Shwe Mann
Shwe Mann’s departure suggests military leaders are setting strict
limits on reforms
The sudden removal of one
of Myanmar’s most powerful men sent has shockwaves through the diplomatic
community in the old capital of Yangon, where foreign embassies are still
located.
It seemed
more like a midnight coup than an ordinary leadership reshuffle – security
forces in the new capital, Naypyidaw, entered the headquarters of the de
facto ruling party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party, or USDP,
late August 12. The following day, it was announced that Shwe Mann, the speaker
of the Lower House of Myanmar’s bicameral parliament, a former general and
anticipated by some foreign observers to be the country’s next president, had
been ousted.
Despite
the drama, his removal reconfirmed the widely held belief that the country’s
military is not about to relinquish real power. The power shift in Naypyidaw is
also unlikely to change the big powers’ attitudes towards the military in
Myanmar.
Parliamentary
elections are scheduled for Nov. 8. Early next year, an electoral college
consisting of elected parliamentarians along with army officers will select the
head of state. After decades under solid military rule, Myanmar is supposedly
edging towards a more democratic order. For many Western pundits, Shwe Mann was
the favorite for the post, regarded as a “bridge” between the junta that had
ruled the country until elections were held in November 2010 and the
quasi-civilian government that took over in March 2011 as well as the
democratic forces headed by the main opposition leader, Nobel Peace Prize
laureate Aung San Suu Kyi.
Before
becoming parliamentary speaker, Shwe Mann was considered the third most
powerful man in the then-ruling junta. As a nominally civilian parliamentarian,
he was often seen with Aung San Suu Kyi and began speaking in favor of reforms
aimed at limiting the power of the military. Myanmar’s constitution was drafted
under military supervision and adopted in 2008 after a referendum dismissed by
most observers as fraudulent.
Under the
constitution, the military holds 25 percent of all seats in the parliament and
regional assemblies. Since major changes in the constitution’s clauses require
75 percent approval, the military enjoys what amounts to veto power over any
major changes in the country’s power structure.
Precisely
what had made Shwe Mann popular among foreign diplomats, academics and think
tanks became, in effect, the cause for his fall. A number of political reforms
and seemingly liberal initiatives were introduced after the new government took
over in 2011 such as the release of political prisoners, more press freedom,
and the right of political parties to operate openly.
Such
steps were not taken because the military had little intention of giving up
power. The strategy was to remain in power and, at the same time, improve the
country’s image and its strained relations with the West, which had imposed
sanctions on the junta for its abysmal human-rights record. During that time, Myanmar
had become heavily dependent on China. Internal military documents dated as far
back as 2004 suggested that the country was losing its independence to its
powerful northern neighbor.
The
solution was simple: make some reforms – and the West would reciprocate by
welcoming Myanmar back into the international community.
The
United States in particular viewed the spread of Chinese influence in Myanmar
with increasing concern. The reforms provided an opportunity for Washington to
normalize relations with Naypyidaw. At the end of November 2011, then–Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton traveled to the nation, the first top-level US visit
in half a century. A year later, President Barack Obama traveled to Myanmar. In
May 2013, Thein Sein, became the first Myanmar president to visit the United
States since 1966. Relations were on track as Myanmar distanced itself from
China. The US was no doubt pleased.
Before
long, it became increasingly clear that Myanmar was not undergoing an organic
democratic transition from military dictatorship to elected civilian rule.
Newspapers and magazines were not closed, but critical journalists and editors
were charged with “libel,” “defamation” and even “trespassing.” Student
activists and people protesting against land seizures were thrown into jail.
Some parliamentarians sought to change the constitution, but the military
intervened to prevent that from happening.
Just
before his second visit to Myanmar in November 2014, Obama said that Myanmar’s
transition from military rule had not been as fast as hoped, and the government
was “backsliding” on some reforms. Observers began to question whether Myanmar
was really “backsliding” – or if the initiatives towards more openness were
limited from the start.
Shwe
Mann, evidently, stepped out of line by trying to go further. Long-time Myanmar
observers see striking similarities between his ouster and a 2004 purge that
saw the fall from grace of then prime minister and once powerful former
intelligence chief Khin Nyunt. He was also a maverick. Like Shwe Mann, he
amassed enormous political and economic power for himself and his family. Shwe
Mann’s two sons, Aung Thet Mann and Toe Naing Mann, are prominent businessmen
involved in numerous deals that certainly will come under scrutiny.
And one cannot
help but wonder if Shwe Mann is really a “closet liberal” or an opportunist
who, in the end, bet on the wrong horse by fraternizing with Aung San Suu Kyi?
In the late 1980s, he saw combat against Karen rebels along Myanmar’s eastern
border, earning the honorific title thura, or brave hero. A cable from the
US embassy in Yangon dated March 15, 2007, made public by WikiLeaks, stated
that he had “utilized civilian porters, including women and children, on a
massive scale during operations against Karen insurgents.”
The
cable’s headline read “Shwe Mann: Burma’s Dictator-in-Waiting,” and outlined
his military career. He was also allegedly involved in the crushing of the 2007
so-called Saffron Revolution, a democracy movement led by Buddhist monks. In
November 2008, Shwe Mann led a secret military delegation to North Korea, where
he signed a memorandum of understanding on military cooperation. He visited an
air base, a missile factory and other defense industries near Pyongyang.
During
his time in the army, Shwe Mann was a loyal officer, showing no sign of
dissent. Ironically, he led the purge against Khin Nyunt and his henchmen in
2004. Now Shwe Mann’s own followers in the USDP and elsewhere may face the same
fate as the former intelligence chief’s. Apart from being parliamentary
speaker, Shwe Mann also led the USDP, a post now held by Htay Oo, a former
major general close to Thein Sein who, in turn, has the backing of the
military. The party’s General Secretary Maung Maung Thein and other Shwe Mann
loyalists have also been removed. A “rejuvenated” USDP is poised to
contest the November election.
These
internal purges are unlikely to have much impact on Myanmar’s foreign
relations. Washington may grumble, but no one there wants to push Myanmar back
into China’s embrace, and China is pragmatic enough to adjust to the new
realities so as not to jeopardize its fragile relations with Naypyidaw. Of
special importance are gas and oil pipelines that China has built from the Bay
of Bengal through Myanmar to the southern Chinese province of Yunnan. In July,
Naypyidaw ratified the agreement to set up the China-led Asia Infrastructure
and Investment Bank, a relationship that China won’t upset by interfering with
an internal power struggle in Myanmar.
If anyone
had doubts, it’s clear that the military still calls the shots in Myanmar.
Bertil Lintner wrote this for YaleGlobal, the website of the Yale University Center
for the Study of Globalization. He is a former correspondent with the Far
Eastern Economic Review and author of several books on Burma/Myanmar. He is
currently a writer with Asia Pacific Media Services.
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