit to the Pacific," April 26, 1978
Source: NSA Staff Materials, Far East Files, Box 7, Carter Library
From May 9 to May 10, 1978,Vice President Walter Mondale visited
Indonesia as part of a larger regional visit and the Carter Administration's
initiative to "deepen relations" with the Suharto regime. This Memo
for President Carter requested his approval for Mondale's policy goals for
the trip, including the expedited delivery of sixteen A-4 fighter jets to
Indonesia, which was then preparing for a massive campaign of aerial
bombardment of East Timor in an effort to crush armed resistance to its
occupation of the territory. Mondale's briefing memo makes no mention of East
Timor.
Telegram 12521 from Document: Telegram 6076 from
Jakarta to State, "Summary of Vice President's Meeting with
Suharto," May 10, 1978
Source: Freedom of Information Act request
In a May 10 meeting with Indonesian President Suharto, Mondale noted
that Indonesia's 1977 release of thousands of political detainees had
"helped create a favorable climate of opinion in the Congress" for
expanded American arms sales. He suggested to Suharto that releasing
prisoners more regularly would further improve public opinion and deflect
criticism - a suggestion the regime later implemented. The Vice President
likewise noted the two nations' "mutual concerns regarding East
Timor," in particular "how to handle public relations aspects of
the problem." As with the problem of political detainees, Mondale
suggested that allowing humanitarian groups such as Catholic Relief Services
access to East Timor would not only help refugees in the area (overwhelmingly
generated by Indonesian military operations) but "have a beneficial impact
on U.S. public opinion."
Issues and Objectives for the
Suharto Visit, Undated
Memo from Kenneth Dam for the President, Subject: Your Meeting with Suharto, October 1, 1982 Summary of the President's Plenary Session with President Suharto of the Republic of Indonesia, October 12, 1982 Source: Freedom of Information Act request
In October 1982 Suharto came to the U.S. on an official state visit,
the highest honor accorded visiting dignitaries. The briefing papers
and summary of Suharto’s plenary session with President Reagan are most
notable for what they do not contain – a single mention of human rights in
Indonesia or East Timor. The visit offers striking reminder of the
degree to which the Reagan Administration abandoned any high level concern
about human rights in Indonesia through the 1980s.
Telegram 14397 from U.S. Embassy Jakarta to State
Department, Subject: [Deleted] views on East Timor developments, September 9, 1983
Telegram 15303 from U.S. Embassy Jakarta to State Department, Subject: Current Developments in East Timor, September 23, 1983 Source: Freedom of Information Act request
In August 1983 East Timorese guerrillas attacked Indonesian military
forces at the airport in Dili, killing 18 soldiers. In response to the
attack, and as part of a larger military offensive involving 10,000-12,000
troops, Indonesian soldiers carried out several large massacres: of 200-300
civilians near the town of Viqueque, and at least 500 civilians in villages
near Mount Bibileu. These two lengthy cables describe those operations and
the breakdown of the ceasefire which preceded it, and fits a persistent
pattern lasting from 1975 to 1999 in which U.S. Embassy officials expressed
skepticism over the scale or even the existence of Indonesian atrocities in
East Timor. In the second cable, the embassy officer repeats the claim,
apparently from an Indonesian source (whose identity is excised), of several
hundred killed near Viqueque.
Telegram 08201 from American Embassy Jakarta to State
Department, Vice-President's Meeting with Soeharto, May 12, 1984
Source: Freedom of Information Act request
In May, 1984 Vice President George H. W. Bush visited Indonesia as
part of a longer trip that included stops in Japan and South Asia. The
briefing papers prepared for Vice President Bush highlight the continued
focus on commercial and security relations over considerations of human
rights. In 1984 the U.S. provided $45 million in credits for foreign
military sales (FMS) and $2.5 million in International Military and
Educational Training (IMET), “our second largest IMET program
worldwide.” Vice-President Bush’s political scene setter notes that
“political activity in Indonesia is tightly controlled,” with “no organized
political activity” between national elections and opposition forces
“dispirited and incapable for the foreseeable future of mounting a direct
challenge to his power.”
Vice President Bush’s visit came on the heels of a major Indonesian
military offensive in East Timor in which hundreds of civilians were
massacred and in the midst of a period of severe repression in Indonesia
punctuated by “a government-organized campaign of summary killings of alleged
violent criminals” known as the “mysterious killings,” which began in late
1982 and continued through 1984. The U.S. Embassy in Jakarta estimated
that the government had summarily executed about 4,000 people, with continued
killings reported.
In his meeting with Suharto, however, Bush, like Reagan and previous
high-ranking U.S. officials, offered nothing but praise for the dictator,
assuring him that “our relations with Indonesia are most significant and that
we derived great satisfaction from our relations with Jakarta.” As with
Suharto’s 1982 visit to the U.S., there was no mention of human rights, and
discussion focused largely on U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and China.
Suharto and Corruption
Memo from David Gunning from Peter Flanning,
Weyerhauser Company – Indonesia Problems,
December 5, 1972
Source: Nixon White House Central Files, Subject File, Country File Indonesia, Box 37
U.S. officials were aware from the start of the deeply entrenched
corruption of the Suharto regime. This memorandum outlines the sort of
protection rackets the Suharto regime offered to foreign investors as the
cost of doing business in Indonesia. It details an arrangement that the
Weyerhaeuser Company (one of the world’s largest timber companies) made with
the Army for a timber concession in Borneo, offering the Army “a 35% interest
in the concession at no cost in order to insure government
cooperation.” Weyerhaeuser officials express concern that “this
arrangement has not provided the protection which was expected” and that
“disconnected actions by disparate army officers and civil servants” in
addition to the Army’s rake-off are threatening the company’s profitable
operations.
Embassy Jakarta Telegram 12910 to Secretary of State,
Indonesian Miracle Beclouded: Proposal for Action at IGGI, December 14, 1972
Source: Lot File 76D446, Box 12, National Archives
This lengthy telegram describes the mounting concern with corruption
voiced by the Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), a donor consortium
established in 1967 to coordinate foreign aid to Indonesia. It describes
“increased, though fragmentary information of widespread and growing
corruption” and “the consensus of all informed observers that scale is large
and growing, that it involves highest echelons in government, and that this
in turn is causing it to spread and deepen in all branches of social and
economic life.”
Memo from Carleton Brower to the Ambassador, What
Happened While You Were Away, August 10, 1973
Source: Lot File 76D446, Box 12, National Archives
Memorandum from Ted Heavner to Mr. Hummel, Suharto's
Involvement in Timber Concessions, September 7, 1973
Source: Lot File 76D446, Box 12, National Archives
These two memos describe Suharto’s personal intervention in a timber
concession in Kalimantan being sought after by the International Paper
Company. The head of IPC stated that “the matter was of the most extreme
sensitivity; that Suharto would brook no interference.” The second memo
describes how, after complex notions involving IPC and the Indonesian
government, “Suharto and his people were talking over the entire concession
for their own profit.”
In unusually blunt language, the memo describes Suharto’s purported
plan: “three dummy corporations, one headed by his half-brother, one by his
son, and one by the notorious Bob Hasan group, will reportedly exploit the
concession. The memos seem to show that Suharto and his colleagues in this
enterprise are totally uninterested in proper timber management or
development of a wood processing industry and are intending only to rape the
concession for maximum short term profit.” [Note: The memos summarized by
these documents were not included in the lot file box at the U.S. National
Archives.]
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